Vulnerability Alert: “Integrate Dynamics 365 CRM” Plugin (<= 1.0.9) — Missing Authorization / Broken Access Control (CVE-2025-10746)

Published: 3 October 2025   |   Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5)   |   Affected: Integrate Dynamics 365 CRM plugin for WordPress — versions ≤ 1.0.9   |   Fixed in: 1.1.0   |   CVE: CVE-2025-10746

Note: This advisory is written from the perspective of a Hong Kong security practitioner: direct, practical, and focused on rapid risk reduction for site owners, developers and hosts.

Summary

• A missing authorization (broken access control) vulnerability exists in Integrate Dynamics 365 CRM plugin. Unauthenticated actors can call functionality that should require authorization.
• This enables privileged actions or sensitive operations in some deployments. The vendor released version 1.1.0 to address the issue; versions 1.0.9 and earlier are vulnerable.
• This advisory explains technical risk, likely attack methods, detection strategies, immediate mitigations (including server-level and WAF-style virtual patching advice), long-term fixes for developers, and an incident-response checklist.

Why this matters

Broken access control is frequently exploited in CMS ecosystems. Missing authorization checks on endpoints or admin-like actions let automated attackers change settings, exfiltrate configuration, or carry out follow-on compromise. Because this issue is exploitable by unauthenticated clients, mass scanning and automated exploitation are realistic threats. Even with a medium CVSS, the practical risk is elevated when unauthenticated access is possible and the plugin stores credentials or integration endpoints.

Technical overview (high-level)

• Type: Broken Access Control / Missing Authorization
• Vector: Plugin request handlers (admin-ajax, REST endpoints, or public form handlers) lacked proper capability checks, nonce verification, or authentication gating, enabling unauthenticated calls to privileged behavior.
• Common root causes:
  • Missing current_user_can() or equivalent capability enforcement.
  • No nonce checks (check_admin_referer / check_ajax_referer) on state-changing AJAX handlers.
  • Publicly-registered REST endpoints without permission_callback enforcing capabilities.
  • Admin-only functions bound to hooks reachable from the front-end or unauthenticated AJAX.
• Fix applied (upstream): Authorization checks (capabilities/nonces/permission callbacks) were added, and public exposure of sensitive actions was reduced or hardened in 1.1.0.

Possible impact on websites

• Unauthorized modification of plugin configuration or connection settings (potentially exposing CRM credentials or callback endpoints).
• Triggering syncs or outbound transmissions to third-party services without consent.
• Manipulation of stored mappings or credentials leading to data leakage.
• Providing an attacker a foothold to chain further actions (e.g., persistent configuration changes, token exposure, or enabling remote code paths).

Who should be concerned

• Any WordPress site using Integrate Dynamics 365 CRM plugin version 1.0.9 or earlier.
• Sites which store integration credentials or send business-critical data to external systems (CRMs, ERPs).
• Agencies and hosts managing multiple sites where the vulnerable plugin may be present.

Immediate actions — step-by-step

1. Verify plugin versions
   Check WP Admin → Plugins. If the plugin is not visible, inspect via WP-CLI or filesystem:

   wp plugin list

   or check plugin header/readme in wp-content/plugins/integrate-dynamics-365-crm/ for the version.

2. Update to patched version
   If you can update safely, upgrade to Integrate Dynamics 365 CRM 1.1.0 or later immediately. This is the definitive fix.
3. If you cannot update immediately — apply temporary mitigations
   – Deactivate the plugin until you can apply the update (fastest risk removal).
   – If deactivation is impossible due to critical business workflows, restrict access to the plugin endpoints using server-level rules or edge WAF rules (examples below).
4. Review logs
   Inspect web server and application logs for suspicious admin-ajax or REST requests and watch for changes in plugin settings or outbound CRM calls.
5. If compromise is suspected
   Follow the incident response checklist later in this advisory (isolate, snapshot, rotate credentials, forensic review).

Detection and hunting

Search logs for plugin-specific endpoints or parameters normally reserved for admin operations:

• Requests to admin-ajax.php with plugin action parameters (e.g., ?action=integrate_d365_sync). Search web server logs for admin-ajax calls from unknown IPs.
• REST requests to plugin-specific routes under /wp-json/* that should be protected.
• POST requests to plugin file paths or form handlers that change settings.

Example log searches:

grep -E "integrate.*dynamics|d365|integrate-dynamics" /var/log/nginx/access.log
grep "admin-ajax.php" /var/log/apache2/access.log | grep "action="

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs): sudden plugin configuration changes, unexpected outbound traffic to CRM domains, creation/modification of files storing secrets, or new admin users.

Temporary virtual patching and server-level mitigations

When immediate plugin updates are not feasible, intercepting or blocking unauthenticated requests to affected endpoints reduces risk. Below are generic, temporary server-level examples. Test carefully — overly broad rules can break functionality.

Nginx example

# Deny direct access to plugin's AJAX endpoint by unauthenticated sources (temporary)
location ~* /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php {
    if ($arg_action ~* "(integrate_dynamics|d365|integrate_d365)") {
        # Allow only logged-in sessions (cookie check) or known admin referrers
        if ($http_cookie !~* "wordpress_logged_in_") {
            return 403;
        }
    }
    # proceed with usual fastcgi / proxy handling
}

Apache /.htaccess example

# Temporary deny direct requests to plugin php files except from allowed IPs

  Require all denied
  # Permit admin IPs (example)
  Require ip 203.0.113.10

Alternatively, if you operate an edge WAF or reverse proxy, create rules that:

• Block unauthenticated POST/GET requests to plugin-specific endpoints that perform privileged actions.
• Require presence of WordPress session cookie or custom header for admin-like actions.
• Enforce rate limits and block known abusive user agents or IP reputation lists.

Recommended WordPress-level hardening and code mitigations (for developers)

Long-term remediation is code-level: add capability checks, nonce validation and permission callbacks.

AJAX handler example:

add_action('wp_ajax_my_plugin_action', 'my_plugin_action_handler');

function my_plugin_action_handler() {
    if ( ! current_user_can('manage_options') ) {
        wp_send_json_error('Unauthorized', 403);
    }

    check_ajax_referer('my_plugin_nonce', 'security');

    // proceed with privileged action
}

REST endpoint example:

register_rest_route('my-plugin/v1', '/action', array(
  'methods' => 'POST',
  'callback' => 'my_plugin_action',
  'permission_callback' => function () {
      return current_user_can('manage_options');
  }
));

Best practices:

• Require explicit capability checks for any state-changing or admin-level behavior.
• Use nonces for AJAX and form submissions, and combine nonces with capability checks.
• Include permission_callback for REST routes; avoid public exposure of admin endpoints.
• Validate and sanitize all inputs; assume all external input is untrusted.

Detection rules for WAF/IDS systems (conceptual)

• Alert on admin-ajax calls with plugin-specific action parameters from clients without wordpress_logged_in cookies.
• Alert on REST route access to plugin endpoints by IPs lacking authenticated session cookies.
• Flag large numbers of calls to plugin endpoints from single IPs or IP ranges (rate-limit thresholds).
• Alert on POST requests that change site options where the request origin is not an admin session.

Incident response checklist (if you suspect compromise)

1. Isolate and snapshot: Take file and DB snapshots for forensic analysis. Preserve logs.
2. Rotate credentials: Reset WordPress admin passwords, API keys, and any external credentials used by the plugin (CRM tokens).
3. Update and patch: Apply plugin update 1.1.0 immediately or deactivate the plugin if update is not possible safely.
4. Scan for persistence: Look for modified files in wp-content, uploads, mu-plugins, themes; search for webshells, suspicious cron jobs, new admin users, and altered database entries.
5. Restore if necessary: If compromise is deep, restore from a known clean backup and reapply security measures.
6. Notify and rotate external secrets: Rotate CRM credentials/tokens if stored or used by the plugin.
7. Follow-up hardening: Enforce 2FA for admins, review access logs, and continue monitoring.

Best practices to reduce exposure to plugin vulnerabilities

• Keep WordPress core, themes and plugins up-to-date. Patch cadence is critical.
• Maintain an inventory of plugins and versions across managed sites; automate with WP-CLI where possible.
• Limit plugin use to necessary, trusted tools and remove unused plugins.
• Apply least privilege principles to user accounts and integration accounts.
• Use 2FA for administrator accounts and enforce strong password policies.
• Run a WAF or edge filtering where feasible and implement virtual patching rules for emergent vulnerabilities.
• Monitor logs and set alerts for anomalous admin-ajax and REST activity.

Why virtual patching matters

When code changes are required in plugin source, not all sites can update immediately (compatibility, staging tests, business constraints). Virtual patching at the edge or via server rules can:

• Intercept and block known exploit patterns before they reach the site.
• Reduce mass exploitation while you schedule and test the official fix.
• Be deployed quickly without modifying site files, lowering immediate operational risk.

How attackers typically find and exploit this class of bug

1. Discovery: automated scanners enumerate plugin slugs and probe endpoints (admin-ajax?action=X, REST routes).
2. Exploitation: attackers issue requests that trigger privileged behavior when capability checks are missing.
3. Automation: patterns are automated and mass-scanned across large address spaces.
4. Chaining: after successful actions, attackers may add persistence, exfiltrate tokens, or pivot to other systems.

Practical defensive checklist for hosts and agencies

• Enable automatic updates for minor/patch releases where appropriate and test critical updates in staging before production.
• Monitor admin-ajax and REST patterns across sites and set automated alerts for anomalies.
• Use rate limiting and IP reputation controls to reduce noise from scanning bots.
• Apply per-site virtual patching policies during disclosure windows to prevent exploitation before updates are applied.
• Educate site owners about plugin lifecycle and the importance of timely updates.

Sample incident timeline (expected)

• Day 0 (disclosure): Advisory published and patch released. Scanning begins quickly.
• Day 0–2: Opportunistic actors probe and attempt automated exploits.
• Day 2–7: Mass exploitation often increases if the vulnerability is reliable.
• Recommendation: aim to update and/or deploy virtual patching within 24–72 hours of disclosure.

Safe development tips for plugin authors

• Always validate permissions: assert specific capabilities for every state-changing action.
• Use nonces for forms and AJAX; pair nonces with capability checks rather than relying on nonces alone.
• Ensure REST endpoints include a permission_callback that checks capabilities and context.
• Document endpoints and minimize public exposure; create CI tests for authorization logic.

Legal and compliance considerations

If the plugin stores or transmits personal data, a vulnerability allowing unauthorized access or transmissions can trigger breach notification obligations. Consult legal or compliance teams and rotate exposed credentials where necessary.

Communications guidance (for agencies and hosts)

• Be transparent with affected site owners about the vulnerability, remediation status, and recommended steps.
• Provide a clear timeline for mitigation and updates.
• Advise rotation of credentials and monitoring of outbound activity if the plugin integrates with external services.

What to include in a post-mortem

• Timeline of events and detection points.
• Evidence of exploitation (logs, modified files, outbound calls).
• Actions taken (updates, credential rotation, restoration).
• Root cause analysis and changes implemented to prevent recurrence.
• Lessons learned and updates to processes or policies.

Suggested monitoring and alerting rules (concise)

• Alert on admin-ajax.php requests with plugin action parameters from clients without wordpress_logged_in cookies.
• Alert on POST requests to plugin endpoints originating from unexpected geographies or IPs.
• Alert on traffic spikes to plugin endpoints.
• Alert on changes to wp_options rows relevant to the plugin.

A real-world defensive playbook (for small teams)

1. Inventory plugins and versions weekly (automate with WP-CLI).
2. Subscribe to trusted vulnerability feeds and configure alerts for plugins you use.
3. Apply critical patches quickly; schedule non-critical updates in maintenance windows.
4. If you cannot patch immediately, enable virtual patching at the edge or temporarily deactivate the plugin.
5. After patching, run a full site scan and review logs for the prior 30 days for suspicious activity.
6. Consider a short-term forced password reset for administrators and rotate external credentials the plugin uses.

Final recommendations (short checklist)

• Update Integrate Dynamics 365 CRM to 1.1.0 or later immediately.
• If immediate update is impossible, temporarily deactivate the plugin or apply targeted server/WAF rules to restrict access.
• Rotate any credentials used by the plugin and audit for suspicious outbound activity.
• Implement ongoing monitoring and maintain an inventory/patching cadence.

Need assistance

If you require help, engage a trusted security consultant, your hosting provider, or an internal security team to apply mitigations, perform forensic checks, and assist with remediation and monitoring.