Note: This advisory is written for site owners, developers and hosting teams. Treat this disclosure as high priority — an unauthenticated LFI on a public site is an immediate operational risk.

Executive summary

A high-severity Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability (CVE-2026-0926) affects Prodigy Commerce plugin versions up to and including 3.2.9. An unauthenticated attacker may supply crafted input via a parameter named template_name, causing the plugin to include and return local files from the web server filesystem.

Why this matters:

• LFI can disclose sensitive configuration files such as wp-config.php, private keys and logs.
• In some deployments LFI can be escalated to remote code execution through log poisoning, writable upload paths, or insecure server settings.
• Unauthenticated, public exploitability makes this highly dangerous for internet-facing WordPress sites.

CVSS: 8.1 (High) — CVE-2026-0926

What is a Local File Inclusion (LFI) and why it’s dangerous

Local File Inclusion occurs when an application constructs a filesystem path from user-supplied input and includes that file (e.g., via PHP include / require) without sufficient validation. Typical attack vectors allow directory traversal (e.g. ../../) to access files outside the intended directory.

Consequences:

• Disclosure of database credentials and salts.
• Exposure of system files useful to attackers (e.g., /etc/passwd).
• Potential escalation to code execution combined with other weaknesses (writable logs, uploads).
• Account takeover if session tokens or cookies are exposed.

Vulnerability specifics (what we know)

• Affected software: Prodigy Commerce WordPress plugin
• Affected versions: ≤ 3.2.9
• Vulnerability type: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
• Affected parameter: template_name
• Privilege required: None (Unauthenticated)
• CVE: CVE-2026-0926
• Severity: High (CVSS 8.1)

Public reports indicate the plugin uses template_name to include files without sufficient validation, allowing directory traversal or arbitrary local path inclusion.

How an attacker might exploit this (high level)

An attacker targets the endpoint that accepts template_name. By inserting traversal sequences or encoded equivalents they can attempt to read files outside the plugin directory. Possible targets include:

• wp-config.php
• Application configuration files such as .env
• Files in predictable upload directories
• Server logs (for later poisoning and inclusion)

Proof-of-concept payloads will not be provided here. Assume active scanning and exploitation attempts will appear quickly after public disclosure.

Immediate actions — what to do in the next 30–60 minutes

1. Identify Prodigy Commerce installs and version
   • From WordPress admin: Plugins > Installed Plugins — check the Prodigy Commerce version.
   • From WP-CLI (SSH):

     # show plugin info (path may vary)
     wp plugin get prodigy-commerce --field=version

   • From the filesystem:

     cat wp-content/plugins/prodigy-commerce/readme.txt
     # or inspect the plugin main PHP file header for the version

   If version ≤ 3.2.9, treat the installation as vulnerable until confirmed otherwise.

2. Deactivate the plugin if you cannot patch immediately
   • WP-Admin: Plugins > Deactivate Prodigy Commerce
   • WP-CLI:

     wp plugin deactivate prodigy-commerce

   Deactivation removes the immediate attack surface at the cost of plugin functionality. Use this when patching is not possible within your risk window.

3. If you operate a Web Application Firewall (WAF), enable LFI-focused rules

   Deploy rules to block requests where template_name contains traversal sequences or references to sensitive files. Focus on blocking:

   • ../, ..\, and percent-encoded forms (%2e%2e%2f, etc.)
   • Requests attempting to include wp-config.php, .env, /etc/passwd, or other sensitive filenames
   • NUL/NULL byte injection and long-encoded payloads

   Test rules in detection/logging mode before blocking to avoid breaking legitimate traffic.

4. Restrict direct web access to plugin PHP files via webserver configuration

   Example Apache (site .htaccess or vhost):

   # Deny direct access to plugin files other than index.php
   
       Require all denied
   
   
   # Or deny access to sensitive files
   
       Require all denied
   

   Example Nginx (site config):

   location ~* /wp-content/plugins/prodigy-commerce/.*\.(php)$ {
       deny all;
       return 403;
   }

   Be aware that denying PHP access to the entire plugin directory may break functionality. Prefer targeted rules that isolate the vulnerable endpoint where possible.

5. Harden PHP configuration if you can
   • Enable open_basedir to limit filesystem access.
   • Disable unnecessary dangerous functions: exec, system, shell_exec, proc_open, etc.
   • Ensure file permissions are restrictive (e.g., wp-config.php at 640 or 644 as appropriate).
6. Rotate secrets if you detect compromise

   If you find evidence of file exfiltration, rotate DB credentials, update authentication salts, and rotate API keys.

How to detect attempts and check for compromise

1. Search web server logs

   # Example log search for traversal attempts
   grep -Ei "template_name=.*(\.\./|\.\.\\|%2e%2e)" /var/log/nginx/access.log /var/log/apache2/access.log

2. Inspect WordPress error and PHP logs

   Look for warnings referencing unexpected includes or file paths outside the plugin directory.

3. File integrity checks

   Compare plugin files to a known-good copy from the vendor to detect tampering. Run reputable malware scanners to check for webshells and suspicious files.

4. Database and account checks

   Look for unexpected administrator accounts or unusual content changes.

5. Scan for leaked secrets

   Search logs or dumps for identifiers such as DB_NAME, DB_USER or other configuration strings.

Long-term mitigations and hardening recommendations

• Keep WordPress core, themes and plugins up to date. Test updates in staging before rolling out to production where necessary.
• Principle of least privilege. Restrict file permissions and database user capabilities.
• Server hardening. Use per-site PHP-FPM pools, enable open_basedir, disable unnecessary functions and block PHP execution in upload directories.
• Input-aware, config-aware development. Plugin authors should never include files directly from user input — use whitelists and canonicalization.
• Monitoring and incident response. Keep 90+ days of logs, implement alerts for anomalous file access, and test backups regularly.

WAF virtual patching — vendor-neutral guidance

Virtual patching with a WAF is an effective short-term control while waiting for an official vendor patch. Recommended rule behaviors:

• Block or challenge requests containing traversal tokens (../, encoded equivalents) in the template_name parameter.
• Block attempts to reference known sensitive filenames through that parameter (wp-config.php, .env, /etc/passwd).
• Rate-limit and block repeated probing from the same IPs.
• Run rules in detection mode first to validate and reduce false positives.

Example WAF rule snippets (conceptual)

Adjust and test in your environment — these are conceptual examples for ModSecurity and Nginx+Lua.

# ModSecurity (conceptual)
SecRule ARGS:template_name "@rx (\.\./|\.\.\\|%2e%2e%2f|%25%32%65%25%32%65%25%32%66)" \
    "id:1001001,phase:2,deny,status:403,log,msg:'Blocked LFI attempt - template_name contains traversal',severity:2"

SecRule ARGS:template_name "@rx (wp-config\.php|/etc/passwd|\.env)" \
    "id:1001002,phase:2,deny,status:403,log,msg:'Blocked LFI attempt - sensitive file in template_name',severity:2"

# Nginx + Lua (conceptual)
access_by_lua_block {
  local args = ngx.req.get_uri_args()
  local t = args["template_name"]
  if t then
    local lower = string.lower(t)
    if string.find(lower, "../", 1, true) or string.find(lower, "%2e%2e", 1, true) or
       string.find(lower, "wp-config.php", 1, true) or string.find(lower, "/etc/passwd", 1, true) then
       ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "Blocked suspicious template_name: ", t)
       ngx.exit(ngx.HTTP_FORBIDDEN)
    end
  end
}

Always validate rules in a staging environment first and monitor for false positives.

What to do if you suspect your site was exploited

1. Take the site offline or put it into maintenance mode to prevent additional exfiltration.
2. Preserve logs and make filesystem snapshots for forensic analysis.
3. Scan for indicators of compromise:
   • Unexpected admin users
   • Modified plugin/theme files
   • New PHP files in uploads or temp directories
4. Look for webshell indicators (suspicious use of eval, base64_decode, system, etc.).
5. Rotate DB credentials, API keys and update authentication salts if compromise is suspected.
6. Restore from a known-clean backup when possible and validate integrity before reconnecting to the internet.
7. Engage a professional forensic or malware-remediation team if you cannot confirm a full clean state.

How developers should fix the root cause (for plugin authors or site maintainers)

If you maintain code or the vendor issues a patch, the remedy should include strict input validation and a whitelist approach.

1. Whitelist mapping (recommended)

   $allowed_templates = [
     'cart' => __DIR__ . '/templates/cart.php',
     'checkout' => __DIR__ . '/templates/checkout.php',
   ];
   
   $template_key = $_GET['template_name'] ?? '';
   if ( array_key_exists( $template_key, $allowed_templates ) ) {
       include $allowed_templates[ $template_key ];
   } else {
       // handle invalid template - show error or default
   }

2. Use realpath and verify the resolved path

   $base = realpath( plugin_dir_path( __FILE__ ) . 'templates' );
   $user_file = realpath( $base . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $user_input );
   
   if ( $user_file && strpos( $user_file, $base ) === 0 ) {
       include $user_file;
   } else {
       // invalid or traversal attempt
   }

3. Sanitize and canonicalize inputs. Avoid blacklist-only strategies and never trust raw user input for file inclusion.

Communication guidance for site owners and teams

• Escalate unauthenticated LFI disclosures to on-call operations immediately.
• Hosting providers should apply network-level mitigations and assist tenants in identifying vulnerable installs.
• Site owners should schedule patch windows, test updates in staging and keep rollback plans ready.

Frequently asked questions

Q: Is this vulnerability exploitable remotely?
A: Yes — it is an unauthenticated remote LFI targeting public endpoints.

Q: Should I remove the plugin?
A: If the plugin is not essential, deactivate it until a vendor patch is available. If it must remain active, apply WAF protections and server-level hardening and monitor closely.

Q: Will a WAF fully protect me?
A: A well-configured WAF reduces risk by blocking exploit patterns but is a mitigating control; apply vendor patches and hardening to fully remediate the root cause.

How to verify the vulnerability is fixed after patching

1. Update the plugin to the vendor-supplied fixed version.
2. Re-run tests in staging and production using vendor test cases or internal test harnesses.
3. Check logs for blocked probes — probes may persist but should not succeed.
4. Confirm no unauthorized file reads occurred using audit logs, file timestamps and other forensic indicators.

Preventive checklist (quick reference)

Why timely mitigation matters

Automated scanners and bots rapidly probe the web for newly disclosed vulnerabilities. The interval between disclosure and active exploitation can be short — especially for popular plugins. Rapid mitigations (WAF rules, server config changes, deactivation) reduce your exposure until the vendor patch is validated and deployed.

Final words — practical next steps

1. Identify affected installs immediately.
2. If you cannot patch, deactivate the plugin or apply WAF/server-level mitigations to block traversal attempts to template_name.
3. Harden PHP and file permissions; enable open_basedir where possible.
4. Monitor logs and scan for indicators of compromise.
5. Rotate secrets if you detect data exfiltration.

If you require assistance assessing risk across multiple sites, testing patches in staging, or investigating suspicious activity, engage a trusted security incident response provider or an experienced security consultant immediately.