| 插件名称 | BuddyHolis ListSearch |
|---|---|
| 漏洞类型 | 跨站脚本攻击(XSS) |
| CVE 编号 | CVE-2026-1853 |
| 紧急程度 | 低 |
| CVE 发布日期 | 2026-02-12 |
| 来源网址 | CVE-2026-1853 |
Urgent Security Bulletin: Stored XSS in BuddyHolis ListSearch (<= 1.1) — What WordPress Site Owners Must Do Now
作者:香港安全专家 | Date: 2026-02-10
Summary: A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability affecting the BuddyHolis ListSearch plugin (versions <= 1.1) allows an authenticated contributor to store malicious scripts via the plugin’s
placeholdershortcode attribute (tracked as CVE-2026-1853). Although some metrics rate this as low-to-medium (CVSS ~6.5), the flaw is easily chained into account takeover and site-wide compromise if not handled promptly. This advisory explains the risk, how the issue works, how to detect exploitation, and practical mitigations you can implement immediately — including WAF rules, hardening snippets, and an incident response checklist.
背景和快速事实
- Affected plugin: BuddyHolis ListSearch
- Vulnerable versions: <= 1.1
- Vulnerability class: Stored Cross-Site Scripting (Stored XSS)
- CVE: CVE-2026-1853
- Required attacker privileges: Authenticated user with Contributor role (or higher)
- CVSSv3 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L (score ~6.5)
- Public disclosure date: 10 Feb, 2026
Core issue: the plugin accepts a user-controlled value for the shortcode attribute named placeholder and outputs that value into front-end HTML without sufficient sanitization or escaping. An authenticated contributor can therefore deposit a payload which executes in the browser of higher-privileged users or visitors.
这很重要的原因(现实世界影响)
From a practical security standpoint — especially for sites with multi-author workflows common in Hong Kong newsrooms, agencies and community sites — this vulnerability is worth urgent attention:
- Contributors can create content that Editors or Administrators view. If those privileged users open a page containing a stored XSS payload, injected JavaScript runs in their browser and can perform privileged actions.
- Stored XSS is persistent: the payload remains on the site and can affect multiple users and sessions.
- Attack scenarios: session cookie theft, theft of REST API nonces, forced actions via the victim’s browser, creation of new admin users, plugin/theme option changes, or installation of backdoors and persistent malware.
- If the vulnerable output is visible to unauthenticated visitors, the exploit can target any visitor, amplifying the impact.
Even though exploitation requires a contributor to insert the malicious attribute and often a privileged user to interact, these conditions are common enough to treat the flaw as actionable: social editing workflows, third-party contributions, or a single careless click by an editor can trigger compromise.
How the vulnerability works — technical explanation
Many WordPress plugins define shortcodes that accept attributes, for example:
[listsearch placeholder="Type to search..."]
If the plugin takes the placeholder attribute and prints it directly into HTML (for instance, inside an input element) without escaping, a crafted attribute can close the attribute and inject new markup or JavaScript. Example vulnerable output (simplified):
<input type="search" placeholder="" />
如果 Search the database (wp_posts, wp_postmeta, widgets, options) for suspicious patterns. Examples: Example SQL checks (run via phpMyAdmin or WP-CLI carefully): If you find matches: Also examine server and access logs for requests containing If you cannot remove the plugin immediately, apply one or more of the following to reduce the chance of successful exploitation. These are emergency measures — treat them as temporary. Add the following as a mu-plugin (recommended so it loads regardless of theme changes). This wrapper sanitizes the 注意: Apply a filter that sanitizes stored shortcode attributes when posts are saved: Apply a CSP header to reduce the damage of injected scripts (defense-in-depth). This can break inline scripts — test first. Disallow Contributors from using the editor that allows shortcodes (Gutenberg block types or Classic Editor). Use block editor settings or capability controls to limit risky block types. If you operate a web application firewall or edge filter, add rules to block obvious payloads. Below are conceptual patterns — adapt to your engine's syntax and test to avoid false positives. Recommendation: log first, then block. Monitor for false positives and refine patterns accordingly. 插件作者的最佳实践: Example of correct output escaping for an input placeholder: Quick CLI approach using WP-CLI (site root): Manual cleanup: 问:我应该立即删除这个插件吗? Q: Will managed hosting malware scans detect this? Q: Does this affect my visitors? If you need help implementing the temporary wrapper, WAF rules, or scanning for stored XSS, engage a qualified WordPress security professional familiar with incident response and forensic preservation. Immediate, careful action reduces the chance of escalation and broader compromise.$atts['placeholder'] 包含 ">Realistic attack flow
placeholder 属性。.CVSS vector explained (short and practical)
Immediate containment steps (next 30–120 minutes)
<script, javascript 的 POST/PUT 有效负载到插件端点:, or inline event handlers in content payloads.placeholder= with encoded or suspicious content when seen in post submission endpoints.Detection: how to check whether you’ve already been hit
listsearch or the shortcode [listsearch 结合 placeholder= and HTML/script content.<script tags inside 帖子内容 或 post_excerpt.onerror=, onmouseover=, onclick= within content or attributes.%3Cscript%3E, <script, javascript 的 POST/PUT 有效负载到插件端点: 发生情况。.SELECT ID, post_title, post_status
FROM wp_posts
WHERE post_content LIKE '%[listsearch%placeholder=%'
OR post_content LIKE '%<script%'
OR post_content LIKE '%javascript:%';SELECT option_name, option_value
FROM wp_options
WHERE option_value LIKE '%listsearch%'
OR option_value LIKE '%<script%';
placeholder= or encoded payloads around the time the suspect content was created.Short-term technical mitigations you can apply now
1) Re-register the shortcode with a safe wrapper
placeholder attribute before the original shortcode callback renders content.<?php
// mu-plugin: sanitize-listsearch-shortcode.php
add_action( 'init', function() {
global $shortcode_tags;
if ( ! isset( $shortcode_tags['listsearch'] ) ) {
return;
}
// Keep the original callback
$original_cb = $shortcode_tags['listsearch'];
// Replace with a safe wrapper
$shortcode_tags['listsearch'] = function( $atts, $content = null, $tag = '' ) use ( $original_cb ) {
if ( isset( $atts['placeholder'] ) ) {
// Strip tags and encode to be safe inside attributes
$atts['placeholder'] = wp_kses( $atts['placeholder'], array() );
$atts['placeholder'] = esc_attr( $atts['placeholder'] );
}
// Call the original callback with sanitized attributes
return call_user_func( $original_cb, $atts, $content, $tag );
};
});
wp-content/mu-plugins/ so it remains active regardless of active theme.2) Sanitize shortcode attributes on save
add_filter( 'content_save_pre', function( $content ) {
// Sanitize any listsearch shortcodes placeholder values
return preg_replace_callback(
'/\[listsearch([^\]]*)\]/i',
function( $m ) {
$attrs = $m[1];
// Replace placeholder="... potentially dangerous ..." with a sanitized version
$attrs = preg_replace_callback(
'/placeholder=(["\'])(.*?)\1/i',
function( $ma ) {
$val = wp_kses( $ma[2], array() );
$val = esc_attr( $val );
return 'placeholder="'. $val .'"';
},
$attrs
);
return '[listsearch' . $attrs . ']';
},
$content
);
}, 10 );3) Content Security Policy (CSP)
Header set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self' https:; script-src 'self' https:; object-src 'none';"4) Restrict editors and block types
Example WAF rules (generic, product-agnostic)
Pattern: <\s*script\b | javascript\s*:Pattern: onmouseover=|onerror=|onclick=|onload=placeholder content in post saves:
\[listsearch[^\]]*placeholder\s*=\s*(['"]).*(<|%3C|javascript:|on\w+=).*?\1Full incident response checklist (if you suspect compromise)
Developer guidance: how the plugin should have handled attributes
esc_attr(), esc_html(), esc_url(), ,或 wp_kses() 视情况而定。.$placeholder = isset( $atts['placeholder'] ) ? $atts['placeholder'] : '';
$placeholder = wp_kses( $placeholder, array() ); // strip tags
$value_attr = esc_attr( $placeholder );
echo '<input type="search" placeholder="' . $value_attr . '" />';Recommended policy changes for site owners and editors
Practical examples: finding and removing malicious placeholders
# Search for scripts in post content
wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%<script%' OR post_content LIKE '%listsearch%placeholder=%'" --skip-column-names
# Export suspicious post IDs
wp post get 123 --field=post_content > /tmp/post-123-content.html
常见问题
A: If the plugin is non-critical, deactivate/delete it immediately. If functionality is required, apply temporary mitigations (WAF rules or the safe wrapper mu-plugin) while awaiting an official patch.
A: Many hosts detect obvious script injections, but stored XSS in shortcodes can be subtle. Proactively search for [listsearch ...] usage and check placeholder 属性。.
A: Only if the injected output is visible to unauthenticated visitors. If the payload executes only in admin/editor views, it still poses an immediate risk to site control via privilege escalation.最终建议(优先级排序)