Recommended immediate mitigation options

1. Disable the plugin until a patched release is available.
2. If plugin must remain active, limit who can use the plugin or create footnotes:
   • Use role and capability management to revoke the plugin’s custom capabilities from Author role.
   • Temporarily change plugin settings or remove UI for authors; make only admins able to create/edit footnotes.
3. Set up a WAF or enable rules to block requests with obvious XSS payload indicators targeting plugin endpoints (examples follow).
4. Sanitize existing stored content:
   • Replace/strip script tags from stored footnotes (manual db cleanup).
   • Use wp_kses to retain harmless tags and strip event attributes and scripts.

Developer guidance — how to fix the plugin (for plugin authors or maintainers)

If you maintain or can patch the plugin, implement the following server‑side fixes immediately.

1. Sanitize on input and escape on output — both are required.

Sanitize when saving:

 &$attrs ) {
    if ( is_array( $attrs ) ) {
        $attrs = array_diff( $attrs, array_filter( $attrs, function( $a ) { return strpos( $a, 'on' ) === 0; } ) );
    }
}
$clean = wp_kses( $_POST['footnote_content'], $allowed_tags );
update_post_meta( $post_id, 'jquery_hover_footnote', $clean );
?>

Escape on output:

2. Use capability checks and nonces for any admin AJAX endpoints

3. Avoid storing unfiltered HTML from untrusted roles

If Authors must add footnotes, restrict allowed HTML to a minimal safe subset using wp_kses with a strict allowed tags array.

4. For WYSIWYG editors sanitize server side after editor submits content

Client‑side sanitization alone is insufficient.

5. Consider an option to allow only administrators to add raw HTML

Authors are restricted to plaintext input where possible.

Example hardening code for theme/plugin authors

 array( 'href' => true, 'title' => true, 'rel' => true ),
        'strong' => array(),
        'em' => array(),
        'b' => array(),
        'i' => array(),
        'br' => array(),
        'p' => array(),
        'ul' => array(),
        'ol' => array(),
        'li' => array(),
        'span' => array( 'class' => true ),
    );
    // Strip dangerous attributes like onerror/onload
    return wp_kses( $content, $allowed );
}

add_action( 'save_post', function( $post_id, $post, $update ) {
    if ( defined( 'DOING_AUTOSAVE' ) && DOING_AUTOSAVE ) return;
    if ( ! current_user_can( 'edit_post', $post_id ) ) return;
    if ( isset( $_POST['jquery_hover_footnote'] ) ) {
        $clean = hk_sanitize_footnote_content( $_POST['jquery_hover_footnote'] );
        update_post_meta( $post_id, 'jquery_hover_footnote', $clean );
    }
}, 10, 3 );
?>

WAF / Virtual patch rules and examples

If a vendor patch is not yet available and you need to protect live traffic, virtual patching via a WAF is a practical stopgap. Below are example rule concepts; adapt to your WAF syntax (ModSecurity, Nginx + Lua, Cloud WAF, plugin WAF, etc.).

Important: WAF rules must be tested in blocking mode on staging first to avoid false positives.

# Block POSTs that include 
			
				
			
					

							
			
			
			





		

		
					
				 
 
   
 
  
 
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