CVE-2025-10686 — Creta Testimonial Showcase (< 1.2.4) Editor Local File Inclusion: What WordPress Site Owners Must Do Now

Date: 2025-11-14  |  Author: Hong Kong Security Expert

TL;DR

A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability (CVE-2025-10686) affects Creta Testimonial Showcase versions earlier than 1.2.4. An attacker with Editor-level privileges can cause the plugin to include local files from the server and return their contents. This can expose secrets such as wp-config.php, backups or other sensitive files and — depending on server configuration — may enable further escalation such as database compromise.

If this plugin is installed on your site, apply the vendor update to 1.2.4 or later immediately. If you cannot update right away, deactivate or remove the plugin, audit and restrict Editor accounts, disable file editing, and apply application-layer protections (for example, targeted WAF rules) until the patch is deployed.

This advisory provides technical detail, impact analysis, detection indicators, short-term mitigations and longer-term hardening steps for WordPress administrators, developers and hosts.

Who should read this

• Site owners running Creta Testimonial Showcase on any WordPress install
• Administrators who manage Editor-level accounts
• Hosting providers and managed WordPress services
• Security teams responsible for vulnerability response and incident handling

Background and summary of the vulnerability

• Identifier: CVE-2025-10686
• Software: Creta Testimonial Showcase (WordPress plugin)
• Affected versions: any release prior to 1.2.4
• Vulnerability class: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
• Required privilege: Editor
• Reported by: security researcher (credit in public advisory)
• Fix: plugin updated to version 1.2.4

Local File Inclusion happens when user-controlled input is used to build a filesystem path that is included or read without proper normalization and validation. In this plugin a parameter controllable by an Editor influences which file is loaded. Without proper canonicalization and path checks, traversal sequences (for example ../) can be used to escape the intended directory and include arbitrary files from the webroot.

Successful exploitation typically results in disclosure of configuration and credential files. In some server environments, crafted payloads or special file contents can permit code execution, but the immediate and most common impact is information disclosure.

Why this matters: impact, attack surface and risk explanation

1. Sensitive Data Disclosure: Files on web servers often include wp-config.php, .env files, backups, logs and private keys. Disclosure of wp-config.php can disclose DB credentials and authentication salts, enabling database access.
2. Privilege requirement: Editor: Exploitation requires Editor-level access, so the vulnerability is not trivial for unauthenticated attackers. However, Editor accounts are common — outsourced editors, marketing staff, or compromised accounts — which increases real-world risk.
3. Potential for lateral escalation: If an Editor account is obtained via credential reuse or phishing, an attacker can perform LFI to obtain further credentials and pivot to broader compromise.
4. Automated exploitation potential: Known LFI bugs are commonly automated; once exploit patterns are public, scanners and bots will probe widely and rapidly.
5. CVSS nuance: The CVSS score (7.2) signals significant impact potential, but the practical exploitability depends on site-specific factors like presence of Editor accounts and server configuration.

Technical analysis (what goes wrong)

• The plugin exposes an endpoint or admin UI that accepts an input parameter (e.g., a filename or template selector).
• Input is not properly canonicalized or validated; the plugin composes a path and includes or reads it directly without ensuring it remains within the plugin’s allowed directory.
• PHP inclusion and file functions accept relative paths, enabling path traversal (../) to access files outside the intended directory.

Conceptually, a vulnerable pattern resembles:

$file = $_GET['template'];
include( plugin_dir_path(__FILE__) . 'templates/' . $file );

If $file is “../wp-config.php” the resolved path may point to the site’s wp-config.php and be included or read.

The patch in version 1.2.4 applies strict validation: whitelisting template names, rejecting traversal sequences, and comparing canonicalized paths (realpath) to ensure the included file is within the expected directory.

Exploitation scenarios (what an attacker would attempt)

To prioritise mitigation, consider these realistic attack paths (no exploit code provided):

• An attacker with Editor credentials uses the plugin’s template or preview endpoint with traversal patterns to retrieve wp-config.php and extract DB credentials.
• A compromised Editor exfiltrates backups or uploads stored under wp-content/uploads or other writable locations.
• Automated scanners enumerate sites with this plugin and attempt common traversal payloads at scale.

Detection indicators (what to look for in logs and monitoring)

• Requests to plugin files containing traversal patterns: ../ or encoded forms such as %2e%2e%2f
• URIs or parameters referencing sensitive filenames: wp-config.php, .env, database.sql, /etc/passwd
• Unexpected 200 responses for paths that should be private
• Requests to plugin endpoints from authenticated Editor accounts that are not part of normal editorial workflows
• Rapid sequential requests targeting many different local files (scanning behavior)
• Base64-encoded payloads in responses returned to an Editor session (possible exfiltration)
• Unusual spikes in requests from a single IP to the plugin path

Set alerts for requests that combine traversal characters and references to sensitive filenames.

Immediate mitigation steps (what to do right now)

1. Update the plugin to version 1.2.4 or later — this is the recommended remediation.
2. If you cannot update immediately:
   • Deactivate the plugin until the update is applied.
   • Or remove the plugin files from the server (via FTP/SSH) to prevent access to the vulnerable code.
3. Restrict Editor accounts: Audit all Editor users; remove or downgrade unused accounts. Force password resets if compromise is suspected. Enforce strong passwords and two-factor authentication where feasible.
4. Disable file editing in WordPress: Add to wp-config.php:

   define('DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT', true);

   This prevents use of theme and plugin editors from wp-admin.

5. Tighten uploads and backup storage: Move backups out of webroot or ensure they are protected from HTTP access. Review filesystem permissions to avoid world- or webserver-writable sensitive locations.
6. Scan for signs of exploitation: Run a full filesystem and malware scan. Check for recent modifications to wp-config.php, .htaccess and PHP files under wp-content. Inspect the database for unauthorized admin users or suspicious entries.
7. Apply application-layer protections: Use targeted WAF rules or server-level controls to block traversal patterns and access to sensitive filenames until the patch is applied.

WAF / virtual patching guidance

A properly configured WAF can reduce risk while you deploy the vendor patch. Use focused rules targeting the plugin’s endpoints and traversal patterns. Examples below are conceptual and must be adapted to your WAF syntax (ModSecurity, Nginx, cloud WAFs, etc.).

General rule concepts:

• Block requests to plugin paths containing traversal sequences and references to sensitive filenames.
• Block requests where authenticated Editor sessions request plugin endpoints with traversal characters.
• Detect encoded traversal patterns (%2e%2e%2f, %2e%2e/) and other obfuscation.
• Block or alert on file:// scheme and other dangerous schemes in parameters.

Conceptual ModSecurity-style rule example:

SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_URI "(?:\.\./|%2e%2e%2f|%2e%2e/)" "id:100001,phase:2,deny,log,msg:'Path traversal attempt blocked'"

Important: avoid overly broad rules that generate false positives. Monitor and refine rules after deployment to ensure they target the vulnerable plugin’s endpoints and not legitimate traffic.

Hardening and long-term prevention

1. Principle of least privilege: Grant Editor and Administrator roles only to trusted personnel. Separate content and maintenance duties.
2. Restrict plugin and theme management: Disable built-in editors and restrict plugin activation to administrators.
3. Isolate sensitive files: Store backups outside webroot or in restricted object storage. Apply server-side access controls to prevent HTTP access to sensitive directories.
4. Input validation and canonicalization: Developers should canonicalize using realpath(), whitelist filenames and ensure the resolved path begins with the expected base directory.
5. Secure deployment and configuration: Disable allow_url_include, consider open_basedir restrictions, and run PHP processes with minimal privileges.
6. Continuous vulnerability management: Track plugin updates and advisories, test patches in staging and apply promptly in production.

Incident response checklist (if you suspect exploitation)

1. Contain: Consider taking the site offline if active exfiltration is suspected. Revoke or reset Editor credentials. Deactivate the vulnerable plugin immediately.
2. Collect evidence: Preserve webserver and application logs, and take filesystem snapshots for forensic analysis.
3. Eradicate: Remove discovered webshells or suspicious files. Replace modified code with clean copies from trusted backups or fresh packages.
4. Recover: Apply the vendor patch (version 1.2.4+). Restore from a known-good backup if necessary. Rotate secrets: database credentials, API keys and salts.
5. Review and harden: Investigate the entry vector, apply the hardening steps above and re-evaluate user roles and access controls.
6. Report: Notify stakeholders and comply with legal or contractual disclosure obligations where data exposure has occurred.

Detection patterns and sample SIEM queries

Adapt these conceptual queries to your logging platform (ELK, Splunk, Datadog, etc.) to hunt for suspicious activity:

• Search for traversal attempts: request_uri OR args contains “../” OR “%2e%2e%2f”
• Look for Editor users accessing plugin endpoints: join web logs with wp_users metadata where user role = ‘editor’ and request_path contains ‘creta’
• Find references to wp-config.php in logs: request_uri OR args contains “wp-config.php” OR “.env” OR “database.sql”
• Identify unusual outgoing DB connections after suspected LFI: monitor new external IPs connecting to your DB server

How developers should fix this class of vulnerability

• Never include or require files using unchecked user input.
• Prefer explicit whitelists for filenames or template IDs rather than blacklists.
• Canonicalize paths with realpath() and verify the resolved path begins with the allowed base directory:

  $base = realpath( plugin_dir_path(__FILE__) . 'templates' );
  $path = realpath( $base . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $candidate );
  if (strpos($path, $base) !== 0) { reject }

• Sanitize and validate all user input and check capabilities so only appropriately privileged users can access sensitive endpoints.
• Write unit and integration tests that include traversal and edge-case path inputs to prevent regressions.

For hosting providers and managed WordPress services

• Scan customer sites for the plugin and notify those running affected versions.
• Where customers cannot patch immediately, apply server-level mitigations (WAF rules, deny access to plugin path).
• Assist customers with Editor password resets and credential policy updates.
• Provide hardened PHP configurations and isolate customer files using chroot/open_basedir or equivalent containment measures.

Final recommendations (prioritized)

1. Update Creta Testimonial Showcase to 1.2.4 or later — do this first.
2. If update cannot be applied immediately, deactivate or remove the plugin.
3. Audit all Editor accounts and enforce least privilege and stronger authentication.
4. Enable DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT in wp-config.php.
5. Apply targeted application-layer protections to block path traversal and sensitive-file access patterns until the fix is deployed.
6. Scan for indicators of compromise and follow an incident response workflow if exploitation is suspected.

Closing thoughts

Local File Inclusion vulnerabilities can expose the keys to your site: database credentials, API keys and other secrets. Although this bug requires Editor privileges, those accounts are often legitimate and can be targeted via credential theft or misuse. Timely patching is your most effective defence. Combine patching with least privilege, host-level hardening, careful monitoring and application-layer protections to reduce risk.

If you need assistance assessing exposure, deploying temporary protections, or conducting a forensic review after a suspected incident, contact a qualified security consultant or your internal security team for hands-on support.