Quick summary (TL;DR)

• The onOffice for WP‑Websites plugin (≤ 5.7) contains an SQL injection vulnerability exploitable by an authenticated user with Editor privileges.
• Editor accounts are common and frequently targeted; compromise can allow database reads, content modification, and further escalation attempts.
• CVE‑2025‑10045 has CVSS 7.6 — high impact despite requiring a logged‑in Editor.
• No official fix is available at publication time. Immediate mitigations include disabling the plugin, restricting Editor access, applying generic WAF/virtual patching measures, and following the incident response checklist below.
• If your site has Editors or uses this plugin, act now.

Why an Editor‑level SQLi matters

An SQL injection that requires an Editor account is sometimes downplayed because it is not remotely exploitable by anonymous users. In practice this is dangerous because:

• Editor accounts exist on many sites (newsrooms, multi‑author blogs, organisations) and are frequent phishing or credential‑stuffing targets.
• Compromised Editor accounts are used to persist backdoors, inject content, and sometimes escalate privileges through targeted database tampering.
• SQL injection gives an attacker direct access to the database: read emails and tokens, change metadata, or prepare privilege escalation payloads.

Requiring Editor privileges reduces attack surface but does not make the vulnerability safe.

What we know about the vulnerability

• Type: SQL Injection (OWASP A1: Injection)
• CVE: CVE‑2025‑10045
• Affected versions: onOffice for WP‑Websites ≤ 5.7
• Required privilege: Editor (authenticated)
• Impact: Database disclosure, modification, potential exfiltration or manipulation
• Official fix: Not yet available at time of disclosure

Root cause in similar cases is typically unsanitised input concatenated into SQL queries instead of using parameterised statements. Plugin admin AJAX endpoints and form handlers that trust logged‑in users are common places where this error happens.

Risk assessment — who should worry most

• Sites running onOffice for WP‑Websites (any version ≤ 5.7): high priority.
• Sites with multiple editors, particularly if editors can upload files or manage content: elevated risk.
• Sites allowing self‑registration followed by Editor promotion through misconfigured workflows: pay attention.
• Agencies and hosts managing many client sites that use this plugin: treat as urgent.

Assume relevance unless you have verified plugin usage and role configurations.

Immediate actions for site owners (ordered)

1. Inventory and assess
   • Confirm whether the onOffice for WP‑Websites plugin is installed and active.
   • Check plugin version — if ≤ 5.7, consider the site affected.
2. Temporary containment
   • If the plugin is active and you cannot patch, disable/deactivate the plugin until a safe fix is available. Deactivation may break features; weigh this against risk.
   • If deactivating is impossible, restrict access to plugin areas (IP whitelist for admin, HTTP auth for wp‑admin, or block public access to plugin endpoints).
3. Limit Editor access
   • Audit Editor accounts and retain only trusted users.
   • Remove or downgrade unused Editor accounts.
   • Force password resets for Editors and other privileged users; require strong passwords and MFA where possible.
4. Apply virtual patching (if you operate a WAF)
   • Deploy WAF rules to block SQL injection attempts on plugin endpoints. See the WAF guidance section below for patterns and rules to consider.
5. Monitor logs and signs of compromise
   • Review web server logs, WordPress activity logs, and database access for suspicious queries or unexpected admin actions.
   • Look for unusual POST requests to plugin endpoints, repeated attempts containing SQL metacharacters, or unauthorised content changes.
6. Prepare for incident response
   • Back up database and site files immediately (store offline).
   • If you detect suspicious activity, isolate the host and follow an incident response workflow: revoke credentials, rotate keys, and restore from a clean backup if necessary.

Recommended detection steps (what to look for)

Search logs for unusual patterns. Practical checks include:

• Web server / application logs
  • Unexpected POST requests to plugin‑related paths (look for the plugin slug in URLs).
  • POST parameters containing SQL keywords (SELECT, UNION, OR 1=1, –, /*).
  • Excessive requests from authenticated Editor accounts to a single endpoint.
• WordPress activity logs
  • Unusual post edits, metadata changes, or new admin users created by Editors.
  • Repeated or atypical operations invoked by Editor accounts.
• Database logs
  • Unusual, complex queries from the web server user.
  • Queries containing literal SQL fragments embedded in parameters.

If you find suspicious signs, isolate the site and treat it as potentially compromised.

Example shell search to help locate suspicious POST bodies referencing the plugin slug:

grep -i "onoffice" /var/log/apache2/access.log | grep -Ei "select|union|or%20|--|/\*|drop|insert"

Practical temporary mitigations (safe and reversible)

• Deactivate the plugin until a patched release becomes available.
• If keeping it running is unavoidable:
  • Restrict access to wp‑admin by IP so only trusted addresses can reach the dashboard.
  • Add HTTP authentication to wp‑admin/wp‑login.php for administrators.
  • Remove Editor privileges for users who do not absolutely need them; temporarily keep a small set of trusted admins.
  • Require MFA for all Editor and Administrator accounts.

Virtual patching / WAF rule guidance

Use these general WAF patterns to block likely exploitation attempts. Test rules in a staging environment before wide deployment to avoid breaking legitimate workflows.

1. Block suspicious SQL tokens in request parameters for plugin endpoints

   Conceptual rule:

   • If request URI contains plugin slug (for example, admin‑ajax.php?action=onoffice_* or other plugin admin URLs) AND request body or query string contains SQL metacharacters/keywords (UNION, SELECT, INFORMATION_SCHEMA, OR 1=1, /*, –, ; DROP) THEN block and log.

   Example regex to detect common SQLi patterns (use with caution):

   (?i:union(?:\s+all)?\s+select|select\s+.*\s+from|information_schema|or\s+1\s*=\s*1|--|/\*|\bdrop\s+table\b|;)

2. Enforce expected parameter types and lengths
   • Block requests where numeric parameters contain non‑numeric or excessively long values.
   • If a parameter should match a fixed list, reject unknown values.
3. Require valid WP nonces for administrative endpoints

   Where plugin AJAX actions perform DB writes, deny write requests that lack an expected nonce pattern. While WAF cannot fully validate nonces, it can enforce the presence and reasonable structure of nonce fields and reject clearly missing or malformed tokens.

4. Limit risky actions by role
   • Block specific AJAX actions from accounts below Administrator where those actions should only be run by admins.
5. Rate limiting and anomaly detection
   • Rate limit POST requests to plugin endpoints to slow automated exploitation.
   • Alert on multiple suspicious payloads or repeated failures from the same IP or account.
6. Logging and alerting
   • Log blocked requests with sufficient detail for investigation (avoid logging full secrets or credentials).
   • Alert your response team on high‑priority blocks.

Code‑level advice for developers (how the plugin should be fixed)

If you develop plugins or are asked to harden the code, apply these principles:

1. Use parameterised queries and avoid concatenating user input into SQL

   In WordPress, use $wpdb->prepare() for dynamic SQL. Do not build queries via sprintf() or direct concatenation with user input.

   Vulnerable example (do not use):

   // VULNERABLE
   $search = $_POST['search_term'];
   $sql = "SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}onoffice_table WHERE name LIKE '%$search%'";
   $rows = $wpdb->get_results($sql);

   Secure replacement:

   $search = isset($_POST['search_term']) ? wp_unslash($_POST['search_term']) : '';
   $search = '%' . $wpdb->esc_like( $search ) . '%';
   $sql = $wpdb->prepare(
       "SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}onoffice_table WHERE name LIKE %s",
       $search
   );
   $rows = $wpdb->get_results( $sql );

2. Validate and sanitize all input early
   • Use strict validation — if a parameter should be integer, use intval() or filter_var(…, FILTER_VALIDATE_INT).
   • For strings, use sanitize_text_field() and esc_sql() where appropriate. Prefer prepared statements over ad‑hoc escaping.
3. Capability checks and nonces
   • Verify the current user has the expected capability before performing any DB write or sensitive read (current_user_can()).
   • Use wp_verify_nonce() to validate admin AJAX and form handlers.

   Example:

   if ( ! isset( $_POST['my_nonce'] ) || ! wp_verify_nonce( $_POST['my_nonce'], 'onoffice_action' ) ) {
       wp_die( 'Invalid request' );
   }

4. Principle of least privilege
   • Do not expose unnecessary functionality to Editors if not required.
   • Consider plugin‑specific capabilities that site owners can grant or revoke.
5. Prepared statements for all SQL

   Avoid dynamic table names derived from user input. When dynamic table names are required, validate strictly against an allowlist.

6. Logging and monitoring

   Add structured logging for failed capability checks and suspicious input shapes without recording secrets.

How to detect if your site was exploited

• Look for new or modified database rows that were not authorised: unexpected users, changed roles, or password resets.
• Search for strange content edits or injected links in published posts.
• Check for web shells or new PHP files in wp‑content/uploads or other writable directories.
• Compare themes/plugins with known good copies, check last modified times, and review backups or git diffs.
• Monitor outgoing network calls from your site to unfamiliar domains.

If you find evidence of exploitation:

• Isolate the site immediately (take offline or restrict access).
• Preserve logs and a copy of the compromised site for forensic analysis.
• Rotate all credentials: WordPress passwords, database credentials, API keys, and any 3rd‑party keys stored on the site.
• Consider a full restore from a known‑good backup and ensure the vulnerability is addressed before returning online.

Recovery checklist

1. Backup current state (logs, DB dump, files).
2. Take site offline or limit access.
3. Remove the plugin (or ensure a fixed version is installed).
4. Scan for backdoors and web shells — check wp‑uploads for PHP files.
5. Rotate all passwords and API keys.
6. Ensure all plugins, themes and core are updated to supported versions.
7. Reissue SSL certs / tokens if they may have been exposed.
8. Reintroduce users with cautious role assignments; enforce MFA.
9. Monitor logs aggressively for several weeks following the event.

Long‑term hardening & best practices

• Assign Editor role sparingly and maintain least privilege.
• Use MFA / 2FA for all elevated accounts.
• Keep plugins and core updated; remove unused or unmaintained plugins.
• Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to enable virtual patching while waiting for vendor fixes.
• Regularly audit plugin inventory and use staging for updates and security testing.
• Maintain a reliable backup strategy and a vulnerability disclosure policy for plugin vendors.

For agencies and hosts: mitigate at scale

• Scan your fleet for the onOffice plugin and affected versions — automate inventory collection via WP‑CLI or management scripts.
• Roll out consistent virtual patching rules across sites where possible.
• Notify customers who have the plugin installed and provide clear remediation options (disable plugin, restrict Editor access, deploy WAF rules).
• Prioritise clients with Editors and high‑value targets (eCommerce, membership sites).

Indicators of attack (IoCs) to watch for

• Repeated POST requests containing SQL tokens to admin AJAX endpoints tied to the plugin.
• Unusual admin actions performed by Editor accounts (bulk edits, meta changes).
• Database queries containing long concatenated strings, SQL comments or UNIONs shortly after Editor login activity.

Record and retain these events for investigations.

Final recommendations — prioritised checklist

1. Verify whether the plugin is installed and which version is active. If affected, act immediately.
2. If feasible, disable the plugin until a fixed version is released.
3. Audit Editor accounts and enforce password resets plus MFA.
4. Deploy WAF virtual rules that block SQL injection patterns on plugin endpoints.
5. Monitor logs for suspicious activity and prepare backups and incident response measures.
6. When an official patch is released, test on staging and update promptly.