A critical SQL injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-28115) has been disclosed in the WordPress plugin “WP Attractive Donations System – Easy Stripe & Paypal donations” affecting versions up to and including 1.25. The issue is exploitable by unauthenticated attackers and has been assigned a high severity rating (CVSS 9.3). At the time of disclosure there is no official patch available from the plugin author.

If your site uses this plugin, treat this as an emergency. This advisory is written in a practical, no-nonsense style for administrators, hosting providers, and security engineers who need immediate, actionable guidance to reduce risk and to plan recovery.

What you’ll find in this article

• Plain-language description of the vulnerability and impact
• How an attacker may abuse it (high level, defensive)
• Immediate containment and mitigation steps (what to do now)
• Suggested virtual patching and monitoring examples (defensive)
• Forensic and recovery guidance if you suspect compromise
• Long-term hardening measures and procedures

Quick summary (TL;DR)

• Vulnerability: SQL Injection (CVE-2026-28115)
• Component: WP Attractive Donations System (plugin)
• Affected versions: ≤ 1.25
• Authentication required: None (unauthenticated)
• Severity: High — CVSS 9.3
• Official patch status: No official patch available at time of disclosure
• Immediate recommended actions: Disable or remove the plugin, implement virtual patching (WAF or webserver blocking), rotate credentials, audit logs and backups

Why this is serious

SQL injection (SQLi) allows an attacker to manipulate database queries the application performs. For WordPress sites, a successful SQLi can lead to:

• Full database read and exfiltration (user lists, password hashes, payment tokens, emails)
• Data modification (adding admin users, altering content)
• Complete site takeover if the attacker can create an admin account or inject a backdoor
• Disclosure of payment or donor data — a critical compliance concern for donation sites
• Persistent compromise (webshells, malware) that survives updates unless cleaned

An unauthenticated SQL injection in a donation/payment plugin is particularly dangerous because such plugins frequently interact with payment and user data. The fact that exploitation requires no valid account means broad internet scanning and automatic exploitation attempts are likely.

High-level technical overview (defensive)

A SQL injection occurs when user-supplied input is included in SQL queries without proper sanitization or parameterization. The exact vulnerable parameter and source code path for this disclosure are part of the technical report; regardless, the core risk is the plugin accepts attacker-controlled input and uses it to build SQL which is sent to the WordPress database.

Attackers typically probe plugin endpoints (AJAX actions, REST endpoints, public forms, or plugin-specific files under /wp-content/plugins/) that accept request parameters and try to inject SQL meta‑characters and constructs (e.g., quotes, SQL keywords). A successful injection can cause the database to return controlled data or alter its state.

No exploit code is provided here. The guidance below focuses on defensive detection and mitigation.

Immediate containment checklist (do this now — in order)

1. Take an offline backup (files + DB)

   Create a full backup and store it off the server before making further changes. This preserves evidence for later forensic analysis.

2. Identify if the plugin is active

   In the WordPress admin: Plugins → find “WP Attractive Donations System” and check the version. CLI: wp plugin list | grep -i "attractive" (or similar).

3. If installed and version ≤ 1.25, disable or remove it immediately

   Deactivate or uninstall the plugin. If you cannot access admin, rename its plugin folder via SFTP or CLI, for example:

   mv wp-content/plugins/wp-attractive-donations-system wp-content/plugins/wp-attractive-donations-system.disabled

4. Put the site into maintenance / read-only mode (if feasible)

   Reduce attack surface while you investigate — temporarily block user interactions that touch payment/donation functionality.

5. Enable virtual patching at server or edge

   Use a WAF or simple server-level blocks to prevent exploitation of the plugin path. If you do not have a dedicated WAF, implement server blocks (examples below).

6. Rotate all secrets and credentials that may have been touched

   Change WordPress admin passwords, database user password, SMTP credentials, payment gateway API keys (Stripe/PayPal), and any integration tokens.

7. Review logs for suspicious activity

   Check web server logs, PHP-FPM logs, WordPress debug logs, and database logs for anomalous requests or unexpected queries.

8. Increase monitoring and isolate if you find indicators of compromise

   If you see signs of exploitation, take the site offline, preserve logs, and consider restoring from a clean pre‑compromise backup.

Where to look for suspicious indicators (hunting guide)

• Web server access logs
  • Requests to plugin paths, e.g. /wp-content/plugins/wp-attractive-donations-system/
  • Requests containing SQL meta‑characters (%27, %22, +UNION+, SELECT, ORDER BY, GROUP BY, –, /* etc.)
• WordPress logs
  • New admin users created unexpectedly
  • Unexpected content changes or posts with unfamiliar content
  • Failed login spikes or unusual login patterns
• Database activity
  • Unexpected SELECT queries returning data from wp_users, wp_posts, wp_options
  • Inserts into wp_users or wp_usermeta that create new admin privileges
  • Suspicious or repeated queries that include SQL control strings
• Filesystem
  • Recently modified PHP files in the uploads directory or theme/plugin directories
  • Unknown files containing obfuscated PHP code or webshell signatures
• Cron and scheduled tasks
  • New cron hooks or scheduled events that execute unknown code

Search examples (CLI)

# Find references to the plugin folder in access logs
grep -i "wp-attractive-donations" /var/log/apache2/access.log*

# Search for suspicious SQL keywords in logs (restrict to plugin path to reduce false positives)
grep -iE "wp-attractive-donations|wp_attractive|attractive_donations" /var/log/nginx/access.log* | grep -iE "union|select|information_schema|sleep|benchmark|concat|--|/\*"

# Find recently modified PHP files in uploads
find wp-content/uploads -type f -iname "*.php" -mtime -30 -print

# List recent changes in plugin/theme directories
find wp-content/themes wp-content/plugins -type f -mtime -30 -ls

Immediate mitigations you can apply (technical)

If you cannot safely remove the plugin because doing so breaks live payment flows, implement these temporary mitigations.

1. Block access to plugin files / endpoints via web server

Nginx example to return 403 for plugin path:

location ~* /wp-content/plugins/wp-attractive-donations-system/ {
    deny all;
    return 403;
}

Apache .htaccess example:

<Directory "/var/www/html/wp-content/plugins/wp-attractive-donations-system/">
    Order allow,deny
    Deny from all
</Directory>

2. Restrict access to sensitive admin endpoints by IP

Limit wp-login.php and wp-admin to administrator IPs where practical.

3. Add a targeted server/WAF rule (virtual patch)

Block any requests where the REQUEST_URI contains the plugin slug and the query string contains SQL control characters or typical SQL keywords. Example ModSecurity-style rules (for defenders):

# Rule: block suspicious SQL keywords to the known plugin path
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains /wp-content/plugins/wp-attractive-donations-system/" "phase:1,id:900100,deny,status:403,msg:'Blocked requests to WP Attractive Donations plugin path'"
SecRule REQUEST_URI|ARGS|ARGS_NAMES "@rx (?i:(union|select|concat|information_schema|sleep|benchmark|--|/\*|;))" "phase:2,id:900101,deny,log,status:403,msg:'SQLi-like payload detected and blocked'"

# Tune to reduce false positives: require both plugin path AND SQL-like patterns before blocking.

Notes:

• Tune the rule to reduce false positives — wrap it so the rule only triggers when both the plugin path and SQL-like patterns are present.
• Monitor logs for true positives and adjust thresholds.

4. Apply request throttling and rate limits

Limit requests to plugin endpoints to reduce mass scanning and brute-force exploitation attempts.

5. Harden DB user privileges temporarily

Remove unnecessary privileges from the WordPress DB user (avoid GRANT / DROP privileges when possible). If practical, create a read-only user for public read operations (this is a longer-term architecture change).

Suggested WAF / Virtual patching rules — defensive examples

Below are conservative defensive examples intended for a WAF or ModSecurity-compatible system. Test rules in monitoring mode before switching to blocking.

1. Block requests to the plugin folder that contain SQL keywords/patterns

   Condition A: REQUEST_URI contains "wp-attractive-donations" or "WP_AttractiveDonationsSystem"
   AND
   Condition B: ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY matches regex for SQL meta-characters or keywords
   If A and B true -> BLOCK and LOG

2. Reject suspicious characters on endpoints that expect numeric IDs

   SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /wp-content/plugins/wp-attractive-donations-system/.*(donation|id)" \
     "chain,deny,id:900200,msg:'Non-numeric id to donation endpoint'"
   SecRule ARGS:id "!@rx ^\d+$"

3. Rate-limit and CAPTCHA suspicious endpoints

   Add challenge responses (CAPTCHA) or rate-limit when multiple attempts to plugin endpoints are observed.

Remember: virtual patching reduces risk while waiting for an official patch, but it is not a substitute for removing the vulnerable code or applying the vendor-supplied fix when available.

Forensic checklist — if you suspect exploitation

If you detect suspicious activity that suggests the site was exploited, follow an incident response process:

1. Preserve evidence

   Make copies of logs, current files, and the database and store them off the host.

2. Isolate the host

   Take the site offline or isolate it from the network while investigating.

3. Analyze the database

   Look for added admin accounts:

   SELECT user_login, user_email, user_registered, user_status FROM wp_users ORDER BY ID DESC LIMIT 50;

   Inspect wp_usermeta for capability escalations.

4. Search for webshells

   Grep for suspicious PHP eval / base64 strings, or recently modified files with PHP in upload directories.

5. Check scheduled events and options

   Check wp-cron hooks and unknown options in wp_options that invoke remote code or include eval.

6. Clean or restore

   If you find compromise, the safest route is to restore from a clean backup taken before the intrusion and to harden before bringing it online. If a clean backup is not available, audit and clean infected files, rotate credentials, and follow remediation steps carefully.

7. Notify stakeholders and compliance teams

   If donor payment data or personal data was exposed, follow applicable data breach notification laws and payment processor rules.

Long-term hardening and process improvements

• Remove unused or little-used plugins, especially those that process payments or accept public input.
• Establish a regular patching cadence (check plugins, themes, WordPress core weekly).
• Use staging for plugin updates and test before deploying to production.
• Implement the principle of least privilege for database accounts and server users.
• Harden file permissions and disable PHP execution in upload directories. Example (Apache):

<Directory "/var/www/html/wp-content/uploads">
    <FilesMatch "\.php$">
        Require all denied
    </FilesMatch>
</Directory>

• Implement file integrity monitoring for WordPress core, plugins, and theme files.
• Centralize logging for quicker hunting and faster incident detection.
• Have an incident response runbook and an up-to-date backup strategy (daily backups, tested restores).

If you need help

If you do not have internal expertise, engage your hosting provider, a trusted incident response consultant, or an experienced security engineer to help implement containment and perform forensic analysis. Seek providers that can demonstrate incident response experience and provide clear, verifiable references. Avoid rushed or unvetted service offers — choose experienced responders.

Practical checklist — what to do in the next 24 hours

1. Confirm whether the plugin is installed and the version (≤ 1.25).
2. If present — disable/uninstall the plugin now.
3. Implement virtual patching (WAF or webserver rules) for the plugin path and SQLi patterns.
4. Take a full backup (files + DB) and store offsite.
5. Rotate WP and DB credentials and any payment API keys.
6. Search logs for suspicious accesses and signs of data exfiltration.
7. Scan site for modified files and unknown admin accounts.
8. If suspicious activity found, isolate the site and follow IR procedures.
9. Consider engaging a qualified security consultant or incident response service for interim protection and deeper investigation.
10. Plan to test and apply the vendor patch when it becomes available; validate in staging first.

Example ModSecurity rule with explanation (defensive)

This example focuses blocking on requests that target the plugin folder and contain SQL-like patterns. Test in detection-only mode first.

# ID 100900 - Detect and block SQLi attempts against the known plugin path
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains wp-attractive-donations" "phase:1,id:100900,pass,log,msg:'Targeting WP Attractive Donations plugin',tag:'WP-Attractive-Donations'"
SecRule REQUEST_URI|ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS|REQUEST_BODY "@rx (?i:(\b(union|select|insert|update|delete|information_schema|concat|benchmark|sleep)\b|(--|/\*|\*/|;)))" \
  "phase:2,id:100901,deny,log,status:403,msg:'Blocked probable SQLi against WP Attractive Donations plugin',capture,tag:'SQLi',severity:2"

Explanation:

• The first rule marks requests targeting the plugin path for additional inspection.
• The second rule blocks if any of the SQL-like tokens are present anywhere in the request.
• Use logging (pass) mode first, review true/false positives, then move to deny if confident.

Final words from a Hong Kong security expert

This disclosure is a clear reminder: plugins that accept public input — especially those that interact with payments and donor data — require heightened scrutiny. SQL injection remains a high-impact, low-effort technique for attackers when input handling and parameterization are not implemented correctly.

Immediate priorities: reduce exposure by disabling or removing the vulnerable plugin, implement virtual patching (edge or server-level blocking), rotate credentials, and scrutinize logs for signs of compromise. When the vendor publishes a patch, test it in staging and apply it to production promptly.

If you lack in-house capability, engage experienced incident responders or your hosting provider. Act quickly — attackers routinely scan and exploit public disclosures.