| Plugin Name | WidgetKit |
|---|---|
| Type of Vulnerability | Cross-site Scripting (XSS) |
| CVE Number | CVE-2025-8779 |
| Urgency | Low |
| CVE Publish Date | 2025-12-15 |
| Source URL | CVE-2025-8779 |
Urgent Security Advisory: Stored XSS in WidgetKit for Elementor (CVE-2025-8779) — What Site Owners Must Do Now
Summary: A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability affecting the “WidgetKit for Elementor” (All-in-One Addons for Elementor – WidgetKit) plugin versions ≤ 2.5.6 has been assigned CVE-2025-8779. An authenticated user with Contributor privileges (or higher, depending on site permissions) can inject persistent script payloads via the Team and Countdown widgets. This advisory provides a technical analysis, impact scenarios, detection queries and step-by-step mitigation guidance for site owners.
Table of contents
- Background and timeline
- What exactly is CVE-2025-8779 (technical summary)
- Why this matters — attack scenarios and impact
- How attackers exploit stored XSS in widget settings
- Immediate actions for site owners (step-by-step)
- How to detect if you’ve been affected
- Cleaning up an infected site (incident response)
- Hardening recommendations (roles, capabilities, content sanitization)
- WAF and virtual patch guidance (technical mitigations)
- Best practices to avoid plugin XSS infections in future
- Frequently asked questions (FAQ)
- Appendix: Useful commands and queries
Background and timeline
On 2025-12-13 a stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability affecting WidgetKit for Elementor (plugin versions ≤ 2.5.6) was disclosed and assigned CVE-2025-8779. The vulnerability allows an authenticated contributor-level user to inject stored JavaScript into the Team and Countdown widgets’ settings, which can be rendered on the front-end or in the admin panel and executed by administrators or site visitors. The plugin vendor released a fixed version 2.5.7 — apply it immediately.
Although the CVSS vector supplied indicates a moderate score (6.5), real-world impact depends on the number of contributor accounts, ability of untrusted users to obtain such accounts, and whether privileged users routinely view pages containing the vulnerable widgets. Stored XSS can enable privilege escalation, account takeover, persistent malware injection, SEO spam or redirect chains — prompt action is required.
What exactly is CVE-2025-8779 (technical summary)
- Vulnerability type: Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
- Affected software: WidgetKit for Elementor (All-in-One Addons for Elementor – WidgetKit), versions ≤ 2.5.6.
- Fixed in: version 2.5.7.
- Required privileges: Contributor (authenticated accounts with at least Contributor capabilities).
- Widgets involved: Team widget and Countdown widget (widget settings/options).
- Attack vector: An authenticated contributor can store malicious HTML/JavaScript in widget configuration fields that are not sufficiently sanitized or escaped; the malicious script is later rendered (stored XSS) and executed in the context of visitors or admin users.
In short: the plugin accepts user-controlled input for certain widget fields, persists that input, and outputs it to the page without proper sanitization or output encoding, allowing script execution in the victim’s browser.
Why this matters — attack scenarios and impact
Stored XSS is particularly dangerous because the payload is persistent and can affect multiple victims over time. Practical misuse includes:
- Account takeover: If an administrator views a page containing the injected widget, the script can attempt to exfiltrate cookies, auth tokens, or perform authenticated requests to modify site configuration or user accounts (depending on site protections).
- Persistent malware injection: Injected scripts can load external JavaScript, create hidden backdoors, or add spam content that damages SEO.
- Defacement & redirects: Visitors can be redirected to phishing or malicious pages.
- Lateral privilege escalation: A contributor with limited rights can target higher-privileged users who view the content.
- Supply-chain risk: Malicious content may be crawled or embedded elsewhere, amplifying impact.
Although exploitation requires an authenticated account (not anonymous), many WordPress sites permit registrations or have team members with contributor-level access, expanding the attack surface.
How attackers exploit stored XSS in widget settings
- Attacker obtains or uses a contributor account (via registration, social engineering, credential reuse or compromise).
- Attacker edits or creates a page/widget using the vulnerable WidgetKit Team or Countdown widget.
- In widget fields saved without sufficient sanitization (e.g., name, description or label), the attacker injects a payload such as a script tag or an event handler attribute.
- Widget settings are saved to the database (postmeta, options or widget-specific tables).
- When a privileged user or site visitor loads the page with that widget, the malicious script executes in their browser context.
- The script can exfiltrate data, perform actions on behalf of the victim, or persist more malicious content.
Note: Exploit payloads are not published here. If you suspect compromise, follow incident response steps below immediately.
Immediate actions for site owners (step-by-step)
If your site uses WidgetKit for Elementor, prioritise the following steps now:
- Upgrade Immediately
- Update WidgetKit to version 2.5.7 or later. This is the single most important action.
- If you cannot update safely (compatibility concerns), temporarily deactivate the plugin or disable the affected widgets until you can patch.
- Restrict Contributor Access Temporarily
- If your site allows new user registrations and you don’t require them, disable registrations.
- Review all users with Contributor or higher roles. Remove unused accounts and reset passwords for accounts you do not fully trust.
- Put the Site in Maintenance Mode (if you suspect active exploitation)
- Prevent administrators and visitors from rendering potentially infected pages while you investigate.
- Search for Suspicious Widget Content
- Use the SQL/WP-CLI queries in the Appendix to locate potentially malicious stored HTML/JS in the database.
- Backup (Full)
- Take a full backup (files + database) before making changes so you have a forensics snapshot.
- Enable Additional Protections
- If you operate a Web Application Firewall (WAF), enable virtual patching and custom rules for this vulnerability (see the WAF section below).
- Turn on malware scanning and alerting that can detect suspicious JavaScript or embedded iframes.
- Rotate Credentials and Secrets
- After cleanup, rotate any exposed credentials (admin logins, FTP, API keys, OAuth tokens).
- Monitor Logs
- Check web server and WordPress logs for suspicious admin POST requests, file write operations, or unexpected plugin/theme changes.
How to detect if you’ve been affected
Stored XSS payloads can be subtle. Effective detection steps include:
1. Search the database for suspicious script tags and event handler attributes
SQL examples (read-only where possible):
SELECT ID, post_title FROM wp_posts
WHERE post_content LIKE '%<script%';
SELECT meta_id, post_id, meta_key, meta_value FROM wp_postmeta
WHERE meta_value LIKE '%<script%' OR meta_value LIKE '%onerror=%' OR meta_value LIKE '%javascript:%';
SELECT option_id, option_name FROM wp_options
WHERE option_value LIKE '%<script%' OR option_value LIKE '%javascript:%';
2. WP-CLI examples
# Search for potential script tags in postmeta
wp db query "SELECT meta_id, post_id, meta_key FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_value LIKE '%<script%';"
# Grep plugin-specific data (may be faster for large DBs)
wp db export - | grep -n "widgetkit" -C 3 | grep -i "<script"
3. Inspect pages containing Team and Countdown widgets
Manually view pages using those widgets and check the page source for inline scripts or unexpected external script sources.
4. Scan with a site scanner
Use a reputable malware scanner to detect injected scripts and unauthorized modifications.
5. Check for unusual administrator activity
Look for unknown admin users, recent changes to critical settings, or unexpectedly modified themes/plugins.
6. Check logs for abnormal POSTs
Review POST requests to widget update endpoints or admin-ajax actions performed by Contributor accounts.
Cleaning up an infected site (incident response)
- Isolate
- Take the site offline (maintenance mode) if possible.
- Preserve Evidence
- Create a forensic backup snapshot before cleaning.
- Remove Malicious Content
- Edit widget settings to remove any HTML or JavaScript.
- For persistent cases, delete the widget and recreate it using sanitized data.
- Update Everything
- Update WidgetKit to 2.5.7+, WordPress core, and all plugins/themes.
- Rotate Credentials
- Reset passwords for all users with Contributor or higher privileges. Rotate database and service credentials as needed.
- Check for Backdoors
- Scan for recently modified files, unknown PHP files, and suspicious scheduled tasks (cron jobs).
- Monitor and Harden
- Continuously monitor logs and scan for re-infection. Apply hardening steps below.
- Notify Stakeholders
- If customer or user data may be affected, follow your disclosure policy and regulatory requirements.
- Re-enable services
- Only bring the site back online once remediation and verification are complete.
Hardening recommendations (roles, capabilities, content sanitization)
Practical measures to reduce attack surface:
- Least privilege: Grant users minimum capabilities needed. Verify whether Contributors truly need access to widget editing or page-builder features.
- Disable unnecessary registrations: If public registrations are not needed, turn them off (WordPress > Settings > General).
- Remove unfiltered_html capability: Ensure only trusted roles have this capability.
- Sanitize input on save: Developers should use sanitize_text_field(), wp_kses_post() or wp_kses() for allowed HTML, and escape on output with esc_html(), esc_attr() or appropriate escaping functions.
- Use allowlists for HTML: Use wp_kses() to define a strict allowlist for fields that legitimately require markup.
- Two-Factor Authentication (2FA): Enforce 2FA for elevated accounts (editors, administrators).
- Logging and monitoring: Enable admin-change logging and monitor failed logins. Integrate logs with a SIEM where possible.
WAF and virtual patch guidance (technical mitigations)
A Web Application Firewall (WAF) can reduce exposure while you patch. Virtual patching is a temporary mitigation and should not replace applying vendor fixes.
Suggested strategies (adapt to your WAF syntax):
- Block suspicious payloads to widget-update endpoints:
- Block POST bodies containing patterns such as
<script,javascript:,onerror=,onload=or suspicious encoded payloads.
- Block POST bodies containing patterns such as
- Restrict access to update endpoints:
- Allow widget-update endpoints only from trusted admin IPs or require authenticated admin sessions.
- Detect obfuscation:
- Flag and block hex-encoded, base64 or otherwise obfuscated payloads targeted at admin endpoints.
- Rate-limit and anomaly detection:
- Limit widget-creation/update requests from a single account/IP in a short interval and alert on anomalous spikes from Contributor accounts.
- Response filtering and content stripping:
- If supported, strip
<script>tags and event-handler attributes from widget settings before storage, or perform outbound response sanitization for pages containing widget payloads.
- If supported, strip
- Logging for forensics:
- Capture full request body and headers for blocked events to support investigations.
Note: Virtual patching must be careful to avoid false positives that break legitimate widget content. Test rules in monitoring mode before enforcing blocking.
Best practices to avoid plugin XSS infections in future
- Keep plugins, themes and WordPress core up to date. Subscribe to trusted security notifications.
- Reduce plugin bloat — remove unused or abandoned plugins.
- Prefer plugins from developers who follow secure coding and sanitization practices.
- Limit features that allow untrusted users to insert markup.
- Use staging environments for testing updates, but do not leave production unpatched.
Frequently asked questions (FAQ)
Q: My site only uses contributors to draft posts; why is this a problem?
A: Contributors may still interact with editor features or widgets depending on site configuration. If contributor input is persisted and later rendered to admins or visitors, it becomes a risk.
Q: Is this vulnerability exploitable remotely by anonymous visitors?
A: No. It requires an authenticated account with at least Contributor privileges. However, account creation and compromise vectors (credential reuse, weak passwords, stolen accounts) can allow attackers to obtain that level of access.
Q: Will disabling the plugin break my site?
A: Deactivating the plugin will remove widgets from pages and may affect layout. If you cannot update immediately, deactivation is a safe temporary step to remove the attack surface — but plan for layout remediation.
Q: If I update to 2.5.7, do I still need to sanitize existing widget content?
A: Yes. Updating prevents new attempts but does not remove already injected payloads. You must search and clean stored content.
Appendix: Useful commands and queries
Note: Run database queries in read-only mode when possible. Always take backups before performing modifications.
1. Find potential script tags in postmeta:
SELECT meta_id, post_id, meta_key
FROM wp_postmeta
WHERE meta_value LIKE '%<script%' OR meta_value LIKE '%javascript:%' OR meta_value LIKE '%onerror=%';
2. WP-CLI search in postmeta:
wp db query "SELECT meta_id, post_id, meta_key FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_value RLIKE '(?i)<script|javascript:|onerror='" --skip-column-names
3. Export suspicious rows for manual review:
wp db export suspicious.sql --add-drop-table
# then grep suspicious.sql for '<script' or suspicious domains
4. Remove basic script tags from a given meta key (dangerous — test first):
<?php
# Example PHP snippet — run only in a safe, tested environment
global $wpdb;
$rows = $wpdb->get_results("SELECT meta_id, meta_value FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_value LIKE '%<script%'");
foreach($rows as $row) {
$clean = preg_replace('#<script(.*?)&(.*?)?</script>#is', '', $row->meta_value);
$wpdb->update('wp_postmeta', ['meta_value' => $clean], ['meta_id' => $row->meta_id]);
}
?>
Warning: The PHP example is illustrative. Sanitization must be context-aware; automated removal may break legitimate content. Test in a safe environment.
Final notes from a Hong Kong security expert
Patch first, then investigate and clean. Patching is the fastest mitigation step. Use WAF-based protections as a temporary measure while you patch, but do not treat them as a permanent replacement for vendor fixes.
Review user accounts and privilege assignments — many exploitation chains begin with weak or unnecessary privileges. If you require assistance with detection, virtual patching or incident response, engage a reputable security/incident-response provider or qualified consultant who can perform forensics and remediation tailored to your environment.
Security is a layered process: timely updates, least privilege, rigorous sanitization, monitoring and properly configured WAFs together create resilient WordPress deployments. Act now to protect your site from stored XSS risks such as CVE-2025-8779.