| 插件名称 | WP职位门户 |
|---|---|
| 漏洞类型 | SQL 注入 |
| CVE 编号 | CVE-2024-11714 |
| 紧急程度 | 高 |
| CVE 发布日期 | 2026-02-03 |
| 来源网址 | CVE-2024-11714 |
Urgent: SQL Injection in WP Job Portal (<= 2.2.2) — What WordPress Site Owners Must Do Now
Date: 3 February 2026 — CVE-2024-11714
As a Hong Kong security practitioner with hands-on incident response experience, I’m issuing a concise, actionable advisory for operators of WordPress sites using the WP Job Portal plugin (versions <= 2.2.2). This vulnerability allows SQL injection via the plugin function getFieldsForVisibleCombobox(). Exploitation requires an authenticated administrator, but the operational risk is still material: stolen or reused admin credentials, insider abuse, or chained vulnerabilities can convert this into a full-blown compromise.
Quick summary — the essentials
- Affected software: WP Job Portal plugin, versions <= 2.2.2
- Vulnerability type: SQL Injection in
getFieldsForVisibleCombobox() - CVE: CVE-2024-11714
- 所需权限:管理员(经过身份验证)
- Fixed in: 2.2.3 — upgrade immediately
- CVSS (reported): 7.6 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L)
Why you should care: an admin-capable SQL injection can be used to read or modify database content (users, emails, API keys, options), create persistent backdoors, or enable later remote code execution when combined with other flaws. The path to exploitation often begins with credential theft or misuse of legitimate admin access.
Technical description — how the vulnerability is triggered
The root cause is construction of SQL queries using untrusted input without parameterization or sufficient validation. The vulnerable pattern is a dynamic SQL string built from request parameters, for example:
// Vulnerable pattern (example)
$comboboxValue = $_REQUEST['value'];
$sql = "SELECT field_value FROM {$wpdb->prefix}job_fields WHERE id IN ($comboboxValue)";
$results = $wpdb->get_results($sql);
如果 $comboboxValue contains SQL meta-characters or payloads (commas, quotes, UNION, –, etc.), an attacker with admin access can inject SQL such as 1); DROP TABLE wp_users; -- 或 1 UNION SELECT user_pass FROM wp_users WHERE ID=1 --.
Common exploitation path:
- Attacker obtains an admin login (phishing, reused password, insider, etc.).
- Attacker triggers the plugin’s admin UI element that invokes
getFieldsForVisibleCombobox()or its AJAX handler. - Malicious input containing SQL payloads is submitted to the vulnerable endpoint and executed against the database.
Why this is serious despite requiring admin privileges
- Admin credentials are regularly compromised via phishing and credential reuse.
- Insider threat: contractors or staff with admin rights may act maliciously or negligently.
- Privilege escalation: lower-privileged accounts can be combined with other bugs to reach admin level.
- Impact is high: attacker can read sensitive data, create admin accounts, or plant backdoors that persist after remediation.
Immediate steps (priority actions)
- 升级 the WP Job Portal plugin to version 2.2.3 immediately. This is the complete fix.
- If you cannot upgrade immediately, deactivate the plugin to prevent the vulnerable code path from executing.
- Rotate administrator passwords and any exposed API credentials. Assume admin access may be compromised until proven otherwise. Require strong, unique passwords and enforce MFA for all admin users.
- Audit admin accounts: remove unnecessary or suspicious users; eliminate shared admin accounts.
- Review logs for suspicious admin activity: new users, unexpected plugin changes, or admin AJAX requests to the vulnerable action.
- Apply temporary mitigations such as blocking the vulnerable AJAX action or filtering suspicious SQL patterns at the edge (virtual patching) while planning the upgrade. See generic rule examples below.
- If you suspect a breach, follow incident response steps: contain, preserve forensic evidence, analyze, eradicate, and recover.
Temporary blocking rules (generic / WAF-agnostic examples)
Below are suggested rule concepts you can implement in your edge filtering, web application firewall, or reverse proxy. Test these on staging before deployment — avoid false positives that break admin workflows.
Rule A — Block the specific AJAX action
Match requests to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php where parameter (POST or GET) action == getFieldsForVisibleCombobox
Block / return 403
Rule B — Block AJAX requests containing SQL meta-characters in numeric-list parameters
Match requests to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php where request argument values contain patterns: ' or " or union or select or insert or delete or drop or -- or ;
Block / return 403
Rule C — Enforce admin-origin checks
Require a valid WordPress referrer header or a recognizable nonce parameter pattern for admin AJAX requests. Block requests that lack expected admin-origin markers.
Rule D — Throttle admin-area POSTs from unexpected IPs
对POST请求进行速率限制到 /wp-admin that originate from unlisted IPs to reduce blast radius for credential misuse.
These measures are stop-gaps: they can reduce exploitation risk while you apply the proper plugin update.
Secure coding guidance — how to fix the vulnerable handler
If you maintain a fork or need to patch custom code, follow these secure coding practices:
- Do not concatenate untrusted input into SQL strings. Use
$wpdb->prepare()with appropriate placeholders. - Validate and sanitize inputs. If expecting numeric ID lists, parse and cast each element to integer.
- Enforce capability checks (e.g.
current_user_can('manage_options')) and verify nonces on AJAX handlers.
Example safe rewrite for a numeric ID list (illustrative):
<?php
function get_fields_for_visible_combobox() {
if ( ! current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) {
wp_send_json_error( 'Insufficient permissions' );
}
// Verify nonce (assuming one is sent)
if ( ! isset( $_POST['wpjp_nonce'] ) || ! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['wpjp_nonce'], 'wpjp_admin' ) ) {
wp_send_json_error( 'Invalid nonce' );
}
if ( empty( $_POST['ids'] ) ) {
wp_send_json_error( 'No ids provided' );
}
// Split IDs and cast each to integer (whitelisting numeric-only)
$ids_raw = explode( ',', wp_unslash( $_POST['ids'] ) );
$ids = array();
foreach ( $ids_raw as $id ) {
$id = intval( $id );
if ( $id > 0 ) {
$ids[] = $id;
}
}
if ( empty( $ids ) ) {
wp_send_json_error( 'No valid ids provided' );
}
global $wpdb;
// Build placeholder list for prepared statement
$placeholders = implode( ',', array_fill( 0, count( $ids ), '%d' ) );
$sql = $wpdb->prepare(
"SELECT field_value FROM {$wpdb->prefix}job_fields WHERE id IN ($placeholders)",
$ids
);
$results = $wpdb->get_results( $sql );
wp_send_json_success( $results );
}
?>
Key points: validate capability and nonce, cast IDs to integers, and use prepared statements with typed placeholders.
Detection and threat hunting — what to look for
When auditing or hunting for abuse related to this disclosure, focus on these artefacts:
- Database anomalies: unexpected SELECTs on
wp_options或wp_users, large dumps or unusual joins. - Admin access logs: logins from unusual IPs, logins at odd times, or multiple failed/successful attempts followed by admin actions.
- Web server logs: calls to
/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php与action=getFieldsForVisibleComboboxor other suspicious action parameters. - Filesystem changes: newly modified plugin files, unknown PHP files under
wp-content, or unexpected cron jobs. - Application errors: SQL errors, stack traces, or anomalous debug entries.
- Outbound connections: unusual network traffic that may indicate data exfiltration.
Helpful commands and queries (examples):
# Search webserver logs for suspicious AJAX calls
grep "admin-ajax.php" /var/log/apache2/access.log | grep "getFieldsForVisibleCombobox"
# Query DB for recently created admin users
SELECT ID, user_login, user_email, user_registered
FROM wp_users
WHERE ID IN (
SELECT user_id FROM wp_usermeta
WHERE meta_key = 'wp_capabilities' AND meta_value LIKE '%administrator%'
)
ORDER BY user_registered DESC;
If you find indications of compromise, preserve logs and take snapshots for forensic analysis before making destructive changes.
Incident response playbook (high level)
- 控制
- Upgrade the plugin to 2.2.3 or deactivate the plugin immediately.
- Rotate admin passwords, revoke API keys, and consider rotating database credentials if unauthorized access is suspected.
- 保留
- Take disk and database snapshots and preserve logs for forensics.
- Avoid overwriting evidence until you’ve captured what you need for analysis.
- 分析
- Reconstruct the timeline: first suspicious access, queries executed, and data accessed or modified.
- Look for new admin users, modified files, and unexpected scheduled tasks.
- 根除
- Remove malicious code/backdoors, delete unauthorized accounts, and ensure the plugin is patched.
- 恢复
- Restore from clean backups if necessary, reissue credentials, and monitor closely for re-infection.
- 事件后
- Perform root cause analysis and strengthen controls: MFA, least privilege, monitoring, and secure development practices.
长期加固和预防
- Principle of least privilege: limit administrator accounts to only those who genuinely need them.
- Enforce multi-factor authentication for all admin users.
- Strong password policies and use of password managers.
- Restrict admin access by IP or require VPN access for administrative tasks where practical.
- 保持插件和主题更新;删除未使用的插件。.
- Schedule code reviews and security testing for custom plugins.
- Maintain frequent, tested offsite backups and rotate backup credentials.
- Enable activity logging, file integrity monitoring, and database auditing where possible.
- Use edge filtering or WAFs to provide virtual patching when immediate updates are not possible (implement carefully to avoid blocking legitimate admin traffic).
Example detection rule for logs/monitoring
Detect admin-ajax calls containing SQL meta-characters:
Pattern: POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php.*action=getFieldsForVisibleCombobox.*(union|select|drop|insert|delete|--|;|')
Action: create high-priority alert and escalate to security operations for immediate review.
Prioritisation advice for multiple sites
If you manage many WordPress instances, prioritise patching for sites that hold PII, process payments, or host many user accounts. Sites serving sensitive content or enterprise clients should be first in the upgrade queue. For multi-tenant operations, schedule coordinated updates and apply temporary edge filters until all instances are patched.
Developer checklist — immediate code review tasks
- Find all SQL built from request parameters and replace concatenation with prepared statements.
- Review every admin-facing AJAX endpoint: ensure capability checks and nonce verification exist and are enforced.
- Validate parameter types and implement whitelist checks where applicable.
- Add unit and integration tests that simulate malicious input for AJAX handlers.
- Document secure coding patterns and require security checks during code review.
Virtual patching approach (recommended steps)
When immediate plugin upgrades are impractical, apply a layered mitigation strategy:
- Block the specific AJAX action name associated with the vulnerability.
- Block or filter admin AJAX requests containing SQL metacharacters or suspicious patterns.
- Rate-limit or throttle admin-area POST actions originating from untrusted IPs.
- Monitor admin login behaviour and alert on anomalies.
These are temporary controls to reduce risk until the plugin is upgraded.
Final thoughts — treat “admin-only” as high-risk
Do not dismiss vulnerabilities that require administrator privileges. Admin accounts are a frequent attack vector through phishing, credential reuse, and insider threat. A single SQL injection reachable by an admin can expose sensitive data and lead to persistent compromise.
Action plan recap:
- Upgrade WP Job Portal to 2.2.3 immediately (or deactivate the plugin).
- 轮换管理员凭据并为所有管理员用户启用MFA。.
- Implement temporary edge/WAF filters blocking the vulnerable AJAX action and suspicious SQL payloads.
- Audit logs and database for signs of compromise and follow the incident response playbook if necessary.
- Harden admin access, enforce least privilege, and maintain backups and monitoring.
If you need hands-on incident response or code review assistance, engage a trusted security professional or team experienced in WordPress incident handling. Given the nature of this vulnerability, prompt action is important — prioritize patching and careful log review today.
— 香港安全专家