Overview

An authenticated SQL Injection vulnerability has been disclosed in the WP Google Map WordPress plugin (versions ≤ 1.0), tracked as CVE-2025-11365. A user with Contributor-level access (or higher) can craft requests that lead to unsafe SQL execution against the site database. This is particularly dangerous for multi-author blogs, membership sites, and any installation that grants write privileges to non-administrator users.

As a security professional based in Hong Kong, this advisory gives a concise, practical checklist to triage, detect, and mitigate risk. The guidance focuses on immediate actions, detection indicators, virtual patching concepts (WAF), and long-term developer fixes. No vendor endorsements are included — the steps are vendor-neutral and applicable worldwide.

What happened (in plain language)

The plugin exposes an endpoint (commonly an AJAX or admin-post handler) that inserts user-supplied input into a SQL query without proper sanitisation or parameter binding. A malicious Contributor can submit crafted input that alters the SQL query’s logic, enabling reading, modification, or deletion of database contents.

• Vulnerable versions: WP Google Map ≤ 1.0
• CVE: CVE-2025-11365
• Required privilege: Contributor (authenticated) or higher
• Official fix: Not available at disclosure time
• Risk: Data theft, data manipulation, possible site takeover depending on data exposed (wp_users, wp_options, etc.)

Why Contributor-level exploitation is alarming

Site owners often assume only Administrators pose a real threat. Contributor access is commonly given to authors, guest writers, forum moderators, or local community members. SQL Injection bypasses role limitations by interacting directly with the database — an attacker with Contributor access may be able to extract password hashes, alter options to load backdoors, create admin users in the database, or trigger scheduled tasks.

Immediate risk assessment (quick triage)

Treat this as a high-priority issue if your site matches any of the following:

• The WP Google Map plugin is installed and active (≤ 1.0).
• Non-admin roles (Contributors, Authors) can interact with plugin features.
• There are new or unreviewed users with writing permissions.
• You run multisite or multiple sites where the plugin may be active.

Even absent clear signs of compromise, authenticated exploitability combined with writable roles requires fast mitigation.

Immediate actions — what you should do in the next hour (order matters)

1. Pause risky functionality.
   • Deactivate the WP Google Map plugin from the Plugins page if you can. This immediately stops exploitation attempts.
   • If you cannot access wp-admin, rename the plugin folder via SFTP/SSH:

     mv wp-content/plugins/wp-google-map wp-content/plugins/wp-google-map.disabled

2. Privilege lockdown.
   • Temporarily remove or downgrade Contributor/Author roles where possible. Replace them with non-writing roles until triage is complete.
   • Audit recently created users (last 30 days) and suspend accounts you cannot verify.
3. Enable web application protections (virtual patching).
   • If you have a WAF or firewall capability (host-level, reverse proxy, or plugin-based), enable rules that block SQLi patterns against plugin endpoints. See the WAF rules section for guidance.
   • If you don’t have one, consider deploying host-provided protections or contacting a trusted security consultant or your hosting provider for immediate assistance.
4. Back up everything.
   • Create an immediate full backup (files + database) and store it off-server or in immutable storage for forensic analysis.
5. Rotate sensitive secrets.
   • If compromise is suspected, rotate database credentials, WordPress salts, and any API keys stored on the site.
6. Monitor and log.
   • Increase logging for admin-ajax.php and plugin endpoints. Capture request bodies where permitted by policy.
   • Record IP addresses and timestamps for suspicious activity.
7. Communicate internally.
   • Notify your operations, development, and hosting teams so they can help isolate and triage the incident.

How to check if you were exploited (evidence to look for)

SQLi can be stealthy. Review the following indicators:

• Unexpected new administrator users in wp_users.
• Modified wp_options entries (active_plugins, siteurl, home, widget_*).
• Suspicious files under wp-content/uploads, wp-content/mu-plugins, or unknown PHP files.
• Unknown scheduled tasks (wp_cron entries), or new themes/plugins installed without authorization.
• Modified usermeta entries changing roles/capabilities.
• Access logs showing contributor sessions making POST requests to admin-ajax.php or plugin endpoints with odd parameters.
• Outbound connections from the site to unknown IPs/domains (possible data exfiltration or C2).

Quick read-only database checks (run queries as read-only where possible):

-- List recently added users
SELECT ID, user_login, user_email, user_registered
FROM wp_users
WHERE user_registered > (NOW() - INTERVAL 30 DAY);

-- Check critical options
SELECT option_name, option_value
FROM wp_options
WHERE option_name IN ('active_plugins','siteurl','home');

-- Inspect cron entries
SELECT option_value
FROM wp_options
WHERE option_name = 'cron';

If you find anomalies, preserve logs and backups and escalate to incident response.

Longer-term mitigation and secure development recommendations (for developers)

The correct remedy is a secure code fix. Relying on WAFs indefinitely is not a substitute for patching. Core developer actions:

1. Input validation and parameterized queries

Never concatenate unchecked input into SQL. Use parameterized queries— in WordPress, prefer $wpdb->prepare(). Sanitize inputs appropriately.

global $wpdb;
$search = $_POST['search_term'] ?? '';
$search = sanitize_text_field( $search );
$sql = $wpdb->prepare( "SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}your_table WHERE title LIKE %s", '%' . $wpdb->esc_like( $search ) . '%' );
$results = $wpdb->get_results( $sql );

2. Capability checks

if ( ! current_user_can( 'edit_posts' ) ) {
    wp_die( 'Insufficient privileges' );
}

Always validate on the server side — authenticated does not mean authorised for every action.

3. Nonce verification

Protect form and AJAX endpoints with nonces (wp_create_nonce, check_admin_referer, wp_verify_nonce) and deny requests missing valid nonces.

4. Least-privilege design

Avoid exposing database-affecting features to contributor-level users. If a feature requires elevated privileges, enforce that on the server.

5. Output escaping

Escape outputs to mitigate chained attacks (XSS that leads to CSRF/SQLi combos).

6. Logging and alerting

Log suspicious parameter values and invalid nonce usage for early detection.

Recommended virtual-patching / WAF rules (vendor-neutral)

When no official patch exists, virtual patching via a WAF can reduce immediate risk. Below are high-level, vendor-neutral rules to consider. Start in detection mode, tune rules to reduce false positives, then enable blocking once confident.

1. Block SQL control patterns against plugin endpoints.
   • Identify plugin-specific AJAX/admin endpoints (admin-ajax.php actions or plugin file paths).
   • Block POSTs containing SQL meta-characters combined with SQL keywords, SQL comment sequences (/* */ or –), UNION SELECT patterns, or stacked queries.
   • Rule example (conceptual): If POST to admin-ajax.php with action matching plugin AND authenticated as Contributor AND request body contains SQL keywords + quotes/punctuation => block.
2. Parameter whitelist enforcement.
   • Only allow expected formats: numeric params accept digits only; short labels limited to alphanumerics and defined punctuation; enforce max length.
3. Require referer and nonce for admin requests.
   • Challenge or drop requests to admin endpoints lacking a valid referer from your domain or a valid nonce.
4. Behavioral/ratelimiting rules.
   • Throttle contributors making many POSTs in a short window; challenge unusually high activity or repeated invalid nonces.
5. Block obfuscation attempts.
   • Detect double-encoding, nested URL encoding, and other obfuscation attempts and challenge these requests.
6. Response-based detection.
   • If SQL errors or stack traces appear in responses to Contributor requests, escalate: block the session/IP and alert admins.

Incident response: a step-by-step playbook

1. Isolate the site. Put the site into maintenance mode or network-isolate to prevent further access.
2. Preserve evidence. Copy logs, database, and files. Do not make destructive changes before collecting evidence.
3. Rotate credentials. Change DB passwords, WordPress salts, admin passwords, and API keys — after ensuring you have backups to allow triage.
4. Remove backdoors. Inspect for malicious PHP files, rogue plugins/themes, unknown admin users, and suspicious scheduled tasks.
5. Restore from clean backup. If you have a confirmed clean backup, restore and then re-apply only audited plugin/theme versions.
6. Post-mortem and hardening. Apply the code fix, tighten privileges, improve logging, and adopt virtual patching for a measured period if required.
7. Communicate. If user data may have been exposed, follow applicable breach notification laws and inform stakeholders appropriately.

Detection rules and logging recommendations

• Log every POST to admin-ajax.php and plugin AJAX endpoints with timestamp, user ID, IP, user agent and masked request parameters.
• Alert on repeated invalid nonce attempts, requests with SQL tokens, and unusually high POST rates from a single contributor account.
• Correlate webserver logs, WordPress logs, and hosting-level logs to detect lateral movement.

Why the database matters and when to rotate DB credentials

Successful SQLi can expose wp_users and other sensitive data. Even if passwords are hashed, offline cracking is possible and reused passwords increase risk. If you detect data exfiltration or unknown database queries, rotate the DB user password and ensure the DB user has only the minimal privileges required by WordPress. Also rotate any secrets stored in the database (API keys, SMTP credentials) if compromise is suspected.

Developer checklist for a secure fix (summary)

• Parameterize all database queries using $wpdb->prepare()
• Sanitize inputs (sanitize_text_field, intval, esc_attr, esc_url as appropriate)
• Enforce capability checks with current_user_can()
• Protect endpoints with nonces and server-side validation
• Limit input length and character sets
• Log and alert on unexpected parameter values and repeated failures

How to safely remove / replace the plugin

1. Deactivate the plugin from WordPress admin (Plugins → Installed Plugins → Deactivate).
2. If admin is inaccessible, rename the plugin directory via SFTP/SSH:

   mv wp-content/plugins/wp-google-map wp-content/plugins/wp-google-map.disabled

3. After deactivation, inspect for leftover tables or options the plugin may have created and remove them only if you are certain they are not required.

If the plugin is essential, apply virtual patching rules, audit the plugin code, and restrict who can access plugin functionality until a safe fix is in place.

Post-incident hardening checklist

• Apply least-privilege to user roles.
• Use two-factor authentication (2FA) for administrators and privileged accounts.
• Limit plugin access — use editorial workflows or form-based submissions for contributors so inputs are sanitised before being stored.
• Keep core, plugins, and themes updated on a staged schedule; test updates in staging before production.
• Implement automated, immutable backups.
• Run scheduled malware scans and integrity checks.
• Use a reputable WAF or host-provided virtual-patching capability for emergency mitigation when patches are delayed.

Practical examples of logging and alert thresholds

• Alert when a contributor account issues more than 5 POST requests to admin endpoints within 1 minute.
• Alert on repeated POSTs containing SQL metacharacters combined with referer mismatches.
• Log and review any large data exports or long-running DB queries initiated from plugin endpoints.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: Can a Contributor exploit this remotely?

A: The attacker must be authenticated as a Contributor (or higher). Exploitation is performed via legitimate authenticated requests (AJAX or admin pages), not anonymous traffic.

Q: Is there a released patch?

A: At disclosure there was no official fix. If a vendor release becomes available, update immediately and validate in a staging environment first.

Q: Will a firewall prevent the vulnerability forever?

A: A WAF provides a mitigation layer and can block known exploitation patterns, but it is not a permanent substitute for secure code. Apply official patches when they become available.

Example incident timeline (typical exploitation)

1. Contributor crafts a malicious payload and submits it via the plugin UI or direct POST to a plugin endpoint.
2. The plugin builds a SQL query using that input and the DB executes it.
3. Attacker may retrieve rows from wp_users/wp_options, insert an admin entry, or modify settings to load remote code.
4. Attacker establishes persistence (malicious files, scheduled tasks) and exfiltrates data if undetected.

Neutral guidance on immediate protection

If you need fast mitigation while triaging, consider the following vendor-neutral options:

• Enable host-level or reverse-proxy WAF rules targeting SQLi patterns against plugin endpoints.
• Contact your hosting provider or a trusted security consultant to apply virtual-patching and help with incident triage.
• Implement strict access controls and enforce non-writing roles for contributors until the plugin is patched or replaced.

Final recommendations — what I would do now

1. Immediately deactivate or isolate the WP Google Map plugin.
2. Apply virtual-patching/WAF rules to block SQLi attempts against plugin endpoints and tune them carefully.
3. Audit and harden user roles — remove or isolate Contributor privileges if not strictly required.
4. Take immutable backups and preserve logs for forensic analysis.
5. Do not deploy code changes to production until the plugin is patched or the vulnerable code is rewritten to use parameterized queries, capability checks, and nonces.
6. If you require assistance, seek a reputable security consultant or your hosting provider for immediate incident response and mitigation.