| 插件名称 | Wp 图表生成器 |
|---|---|
| 漏洞类型 | 认证存储型 XSS |
| CVE 编号 | CVE-2025-8685 |
| 紧急程度 | 低 |
| CVE 发布日期 | 2025-08-11 |
| 来源网址 | CVE-2025-8685 |
漏洞公告:WP 图表生成器 (≤ 1.0.4) — 经过身份验证的贡献者通过 [wpchart] 短代码存储的 XSS (CVE‑2025‑8685)
执行摘要
本公告描述了“WP 图表生成器”WordPress 插件(版本 ≤ 1.0.4)中的存储跨站脚本(XSS)漏洞,跟踪编号为 CVE‑2025‑8685。具有贡献者权限(或更高)的经过身份验证的用户可以通过插件的 [wpchart] 短代码存储恶意负载。由于负载是持久的,查看受影响页面的访客可能会在其浏览器中执行攻击者控制的 JavaScript。.
在报告的披露中,严重性被认为是低到中等(CVSS 向量 ~6.5),因为利用需要经过身份验证的贡献者账户。发布时没有官方供应商补丁。本公告提供了技术细节、检测方法、短期缓解选项、开发者修复指导、WAF/ModSecurity 规则示例,以及来自经验丰富的香港安全从业者的事件响应检查表。.
漏洞是什么?
- 受影响的软件:WP 图表生成器插件
- 受影响的版本:≤ 1.0.4
- 漏洞类型:[wpchart] 短代码渲染中的存储跨站脚本(XSS)
- 所需权限:贡献者(或更高)
- 发布日期:2025年8月11日
- CVE:CVE‑2025‑8685
- 官方修复:发布时无
该插件直接将不受信任的短代码属性和/或内部内容渲染到前端 HTML/JS 中,而没有正确的清理和转义。贡献者可以创建包含脚本片段或事件处理程序的精心制作的 [wpchart] 短代码内容。当渲染时,浏览器在网站的源中执行注入的 JavaScript。.
重要性分析(影响分析)
存储 XSS 即使在初始访问需要低权限时仍然是高风险。主要影响:
- 每次访客查看页面时,持久负载都会执行,扩大了暴露范围。.
- 执行的 JavaScript 以页面源的权限运行:它可以尝试窃取 cookies(如果不是 HttpOnly),代表已登录用户执行操作,显示钓鱼 UI 或重定向访客,并加载进一步的恶意资源(利用链、加载器、加密货币挖矿者)。.
- 许多网站允许贡献者账户(例如,多作者博客、会员网站),因此攻击者可以获得或创建此类账户。.
- 登录状态下查看前端内容的编辑/admin 账户增加了权限提升或账户接管的风险。.
漏洞的外观 — 高级技术演示
插件注册了一个 [wpchart] 接受属性(标签、标题、数据数组、颜色)的短代码。当这些属性在没有上下文感知转义的情况下嵌入到HTML或内联JavaScript中时,就会出现漏洞。.
- 攻击者获取或创建一个贡献者账户。.
- 他们添加一个包含精心制作的
[wpchart]短代码及其属性或包含脚本片段或事件处理程序的内部内容的帖子或页面。. - 有效负载存储在数据库中。当页面被服务时,浏览器解析注入的标记或脚本并执行它。.
- 任何访客(包括已登录的编辑/管理员)都可以触发有效负载。.
说明性有效负载(请勿在公共网站上部署):
[wpchart title=""]
[wpchart data='[{"label":""
","value":10}]']
根本原因是在没有转义或验证的情况下将不受信任的输入呈现到HTML/JS上下文中。.
利用场景及谁面临风险
- 允许贡献者创建内容的网站(会员或多作者网站)。.
- 具有社交注册、大批量导入作者或账户控制薄弱的网站。.
- 编辑/管理员在身份验证状态下预览或查看前端内容的网站。.
- 公共访客和客户可能会受到影响(隐私和声誉损害)。.
- 商业网站特别敏感,因为可能会篡改结账流程。.
检测 — 如何找到易受攻击或被利用的实例
搜索帖子、页面和元数据以获取 [wpchart] 实例和类似脚本的片段。.
WP-CLI
# 搜索帖子和页面中的 'wpchart'
SQL
-- 在 post_content 中搜索 wpchart 短代码;
查找可疑的标记: <script, onerror=, onload=, javascript 的 POST/PUT 有效负载到插件端点:, document.cookie, 获取(, ,以及编码的等价物(例如,, <script>, %3Cscript%3E).
SELECT ID, post_title, post_content
Also search postmeta and plugin options where chart configurations may be stored:
SELECT post_id, meta_key, meta_value
FROM wp_postmeta
WHERE meta_value LIKE '%wpchart%'
OR meta_value REGEXP '(?i)(
Examine webserver logs for POSTs creating/updating content and for outbound requests to suspicious domains originating from page views.
Short-term mitigations (site owners and admins)
If an immediate vendor patch is unavailable, take the following actions to reduce exposure:
- Remove or deactivate the plugin (preferred): If chart functionality is not required immediately, deactivate and remove the plugin until fixed.
- Restrict Contributor accounts: Temporarily disable new registrations or change default role to Subscriber. Review contributors and suspend or reset passwords for suspicious accounts.
- Review content and remove malicious shortcodes: Search posts/pages and sanitize or remove any
[wpchart]occurrences that include script-like patterns. - Temporary server-side sanitizer (virtual patch): Override the shortcode with a safe handler to sanitize attributes and content. Example mu-plugin snippet:
<?php
// mu-plugin/wpchart-sanitizer.php
if ( ! function_exists( 'wpchart_sanitized_handler' ) ) {
function wpchart_sanitized_handler( $atts = [], $content = '' ) {
// Basic attribute sanitization example
$atts = array_map( 'sanitize_text_field', (array) $atts );
// whitelist numeric attributes
if ( isset( $atts['width'] ) ) {
$atts['width'] = intval( $atts['width'] );
}
if ( isset( $atts['height'] ) ) {
$atts['height'] = intval( $atts['height'] );
}
// sanitize content using a safe allowlist
$content = wp_kses( $content, array(
'a' => array( 'href' => true, 'title' => true ),
'span' => array( 'class' => true ),
) );
// Build safe output (example: escaped)
$title = isset( $atts['title'] ) ? esc_html( $atts['title'] ) : '';
return '<div class="wpchart-safe" data-config="' . esc_attr( json_encode( $atts ) ) . '">' . $title . $content . '</div>';
}
// Remove original shortcode if registered and register safe handler
remove_shortcode( 'wpchart' );
add_shortcode( 'wpchart', 'wpchart_sanitized_handler' );
}
?>
Notes: place this as an mu-plugin so it loads early. This is a temporary mitigation to neutralize stored payloads before rendering.
- Harden browser-side controls: Implement a Content Security Policy (CSP) that blocks inline scripts and restricts script sources. Example header:
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' https://trusted-cdn.example.com; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'Also ensure cookies use Secure and HttpOnly flags and consider SameSite settings.
- Deploy rule-based request filters: Use host-level or application-layer filters to block content submissions containing script-like payloads targeted at the
[wpchart]shortcode (examples below).
WAF / ModSecurity rules (examples)
Below are example ModSecurity rules to block common XSS patterns related to [wpchart]. Test thoroughly before applying to production.
# ModSecurity example
SecRule REQUEST_URI|REQUEST_BODY "@rx \[wpchart[^\]]*(
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "^POST$" \
"chain, id:1001002,phase:2,deny,log,status:403,msg:'Blocked POST containing script tag',severity:2"
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx <\s*script\b" "t:none"
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx \[wpchart[^\]]*(onerror|onload|javascript:|document\.cookie|window\.location)" \
"id:1001003,phase:2,deny,log,status:403,msg:'Blocked suspicious attribute inside wpchart',severity:2"
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /wp-admin/post.php|/wp-admin/post-new.php" \
"phase:2,id:1001004,deny,log,status:403,msg:'Blocked potential XSS payload in post content',chain"
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx (onerror|onload|<\s*script|javascript:|document\.cookie|fetch\()" "t:none"
Guidance:
- Target rules narrowly (match the
[wpchart]token and plugin-specific meta keys) to reduce false positives. - Log and run in monitor/report-only mode initially to tune rules, then switch to deny once confidence is established.
- Combine with rate-limiting to mitigate repeated attempts.
Recommended permanent code fixes for plugin developers
Developers should address the root causes with robust validation and context-aware escaping:
- Sanitize input on accept: Use typed validation for numeric fields (intval(), floatval()), use
sanitize_text_field()for simple strings, and parse & validate JSON configuration server-side. - Escape output per context: Use
esc_attr()for attribute values,esc_html()for text nodes andwp_kses()with strict allowlists for any permitted HTML. Avoid echoing unchecked input into inline scripts. - Prefer data-* attributes: Emit sanitized JSON inside a data attribute via
wp_json_encode()and let a vetted client-side script consume that data safely. - Enforce capability checks and nonces: For any AJAX endpoints or admin UI that stores content, enforce
current_user_can()andcheck_admin_referer(). - Example safe shortcode output pattern:
function wpchart_safe_shortcode( $atts = [], $content = '' ) {
$atts = shortcode_atts( array(
'title' => '',
'width' => 600,
'height' => 400,
'data' => '[]',
), $atts, 'wpchart' );
// Sanitize / validate
$safe = array(
'title' => sanitize_text_field( $atts['title'] ),
'width' => intval( $atts['width'] ),
'height' => intval( $atts['height'] ),
);
// For JSON data: decode and validate structure; re-encode safely
$data = json_decode( wp_unslash( $atts['data'] ), true );
if ( ! is_array( $data ) ) {
$data = array();
}
// Validate each data point (example)
$validated_data = array();
foreach ( $data as $row ) {
$label = isset( $row['label'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( $row['label'] ) : '';
$value = isset( $row['value'] ) ? floatval( $row['value'] ) : 0;
$validated_data[] = array( 'label' => $label, 'value' => $value );
}
// Output: store config safely in data attribute and escape it for HTML
$cfg = wp_json_encode( array(
'title' => $safe['title'],
'width' => $safe['width'],
'height'=> $safe['height'],
'data' => $validated_data,
) );
return sprintf(
'<div class="wpchart" data-wpchart="%s"></div>',
esc_attr( $cfg )
);
}
Do not build inline scripts that interpolate user-provided values. Use external, audited JS that reads sanitized data-* attributes.
Incident response: If you suspect exploitation
- Take affected page(s) offline (unpublish) or put the site into maintenance mode if widespread.
- Identify and remove malicious posts, shortcodes or plugin meta entries (see detection section).
- Change passwords for Contributor+ accounts and administrators. Consider forcing password resets for all users if compromise is suspected.
- Inspect server logs for suspicious activity and block attacker IPs at host or WAF level.
- Run a full malware scan and file integrity check. Look for added admin users, unexpected scheduled tasks, or backdoors.
- Rotate API keys, integration tokens, and any stored credentials that could be exposed.
- If admin accounts were compromised, audit site settings and restore from a known-clean backup if necessary.
- Notify affected users if user data may have been exposed, following applicable privacy and breach-notification law.
- After cleanup, re-enable stricter registration policies, enforce two-factor authentication for elevated roles, apply CSP and secure HTTP headers.
- Monitor for re-injection attempts and maintain long-term detection rules.
Monitoring and detection after cleanup
- Enable logging for request filters and review blocked events.
- Set up content integrity checks to detect reappearance of suspicious
[wpchart]shortcodes or injected script tags. - Schedule weekly scans and manual reviews for a period after the incident.
- Deploy updates in a staging environment and validate fixes before production rollout.
Hardening recommendations to reduce XSS risk site-wide
- Apply principle of least privilege: limit Contributor role usage and consider custom roles with reduced capabilities.
- Require editorial review workflows: contributors should submit for review rather than publish directly.
- Enforce strong passwords and two-factor authentication for editors and administrators.
- Restrict untrusted user registration or require administrator approval.
- Use CSP in report-only mode first to identify issues, then enforce once safe.
- Ensure session cookies are HttpOnly and Secure; consider SameSite settings.
- Keep WordPress core and plugins updated and perform periodic security audits.
A short note for developers: test for XSS during QA
- Include input fuzzing for shortcode attributes and stored values.
- Automate tests to detect unescaped outputs in HTML and JS contexts.
- Review third-party chart libraries and ensure data is passed safely (prefer data-* + JSON + validated client-side rendering).
- Maintain a clear disclosure policy and a public changelog to accelerate coordinated fixes when issues are reported.
Frequently asked questions (FAQ)
Q: If I am not using the WP Chart Generator plugin, am I affected?
No. This advisory concerns specifically the WP Chart Generator plugin (≤ 1.0.4). However, the general guidance applies to any plugin that renders unescaped user input.
Q: If an attacker needs a Contributor account, is my site safe?
Not necessarily. Many sites allow registrations that map to low-privilege roles; weak or reused passwords are a common vector. Treat user registration as a potential risk and limit privileges where possible.
Q: Will a Content Security Policy fully prevent exploitation?
A properly configured CSP substantially reduces the impact of many XSS payloads by blocking inline scripts and restricting script origins, but CSP should complement input sanitization and server-side protections — it is not a substitute for correct coding.
Q: Is the issue already patched?
At the time of this advisory, no official patched release was available. Follow the plugin's release channel for updates and apply the mitigations listed here until a patch is published.
Closing thoughts
Stored XSS like CVE‑2025‑8685 can have persistent and far-reaching consequences. Although exploitation requires authenticated access, many realistic paths exist to obtain contributor-level permissions. Treat unescaped shortcode attributes and plugin-rendered client-side scripts as high priority. Immediate actions: review and sanitize content, restrict Contributor capabilities, apply temporary sanitization or request-filtering, and consider deactivating the plugin until it is fixed. Plugin authors should implement strict input validation and context-aware escaping for all shortcode attributes and stored content.
If you lack in-house capability to perform scans or apply mitigations, engage a trusted security practitioner or managed service to assist with detection, virtual patching and recovery steps. Maintain careful logs of remediation actions and preserve forensic artifacts if a compromise is suspected.
Stay vigilant. Review user-generated content regularly and reduce the blast radius of low-privilege user accounts.