安全通告 List Subpages 插件存儲 XSS(CVE20258290)

WordPress 列出子頁面插件






Urgent: List Subpages Plugin (<= 1.0.6) — Authenticated Contributor Stored XSS (CVE-2025-8290)


插件名稱 列出子頁面
漏洞類型 儲存型 XSS
CVE 編號 CVE-2025-8290
緊急程度
CVE 發布日期 2025-08-28
來源 URL CVE-2025-8290

緊急:列出子頁面插件 (≤ 1.0.6) — 認證的貢獻者儲存型 XSS (CVE-2025-8290)

日期: 2025-08-28   |   作者: 香港安全專家

摘要: 列出子頁面插件中的儲存型 XSS 允許認證的貢獻者級別用戶通過該 標題 參數注入 HTML/JavaScript,該參數後來在未正確轉義的情況下被渲染。此公告提供了技術細節、檢測步驟和針對網站擁有者和管理員的緩解措施。.

執行摘要

影響 WordPress 插件“列出子頁面”(版本 ≤ 1.0.6)的儲存型跨站腳本(XSS)漏洞已被分配 CVE-2025-8290。具有貢獻者級別權限的認證用戶可以將惡意標記插入到 標題 一個參數中,該參數被儲存並在不安全的情況下被渲染。當特權用戶(管理員/編輯)查看受影響的頁面時,負載在該用戶的瀏覽器上下文中執行,可能導致會話盜竊、權限提升或持久性網站妥協。.

此公告由一位位於香港的安全從業者撰寫,提供檢測、臨時緩解和長期加固的實用指導。如果您的網站使用列出子頁面,請迅速採取行動以限制暴露。.

重要:儲存型 XSS 負載是持久的。即使貢獻者無法直接發布,保存的值可能會在管理預覽或其他上下文中被渲染,並在被移除或安全轉義之前保持危險。.

這個漏洞是什麼?

  • 漏洞類型:儲存型跨站腳本(XSS)。.
  • 受影響的軟體:WordPress 的列出子頁面插件。.
  • 易受攻擊的版本:≤ 1.0.6。.
  • CVE:CVE-2025-8290。.
  • 所需權限:貢獻者(已認證)。.
  • 影響:惡意 標題 值被儲存並在未正確轉義的情況下被回顯。當管理員/編輯加載該頁面時,注入的 JS 在他們的瀏覽器會話中運行。.

為什麼這很重要:儲存型 XSS 在數據庫中持久存在,並且每次受影響的內容被渲染時都可以執行。後果包括帳戶接管、武器化的管理操作、文件修改和全站持久性濫用。.

攻擊者可能如何利用這一點

  1. 註冊一個低權限帳戶(如果註冊已啟用)或使用現有的貢獻者帳戶。.
  2. 提交一個精心製作的 標題 有效載荷通過插件的表單或API端點。.
  3. 插件在沒有足夠的清理/轉義的情況下存儲有效載荷。.
  4. 一個特權用戶稍後查看渲染該頁面的 標題, ,導致有效載荷在他們的瀏覽器中執行。.
  5. 攻擊者然後利用特權上下文來竊取會話、創建管理用戶或執行其他惡意行為。.

常見的後利用活動:竊取身份驗證cookie/CSRF令牌、未經授權的管理帳戶創建、安裝後門、SEO垃圾郵件、破壞和橫向移動到托管資源。.

技術細節(假設什麼)

  • 易受攻擊的參數: 標題. 。插件存儲並在稍後打印此值而沒有適當的轉義。.
  • 根本原因:在渲染時輸出編碼不足——原始回顯/打印而不是轉義函數,例如 esc_html(), esc_attr(), ,或受控 wp_kses().
  • 利用前提條件:已驗證的用戶(貢獻者)。許多網站允許註冊,降低了利用的門檻。.
  • 在閱讀時可能沒有官方修補程序;計劃在供應商修復或插件被替換之前進行臨時緩解。.

注意:此公告不會發布利用有效載荷。目的是幫助防禦者檢測和緩解,而不提供給攻擊者現成的模板。.

立即風險評估——這對您的網站意味著什麼

如果您的網站運行List Subpages(≤ 1.0.6)並允許貢獻者或類似角色:

  • 風險:中等(基準CVSS ≈ 6.5),根據用戶註冊設置和管理活動而變化。.
  • 緊急性:對於允許公共註冊、在管理視圖中積極使用插件輸出的網站,或有多個管理員經常預覽頁面的網站,風險高。.
  • 如果公共註冊被禁用且不存在貢獻者帳戶,風險降低但未消除(現有帳戶可能會被外部攻擊)。.

偵測 — 如何檢查您的網站是否已被攻擊

立即執行這些檢查。它們是實用且保守的;在進行更改之前,始終備份。.

  1. 在資料庫中搜尋可疑的字串,位於文章標題、文章元資料或外掛表中。尋找 <script, onerror=, javascript:, ,或編碼變體,如 <script.
  2. WP-CLI 安全的唯讀查詢(範例):
    wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title, post_type FROM wp_posts WHERE post_title LIKE '%
    wp db query "SELECT meta_id, post_id, meta_key, meta_value FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_value LIKE '%
  3. If no WP-CLI, use mysqldump + grep or search database exports for suspicious tokens.
  4. Inspect recent posts, drafts, previews from low-privilege accounts.
  5. Review server and application logs for admin-side GET/POSTs referencing plugin pages or title parameters.
  6. Check for new admin users, changed passwords, modified files, unexpected scheduled tasks, or unfamiliar PHP files in uploads or plugin/theme directories.
  7. Run malware scans with your existing toolset and search for webshell indicators and unusual file changes.

If you find indicators of compromise, proceed to the incident response checklist below.

Short-term mitigation (apply these immediately)

When an official plugin patch is not available, take these emergency steps to reduce exposure:

  1. Deactivate the plugin immediately.
    • If admin access is unavailable, rename the plugin folder via SFTP/SSH: wp-content/plugins/list-subpages → wp-content/plugins/list-subpages.disabled
  2. If you cannot fully deactivate the plugin, restrict access to its UI and pages:
    • Limit who can access admin pages that render plugin output.
    • Restrict capability checks so only administrators can reach plugin screens.
  3. Temporarily disable public registration (Settings → General → Membership) and audit Contributor accounts. Demote or remove any untrusted Contributors.
  4. Add an output-sanitizing filter to escape titles at render time (see code snippets below) as a temporary virtual patch on the site.
  5. At web server level, block or challenge requests that include clear XSS patterns in the title parameter (for example: <script, onerror=, javascript:).
  6. Monitor admin logins and rotate passwords for administrative users if suspicious activity is observed.

Rationale: Deactivation prevents new payload storage and rendering. Server-level rules and output-sanitizing filters reduce the chance that stored content executes when accessed by privileged users. These measures are temporary and should be replaced by an official patch or a secure plugin alternative.

Permanent mitigation and best practice (after official patch or when replacing plugin)

  1. Apply the official plugin update when the vendor releases a fix; test in staging before production.
  2. If no patch is provided, replace the plugin with a maintained alternative or implement the needed functionality via trusted custom code with proper input validation and output escaping.
  3. Always escape output when printing user-supplied content:
    • Titles: esc_html() or esc_attr()
    • URLs: esc_url()
    • Rich HTML only via a restrictive wp_kses() policy
  4. Implement least-privilege policies: disable public registrations unless necessary, and minimise accounts with Contributor+ capabilities.
  5. Sanitise inputs at submission using functions like sanitize_text_field() and wp_kses_post() where appropriate.
  6. Maintain routine security hygiene: update core/themes/plugins, remove unused plugins, enforce strong passwords and MFA for privileged accounts, and keep off-site backups.

Hardening with code snippets (temporary site-side mitigations)

These defensive snippets are intended as short-term mitigations. Test on staging before deploying to production. Create a small mu-plugin (e.g., wp-content/mu-plugins/list-subpages-mitigations.php).

1) Sanitize titles during output

<?php
/**
 * Temporary mitigation: sanitize titles during output.
 * Place in wp-content/mu-plugins/list-subpages-mitigations.php
 */

add_filter( 'the_title', 'hk_sanitize_title_output', 10, 2 );
function hk_sanitize_title_output( $title, $id ) {
    if ( is_string( $title ) && ( stripos( $title, '<script' ) !== false || stripos( $title, '<img' ) !== false || stripos( $title, 'onerror=' ) !== false || stripos( $title, 'javascript:' ) !== false ) ) {
        return esc_html( $title );
    }
    return wp_kses_post( $title );
}
?>

2) Restrict plugin admin pages to administrators only

<?php
/**
 * Restrict access to List Subpages admin screens to administrators only.
 */

add_action( 'admin_init', 'hk_restrict_list_subpages_admin' );
function hk_restrict_list_subpages_admin() {
    if ( ! current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) {
        global $pagenow;
        $blocked_slugs = array( 'tools.php?page=list-subpages', 'admin.php?page=list-subpages' );

        if ( isset( $_GET['page'] ) ) {
            $current = $pagenow . '?page=' . sanitize_text_field( $_GET['page'] );
            if ( in_array( $current, $blocked_slugs, true ) ) {
                wp_die( 'Insufficient permissions to access this page.' );
            }
        }
    }
}
?>

3) Sanitize incoming POST data named title

<?php
/**
 * Defensive: sanitize any incoming 'title' parameter in POST requests.
 */

add_action( 'init', 'hk_defensive_sanitize_post_title' );
function hk_defensive_sanitize_post_title() {
    if ( $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST' && ! empty( $_POST['title'] ) ) {
        $_POST['title'] = wp_strip_all_tags( wp_kses_post( $_POST['title'] ) );
    }
}
?>

These snippets reduce risk but are not a substitute for a proper code fix. Remove or update them after applying an official patch or replacing the plugin.

Web Application Firewall (WAF) / virtual patching guidance

A WAF or server-level filtering can provide immediate protection by blocking common exploit payloads, but it should complement code-level fixes rather than replace them. Suggested high-level rules (conceptual):

  • Block or challenge requests where the title parameter contains <script or encoded equivalents (&lt;script, &#x3C;script).
  • Block requests with title containing onmouseover=, onerror=, javascript:, or suspicious src attributes.
  • Throttle or block POSTs to plugin admin endpoints from IPs exhibiting high request rates or originating from unrelated geographies.

Example conceptual pattern (adapt to your WAF syntax):

If REQUEST_METHOD == POST and REQUEST_BODY contains `(title=.*(<|&lt;|%3C)(script|img|iframe|svg)|onerror=|javascript:)` then BLOCK

Use logging and alerts to capture blocked attempts for follow-up investigation. WAFs buy time but do not fix insecure server-side output handling.

Incident response checklist (if you find evidence of exploitation)

  1. Contain:
    • Disable the vulnerable plugin (deactivate or rename the plugin folder).
    • Lock down administration access; enable maintenance mode if necessary.
    • Remove or block Contributor accounts suspected of being abused.
  2. Preserve evidence:
    • Export web server logs, database entries with suspicious content, and copies of affected files.
    • Create a forensics copy of the live site for offline analysis.
  3. Eradicate:
    • Remove stored malicious payloads from the database (carefully).
    • Remove new admin users, scheduled tasks, backdoor files, and unfamiliar PHP scripts.
    • Rotate secrets: WordPress salts, admin passwords, and any exposed API keys.
  4. Recover:
    • Restore from a known clean backup if necessary.
    • Reinstall WordPress core/themes/plugins from trusted sources and re-scan.
  5. Review & harden:
    • Apply permanent mitigations, audit user roles, and enable MFA for admin/editor accounts.
    • Implement continuous monitoring and scheduled security reviews.
  6. Notify stakeholders if sensitive data was accessed and comply with local regulations.

If you need professional incident response, engage a qualified WordPress forensic team or security consultant experienced with PHP/WordPress investigations.

Searching for indicators — useful queries and commands

Examples for experienced administrators. Always run non-destructive read-only queries first and ensure backups exist.

WP-CLI (read-only)

wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title, post_author, post_date FROM wp_posts WHERE post_title LIKE '%
wp user list --role=contributor --fields=ID,user_login,user_email

MySQL direct

SELECT post_id, meta_key, meta_value FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_value LIKE '%

Filesystem

grep -R --line-number --exclude-dir=cache "<script" wp-content/uploads || true

Logs

zgrep "title=" /var/log/apache2/access.log* | tail -n 200

Long-term recommendations and policy

  • Maintain a plugin inventory and vet third-party plugins before installation.
  • Use staging environments to test updates and security fixes.
  • Enforce strong passwords and multi-factor authentication for all privileged accounts.
  • Apply least-privilege principles: only grant Contributor+ roles when necessary and consider custom roles for fine-grained control.
  • Subscribe to reputable vulnerability feeds and maintain a documented emergency patching process.
  • Schedule quarterly security reviews of plugins and custom code.

Considerations for agencies and multi-site installations

  • On WordPress Multisite, a stored XSS can impact multiple sites. Deactivate network-wide if present.
  • Managed hosting: coordinate with your host for log scanning, credential rotation, and backups.
  • Agencies managing many client sites should automate detection and filtering to prevent mass exploitation.

Example timeline and responsibilities for site administrators

  • Day 0 (disclosure): Identify whether the plugin is installed and if its version is ≤ 1.0.6.
  • Within hours: Deactivate plugin or apply server-level blocking rules; audit Contributor accounts and recent posts.
  • Within 24–72 hours: Remove discovered payloads, scan for secondary compromise, rotate admin credentials.
  • Ongoing: Monitor for vendor patch, test on staging, and apply the patch promptly when available.

Suggested responsibilities:

  • Site Admin: Immediate mitigations and user review.
  • Developer: Implement temporary code mitigations and test fixes.
  • Host/Operations: Assist with logs, backups, and server-side blocking.
  • Security Lead: Run scans, confirm eradication, and maintain monitoring.

Frequently asked questions (FAQ)

Q: If Contributors cannot publish, am I still at risk?

A: Yes. Stored XSS does not require publishing. If a Contributor can create or edit content that is saved and later rendered (including previews), payloads can execute when viewed by an administrator or editor.

Q: What if the plugin is installed but not actively used?

A: Even unused plugins can expose attack surfaces if they register admin pages, shortcodes, or render stored values. Deactivate unused plugins.

Q: Can a WAF fully solve this?

A: A WAF is an effective mitigation to reduce exploitation attempts, but it is not a replacement for fixing the vulnerable code. Use WAFs together with code repairs and other controls.

Q: How will I know if I’ve been exploited?

A: Look for unexpected admin actions, new admin users, modified files, suspicious content in posts/titles/meta, and anomalous log activity. Use the detection steps listed above.

Final words from a Hong Kong security expert

Stored XSS vulnerabilities that allow low-privilege users to plant persistent payloads are especially dangerous because they weaponise the human element — administrators and editors viewing content. The mitigation path is clear: contain immediately, search for indicators, remove payloads safely, and apply code-level fixes or plugin replacements that enforce proper escaping.

Act quickly but carefully. If you have multiple sites or clients, prioritise those with public registration or frequent admin previews. For complex compromises, engage an experienced WordPress incident response team that can perform thorough forensics and cleanup.

Stay vigilant. Regularly review plugin inventories, enforce least privilege, enable multi-factor authentication, and keep backups offline. These practices will lower your risk profile for this and future vulnerabilities.

— Hong Kong Security Expert


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