Security Advisory List Subpages Plugin Stored XSS(CVE20258290)

WordPress List Subpages plugin






Urgent: List Subpages Plugin (<= 1.0.6) — Authenticated Contributor Stored XSS (CVE-2025-8290)


Plugin Name List Subpages
Type of Vulnerability Stored XSS
CVE Number CVE-2025-8290
Urgency Low
CVE Publish Date 2025-08-28
Source URL CVE-2025-8290

Urgent: List Subpages Plugin (≤ 1.0.6) — Authenticated Contributor Stored XSS (CVE-2025-8290)

Date: 2025-08-28   |   Author: Hong Kong Security Expert

Summary: A stored XSS in the List Subpages plugin allows authenticated Contributor-level users to inject HTML/JavaScript via the title parameter that is later rendered without proper escaping. This advisory provides technical details, detection steps, and mitigation actions for site owners and administrators.

Executive summary

A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability affecting the WordPress plugin “List Subpages” (versions ≤ 1.0.6) has been assigned CVE-2025-8290. An authenticated user with Contributor-level privileges can insert malicious markup into a title parameter that is stored and later rendered unsafely. When a privileged user (administrator/editor) views the affected page, the payload executes in that user’s browser context, potentially leading to session theft, privilege escalation, or persistent site compromise.

This advisory is written by a Hong Kong-based security practitioner with practical guidance for detection, temporary mitigation, and long-term hardening. If your site uses List Subpages, act quickly to limit exposure.

Important: stored XSS payloads are persistent. Even if Contributors cannot publish directly, saved values may be rendered in admin previews or other contexts and remain dangerous until removed or safely escaped.

What is this vulnerability?

  • Vulnerability type: Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
  • Affected software: List Subpages plugin for WordPress.
  • Vulnerable versions: ≤ 1.0.6.
  • CVE: CVE-2025-8290.
  • Required privilege: Contributor (authenticated).
  • Impact: Malicious title values are stored and later echoed without proper escaping. When an admin/editor loads the page, injected JS runs in their browser session.

Why this matters: stored XSS persists in the database and can execute each time the affected content is rendered. Consequences include account takeover, weaponised admin actions, file modifications, and site-wide persistent abuse.

How an attacker might exploit this

  1. Register a low-privilege account (if registration is enabled) or use an existing Contributor account.
  2. Submit a crafted title payload through the plugin’s form or API endpoint.
  3. The plugin stores the payload without sufficient sanitization/escaping.
  4. A privileged user later views a page rendering that title, causing the payload to execute in their browser.
  5. The attacker then uses the privileged context to steal sessions, create admin users, or perform other malicious actions.

Common post-exploitation activities: theft of authentication cookies/CSRF tokens, unauthorized admin account creation, installation of backdoors, SEO spam, defacement, and lateral movement to hosting resources.

Technical details (what to assume)

  • Vulnerable parameter: title. The plugin stores and later prints this value without proper escaping.
  • Root cause: insufficient output encoding at render time — raw echo/print instead of escaping functions such as esc_html(), esc_attr(), or controlled wp_kses().
  • Exploit prerequisites: authenticated user (Contributor). Many sites allow registrations, lowering the barrier to exploit.
  • No official patch may be available at the time of reading; plan for temporary mitigations until a vendor fix is released or the plugin is replaced.

Note: This advisory will not publish exploit payloads. The objective is to help defenders detect and mitigate without providing attackers with a ready-made template.

Immediate risk assessment — what this means for your site

If your site runs List Subpages (≤ 1.0.6) and allows Contributors or similar roles:

  • Risk: Medium (baseline CVSS ≈ 6.5), variable depending on user registration settings and admin activity.
  • Urgency: High for sites that allow public registration, actively use the plugin output in admin views, or have multiple admins who preview pages frequently.
  • If public registration is disabled and no Contributor accounts exist, risk is reduced but not eliminated (existing accounts could be compromised externally).

Detection — how to check if your site has been targeted

Perform these checks immediately. They are practical and conservative; always make backups before making changes.

  1. Search the database for suspicious strings in post titles, post meta, or plugin tables. Look for <script, onerror=, javascript:, or encoded variants like &#x3C;script.
  2. WP-CLI safe read-only queries (examples):
    wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title, post_type FROM wp_posts WHERE post_title LIKE '%
    wp db query "SELECT meta_id, post_id, meta_key, meta_value FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_value LIKE '%
  3. If no WP-CLI, use mysqldump + grep or search database exports for suspicious tokens.
  4. Inspect recent posts, drafts, previews from low-privilege accounts.
  5. Review server and application logs for admin-side GET/POSTs referencing plugin pages or title parameters.
  6. Check for new admin users, changed passwords, modified files, unexpected scheduled tasks, or unfamiliar PHP files in uploads or plugin/theme directories.
  7. Run malware scans with your existing toolset and search for webshell indicators and unusual file changes.

If you find indicators of compromise, proceed to the incident response checklist below.

Short-term mitigation (apply these immediately)

When an official plugin patch is not available, take these emergency steps to reduce exposure:

  1. Deactivate the plugin immediately.
    • If admin access is unavailable, rename the plugin folder via SFTP/SSH: wp-content/plugins/list-subpages → wp-content/plugins/list-subpages.disabled
  2. If you cannot fully deactivate the plugin, restrict access to its UI and pages:
    • Limit who can access admin pages that render plugin output.
    • Restrict capability checks so only administrators can reach plugin screens.
  3. Temporarily disable public registration (Settings → General → Membership) and audit Contributor accounts. Demote or remove any untrusted Contributors.
  4. Add an output-sanitizing filter to escape titles at render time (see code snippets below) as a temporary virtual patch on the site.
  5. At web server level, block or challenge requests that include clear XSS patterns in the title parameter (for example: <script, onerror=, javascript:).
  6. Monitor admin logins and rotate passwords for administrative users if suspicious activity is observed.

Rationale: Deactivation prevents new payload storage and rendering. Server-level rules and output-sanitizing filters reduce the chance that stored content executes when accessed by privileged users. These measures are temporary and should be replaced by an official patch or a secure plugin alternative.

Permanent mitigation and best practice (after official patch or when replacing plugin)

  1. Apply the official plugin update when the vendor releases a fix; test in staging before production.
  2. If no patch is provided, replace the plugin with a maintained alternative or implement the needed functionality via trusted custom code with proper input validation and output escaping.
  3. Always escape output when printing user-supplied content:
    • Titles: esc_html() or esc_attr()
    • URLs: esc_url()
    • Rich HTML only via a restrictive wp_kses() policy
  4. Implement least-privilege policies: disable public registrations unless necessary, and minimise accounts with Contributor+ capabilities.
  5. Sanitise inputs at submission using functions like sanitize_text_field() and wp_kses_post() where appropriate.
  6. Maintain routine security hygiene: update core/themes/plugins, remove unused plugins, enforce strong passwords and MFA for privileged accounts, and keep off-site backups.

Hardening with code snippets (temporary site-side mitigations)

These defensive snippets are intended as short-term mitigations. Test on staging before deploying to production. Create a small mu-plugin (e.g., wp-content/mu-plugins/list-subpages-mitigations.php).

1) Sanitize titles during output

<?php
/**
 * Temporary mitigation: sanitize titles during output.
 * Place in wp-content/mu-plugins/list-subpages-mitigations.php
 */

add_filter( 'the_title', 'hk_sanitize_title_output', 10, 2 );
function hk_sanitize_title_output( $title, $id ) {
    if ( is_string( $title ) && ( stripos( $title, '<script' ) !== false || stripos( $title, '<img' ) !== false || stripos( $title, 'onerror=' ) !== false || stripos( $title, 'javascript:' ) !== false ) ) {
        return esc_html( $title );
    }
    return wp_kses_post( $title );
}
?>

2) Restrict plugin admin pages to administrators only

<?php
/**
 * Restrict access to List Subpages admin screens to administrators only.
 */

add_action( 'admin_init', 'hk_restrict_list_subpages_admin' );
function hk_restrict_list_subpages_admin() {
    if ( ! current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) {
        global $pagenow;
        $blocked_slugs = array( 'tools.php?page=list-subpages', 'admin.php?page=list-subpages' );

        if ( isset( $_GET['page'] ) ) {
            $current = $pagenow . '?page=' . sanitize_text_field( $_GET['page'] );
            if ( in_array( $current, $blocked_slugs, true ) ) {
                wp_die( 'Insufficient permissions to access this page.' );
            }
        }
    }
}
?>

3) Sanitize incoming POST data named title

<?php
/**
 * Defensive: sanitize any incoming 'title' parameter in POST requests.
 */

add_action( 'init', 'hk_defensive_sanitize_post_title' );
function hk_defensive_sanitize_post_title() {
    if ( $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST' && ! empty( $_POST['title'] ) ) {
        $_POST['title'] = wp_strip_all_tags( wp_kses_post( $_POST['title'] ) );
    }
}
?>

These snippets reduce risk but are not a substitute for a proper code fix. Remove or update them after applying an official patch or replacing the plugin.

Web Application Firewall (WAF) / virtual patching guidance

A WAF or server-level filtering can provide immediate protection by blocking common exploit payloads, but it should complement code-level fixes rather than replace them. Suggested high-level rules (conceptual):

  • Block or challenge requests where the title parameter contains <script or encoded equivalents (&lt;script, &#x3C;script).
  • Block requests with title containing onmouseover=, onerror=, javascript:, or suspicious src attributes.
  • Throttle or block POSTs to plugin admin endpoints from IPs exhibiting high request rates or originating from unrelated geographies.

Example conceptual pattern (adapt to your WAF syntax):

If REQUEST_METHOD == POST and REQUEST_BODY contains `(title=.*(<|&lt;|%3C)(script|img|iframe|svg)|onerror=|javascript:)` then BLOCK

Use logging and alerts to capture blocked attempts for follow-up investigation. WAFs buy time but do not fix insecure server-side output handling.

Incident response checklist (if you find evidence of exploitation)

  1. Contain:
    • Disable the vulnerable plugin (deactivate or rename the plugin folder).
    • Lock down administration access; enable maintenance mode if necessary.
    • Remove or block Contributor accounts suspected of being abused.
  2. Preserve evidence:
    • Export web server logs, database entries with suspicious content, and copies of affected files.
    • Create a forensics copy of the live site for offline analysis.
  3. Eradicate:
    • Remove stored malicious payloads from the database (carefully).
    • Remove new admin users, scheduled tasks, backdoor files, and unfamiliar PHP scripts.
    • Rotate secrets: WordPress salts, admin passwords, and any exposed API keys.
  4. Recover:
    • Restore from a known clean backup if necessary.
    • Reinstall WordPress core/themes/plugins from trusted sources and re-scan.
  5. Review & harden:
    • Apply permanent mitigations, audit user roles, and enable MFA for admin/editor accounts.
    • Implement continuous monitoring and scheduled security reviews.
  6. Notify stakeholders if sensitive data was accessed and comply with local regulations.

If you need professional incident response, engage a qualified WordPress forensic team or security consultant experienced with PHP/WordPress investigations.

Searching for indicators — useful queries and commands

Examples for experienced administrators. Always run non-destructive read-only queries first and ensure backups exist.

WP-CLI (read-only)

wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title, post_author, post_date FROM wp_posts WHERE post_title LIKE '%
wp user list --role=contributor --fields=ID,user_login,user_email

MySQL direct

SELECT post_id, meta_key, meta_value FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_value LIKE '%

Filesystem

grep -R --line-number --exclude-dir=cache "<script" wp-content/uploads || true

Logs

zgrep "title=" /var/log/apache2/access.log* | tail -n 200

Long-term recommendations and policy

  • Maintain a plugin inventory and vet third-party plugins before installation.
  • Use staging environments to test updates and security fixes.
  • Enforce strong passwords and multi-factor authentication for all privileged accounts.
  • Apply least-privilege principles: only grant Contributor+ roles when necessary and consider custom roles for fine-grained control.
  • Subscribe to reputable vulnerability feeds and maintain a documented emergency patching process.
  • Schedule quarterly security reviews of plugins and custom code.

Considerations for agencies and multi-site installations

  • On WordPress Multisite, a stored XSS can impact multiple sites. Deactivate network-wide if present.
  • Managed hosting: coordinate with your host for log scanning, credential rotation, and backups.
  • Agencies managing many client sites should automate detection and filtering to prevent mass exploitation.

Example timeline and responsibilities for site administrators

  • Day 0 (disclosure): Identify whether the plugin is installed and if its version is ≤ 1.0.6.
  • Within hours: Deactivate plugin or apply server-level blocking rules; audit Contributor accounts and recent posts.
  • Within 24–72 hours: Remove discovered payloads, scan for secondary compromise, rotate admin credentials.
  • Ongoing: Monitor for vendor patch, test on staging, and apply the patch promptly when available.

Suggested responsibilities:

  • Site Admin: Immediate mitigations and user review.
  • Developer: Implement temporary code mitigations and test fixes.
  • Host/Operations: Assist with logs, backups, and server-side blocking.
  • Security Lead: Run scans, confirm eradication, and maintain monitoring.

Frequently asked questions (FAQ)

Q: If Contributors cannot publish, am I still at risk?

A: Yes. Stored XSS does not require publishing. If a Contributor can create or edit content that is saved and later rendered (including previews), payloads can execute when viewed by an administrator or editor.

Q: What if the plugin is installed but not actively used?

A: Even unused plugins can expose attack surfaces if they register admin pages, shortcodes, or render stored values. Deactivate unused plugins.

Q: Can a WAF fully solve this?

A: A WAF is an effective mitigation to reduce exploitation attempts, but it is not a replacement for fixing the vulnerable code. Use WAFs together with code repairs and other controls.

Q: How will I know if I’ve been exploited?

A: Look for unexpected admin actions, new admin users, modified files, suspicious content in posts/titles/meta, and anomalous log activity. Use the detection steps listed above.

Final words from a Hong Kong security expert

Stored XSS vulnerabilities that allow low-privilege users to plant persistent payloads are especially dangerous because they weaponise the human element — administrators and editors viewing content. The mitigation path is clear: contain immediately, search for indicators, remove payloads safely, and apply code-level fixes or plugin replacements that enforce proper escaping.

Act quickly but carefully. If you have multiple sites or clients, prioritise those with public registration or frequent admin previews. For complex compromises, engage an experienced WordPress incident response team that can perform thorough forensics and cleanup.

Stay vigilant. Regularly review plugin inventories, enforce least privilege, enable multi-factor authentication, and keep backups offline. These practices will lower your risk profile for this and future vulnerabilities.

— Hong Kong Security Expert


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