插件名称	Plank
漏洞类型	本地文件包含
CVE 编号	CVE-2025-69398
紧急程度	高
CVE 发布日期	2026-02-13
来源网址	CVE-2025-69398

Immediate guidance for WordPress site owners: Local File Inclusion (LFI) in Plank theme (<= 1.7) — what you need to know and what to do now

On 11 February 2026 a critical Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability affecting the Plank WordPress theme (versions up to and including 1.7) was disclosed (CVE‑2025‑69398). The vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to cause the site to include and return the contents of local files. It carries a high severity rating (CVSS 8.1) and — depending on server configuration and available files — can expose sensitive configuration data (for example wp-config.php), credentials, or be chained toward remote code execution.

This advisory is written from the perspective of a Hong Kong security practitioner experienced in incident response and hardening WordPress sites. It provides technical background, detection methods, and a prioritized mitigation and recovery checklist you can apply immediately.

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TL;DR — What every site owner must do first

1. If your site uses the Plank theme and the theme version is ≤ 1.7, treat the site as vulnerable.
2. If you cannot immediately update to a patched version, temporarily:
   • Switch to a safe theme (WordPress default) or remove the Plank theme folder from the server.
   • Deploy WAF rules (virtual patching) that block LFI patterns such as directory traversal and PHP stream wrapper usage.
   • Harden PHP settings and block direct public access to sensitive files (wp-config.php, .env, etc.).
3. Examine logs for traversal sequences or stream-wrapper attempts and scan for webshells or unexpected PHP files.
4. After confirming cleanup, rotate database credentials and WordPress salts; assume credentials found in exposed files may be compromised.

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What is Local File Inclusion (LFI) and why it is so dangerous in WordPress

Local File Inclusion occurs when application code includes or requires files based on user-controlled input without sufficient validation. An attacker can use directory traversal (../) or stream wrappers to read arbitrary files. In WordPress, LFI commonly leads to:

• Disclosure of wp-config.php (database credentials and salts).
• Exposure of other configuration or credential files.
• Potential escalation to remote code execution when chained with log poisoning or stream-wrappers.
• Full site takeover if credentials are retrieved and used to alter the site or database.

Because WordPress stores high-value secrets (DB credentials, API keys), any LFI that returns file contents is a critical operational risk.

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The Plank theme issue — key facts

• Affected software: Plank WordPress theme
• Vulnerable versions: ≤ 1.7
• Attack type: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
• Authentication required: None (unauthenticated)
• CVSS Score: 8.1 (High)
• CVE: CVE‑2025‑69398
• Exploitation complexity: Non-trivial in some environments, but unauthenticated access makes wide scanning and exploitation feasible.

Note: Exploitability depends on PHP configuration and files present on disk. Even if direct code execution is not immediately possible, data disclosure (database credentials, salts) is sufficient for urgent containment.

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How an LFI like this is typically triggered (conceptual, safe description)

The common pattern is dynamic inclusion based on a user-supplied parameter. Examples (conceptual):

include( get_template_directory() . '/' . $_GET['page'] );
require_once( $base_path . '/' . $_POST['view'] );

If the input is not validated or constrained to an allowlist, an attacker can supply traversal payloads such as:

• ../../../../wp-config.php
• ../../../../.env
• PHP流包装器： php://filter 或 数据：

The goal here is to explain the pattern so defenders can detect and block it; publishing full exploit payloads is avoided for safety.

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Risk scenarios and worst-case outcomes

• Immediate information disclosure: database credentials and salts from wp-config.php.
• Secondary compromise: using leaked DB credentials to modify data, create admin users, or access backups.
• Webshells and RCE: via log poisoning, uploads, or stream-wrapper abuses.
• Persistent backdoors: malicious files or modified theme/plugin code that remain after superficial cleanup.

Because this LFI is unauthenticated, automated scanners and opportunistic attackers will likely probe widely; treat all vulnerable instances as high priority.

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如何检测尝试或成功的利用

Search HTTP access logs, WAF logs, and application logs for these indicators:

• 遍历序列： ../, ..%2f, ..%252f
• Stream wrappers: php://filter, php://, 数据:;base64
• Requests targeting theme directories with unexpected query parameters
• Unusual long encoded parameter values or double-encoded strings
• Unexpected 200 responses that include sensitive content
• 新的或修改过的PHP文件在 wp-content/uploads, theme or plugin folders
• New admin accounts, changed passwords, or unexpected DB entries

Example commands (adapt to your environment):

sudo zgrep -iE "(?:\.\./|\.\.%2f|php://filter)" /var/log/nginx/*log* | less
sudo zgrep -i "plank" /var/log/nginx/*access.log*
find /var/www/html/wp-content/uploads -type f -iname "*.php" -mtime -30

Also check WordPress debug.log (if enabled) and any WAF or security plugin logs for suspicious activity.

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Immediate mitigations — prioritized and practical steps you can take now

If you discover an instance of Plank ≤ 1.7 on a live site, apply these actions immediately. They are ordered from fastest/easiest to more in-depth recovery steps.

1. Emergency containment (minutes)

• If feasible, put the site into maintenance mode while you respond.
• Temporarily switch the active theme to a bundled WordPress default theme.
• If switching is not possible, remove the Plank theme folder from /wp-content/themes/ to stop further exploitation.

2. Virtual patching / WAF rules (minutes)

• Deploy WAF rules blocking directory traversal patterns and PHP stream wrappers. This provides immediate protection while you plan a permanent fix.
• Block patterns such as "../", double-encoded traversal, php:// and suspicious long parameter sequences.

3. Server-level hardening (minutes to hours)

• PHP: set allow_url_include = 关闭; where possible set allow_url_fopen = 关闭.
• 使用 open_basedir to restrict PHP file access to the WordPress directory where practical.
• Apply strict filesystem permissions: the web user should have minimal write access (uploads only); theme and core files should be read-only for the web user.
• Disable PHP execution in wp-content/uploads (see examples below).

4. Protect sensitive files via webserver rules (minutes)

Deny direct web access to wp-config.php and other sensitive files. Example rules:

Apache (.htaccess)：

<files wp-config.php>
    order allow,deny
    deny from all
</files>

Nginx example to block php://filter and traversal sequences:

if ($request_uri ~* "%2e%2e|%252e%252e|php://") {
    return 403;
}

5. Scan and audit (hours)

• Run full malware and file-integrity scans. Look for modified theme/plugin files, unknown PHP files in uploads, and new scheduled tasks.
• Use reputable malware scanners and file-integrity tools; if you lack in-house tooling, consult your host or a trusted security provider for scanning.

6. Credential rotation and cleanup (after confirmed cleanup)

• Change database credentials and update them in wp-config.php.
• Rotate WordPress salts and any API keys found in files.
• Force password reset for all admin users and check for unexpected admin accounts.
• Examine the database for unexpected content and restore from clean backups if necessary.

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Sample WAF rules and server hardening snippets

Test these on staging before applying to production.

ModSecurity rule to block traversal and stream-wrapper usage:

SecRule REQUEST_URI|ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS "(?:\.\./|\.\.%2f|%2e%2e%2f|php://|data:;base64)" \
    "id:1001001,phase:1,deny,log,status:403,msg:'Blocked possible LFI / directory traversal / stream wrapper usage'"

Nginx examples:

# block traversal and php://filter attempts
if ($request_uri ~* "(?:\.\./|\.\.%2f|php://filter|data:;base64)") {
    return 403;
}
# block PHP files in uploads
location ~* /wp-content/uploads/.*\.(php|phtml|php5)$ {
    deny all;
}

.htaccess to prevent PHP execution in uploads:

# Prevent execution of PHP in uploads
<FilesMatch "\.(php|php5|phtml)$">
    Order Deny,Allow
    Deny from all
</FilesMatch>

These measures are effective against common exploit patterns but are not a substitute for applying a proper code fix.

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If your site was compromised — recovery checklist (forensically minded)

If you find evidence of compromise, follow a formal recovery process:

1. Isolate the server: take the site offline or block attacker IPs while preserving logs.
2. Preserve logs: copy all webserver, syslog, and application logs to a secure location for forensic analysis.
3. Identify scope of compromise:
   • Which files were accessed, modified or created?
   • Any suspicious database changes (new admin users, altered options)?
4. Clean or rebuild:
   • Safest: rebuild from known-good sources — export content, reinstall core/themes/plugins from official repositories, restore content from a clean backup.
   • Manual cleaning is possible but error-prone and may miss backdoors.
5. Rotate all credentials: DB user/password, WordPress salts, API keys, FTP/SFTP and hosting control panel passwords.
6. Re-scan after cleanup to ensure no lingering backdoors.
7. Harden configuration to reduce risk of re-intrusion.
8. If you lack in-house incident response, engage a professional incident responder or your hosting provider.

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Guidance for developers and theme maintainers — code-level fixes and secure patterns

Theme authors must not include files based on raw user input. Recommended patterns:

• Use allowlists (whitelist filenames) instead of blacklists. Map safe keys to allowed file paths:

  $templates = [
     'home' => 'template-home.php',
     'portfolio' => 'template-portfolio.php'
  ];
  $key = $_GET['view'] ?? 'home';
  if (array_key_exists($key, $templates)) {
      include get_template_directory() . '/' . $templates[$key];
  } else {
      // safe fallback
  }

• 使用 realpath() and verify paths are inside the base directory:

  $path = realpath( get_template_directory() . '/' . $userInput );
  if ($path && strpos($path, realpath(get_template_directory())) === 0) {
      include $path;
  } else {
      // handle error
  }

• Sanitize and normalize input; strip null bytes and encoded traversal sequences.
• Avoid direct inclusion of user-provided paths; prefer get_template_part() and WordPress theme APIs.
• Do not deploy development debug or config files to production servers.

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Monitoring, logging and proactive detection

• Enable comprehensive logging and retain logs for a practical retention period.
• Monitor for LFI indicators: encoded traversal strings and php:// wrappers in URIs and parameters.
• Alert on suspicious file creations and modifications in theme, plugin and uploads directories.
• Configure your WAF and monitoring systems to log and alert on blocked LFI attempts; these logs are early warning of scanning and exploitation.

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Why virtual patching (WAF rules) matters

• Speed: theme authors may take time to release a patch; some sites cannot update immediately because of customisations. Virtual patching blocks exploit attempts at the edge while you plan a safe upgrade.
• Coverage: managed WAF rules can be tuned for common WordPress-specific patterns (directory traversal, stream wrappers, suspicious parameter values).
• Visibility: WAF logs and alerts help detect mass scanning or targeted attempts against your sites.

Where possible use a managed WAF or hosting-provided rule set to apply immediate mitigations while you prepare a long-term fix.

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What to do if you can’t immediately remove or replace the theme

If immediate update is not possible (customisations, staging constraints or legacy dependencies), apply these mitigations:

• Implement server-level blocks (.htaccess/Nginx) as shown above.
• Deploy strict WAF rules blocking traversal strings and PHP stream wrappers.
• Reduce exposure: disable XML-RPC, restrict wp-admin access by IP where practical.
• Ensure backups are isolated and not writable by the webserver user.
• Continuously monitor logs for exploitation attempts and suspicious activity.

Virtual patching plus attack-surface reduction buys time to test and apply a permanent fix.

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Post-incident monitoring and long-term prevention

• Keep themes, plugins and WordPress core updated; monitor vendor advisories.
• Use a staged workflow for updates (dev/staging/production) to test before rollout.
• Enforce least-privilege for filesystem and database users.
• Monitor file integrity and set up automated scans and alerts for unexpected changes.
• Perform regular security audits and apply secure coding checklists for custom code.

Security is continuous — treat LFI disclosures as reminders to coordinate development, operations and security.

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Final notes for hosts, agencies and site managers

• If you manage multiple sites, treat all Plank ≤ 1.7 instances as high priority and apply centralised WAF rules and audits.
• Maintain segmented backup strategies and test restore procedures regularly.
• Document incident response roles: who rotates credentials, who takes sites offline, and how forensic data is captured.
• Consider external assessment if you cannot confidently clean a compromise in-house.

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结论

Local File Inclusion vulnerabilities directly expose sensitive files and can be leveraged to gain control of a WordPress site. The Plank theme LFI (<= 1.7, CVE‑2025‑69398) is high-risk because it is unauthenticated and targets a common pattern.

If your site uses Plank ≤ 1.7:

• Treat the site as vulnerable.
• Apply immediate containment: switch theme or remove Plank.
• Deploy WAF virtual patching and server-level hardening.
• Scan, clean and rotate credentials.
• Update the theme to a patched release when available or replace it with a secure alternative.

If you need managed mitigation while you remediate, enable a managed WAF or consult your hosting provider for temporary rule sets and malware scanning. Time matters — act now.

If you require assistance, engage a professional incident responder or your hosting provider experienced with WordPress incident handling.