Community Security Advisory Buyent Theme Privilege Escalation(CVE202513851)

Privilege Escalation in WordPress Buyent Theme






Privilege Escalation in Buyent Theme (CVE-2025-13851) — What WordPress Site Owners Must Do Now


Plugin Name Buyent Classified Plugin
Type of Vulnerability Privilege escalation
CVE Number CVE-2025-13851
Urgency High
CVE Publish Date 2026-02-19
Source URL CVE-2025-13851

Privilege Escalation in Buyent Theme (CVE-2025-13851) — What WordPress Site Owners Must Do Now

Date: 2026-02-19 | Tags: WordPress, Security, Vulnerability, WAF, Incident Response

Summary — A critical vulnerability (CVE-2025-13851) affecting the Buyent WordPress theme (with the Buyent Classified plugin) up through version 1.0.7 allows unauthenticated attackers to escalate privileges via the user registration flow. CVSS base score 9.8. Immediate mitigation is required: disable or lock down registrations, audit accounts, apply virtual patches at the edge where available, and follow the incident response steps below.

Overview and risk summary

On 19 February 2026 security researchers published details for a critical vulnerability in the Buyent theme (including the Buyent Classified plugin) affecting versions ≤ 1.0.7. The flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker — meaning someone who has not logged into your site — to create or alter a user account in a way that results in privilege escalation. The vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2025-13851 and carries a CVSS score of 9.8 (Critical).

Key facts:

  • Affected software: Buyent theme + Buyent Classified plugin, versions ≤ 1.0.7
  • Vulnerability type: Privilege escalation via user registration / authentication logic (OWASP A7: Identification and Authentication Failures)
  • CVE: CVE-2025-13851
  • Required privilege: none (unauthenticated)
  • Impact: full site takeover possible if administrative privileges are obtained
  • Official vendor fix: at the time of publication no upstream patch is available for affected releases (site owners must mitigate proactively)

If your site uses this theme/plugin combination, treat this as emergent. Attackers weaponise unauthenticated privilege escalation flaws quickly because they let attackers pivot to full control.

What the vulnerability is (high level)

This vulnerability is rooted in how the theme/plugin handles new user registration data. In secure WordPress development, a registration endpoint should never allow clients to set sensitive properties such as role, capabilities, or assign high privileges without server-side validation and capability checks. When registration data is accepted directly (or indirectly) into user creation APIs without sanitisation or enforcement of least privilege, an attacker can inject a role value (for example, “administrator”) or abuse a weak server-side mapping to escalate privileges.

What we know in summary (non-exploitative description):

  • The registration endpoint/process accepts input that influences the role or capability assignment for the newly created account.
  • Proper authorization checks (server-side verification, capability checks, explicit forcing of a safe default role) are missing or bypassable.
  • Because the endpoint is accessible to unauthenticated users, attackers can create accounts that end up with higher-than-intended privileges.

We will not publish exploit code here. The goal is to provide actionable, responsible guidance so administrators can protect their sites now.

Why this matters: real consequences of privilege escalation

Privilege escalation is one of the most dangerous classes of vulnerabilities because it lets an attacker move from a limited foothold to full control. Immediate impacts an attacker can achieve after obtaining elevated privileges include:

  • Create, edit, or delete posts and pages (content sabotage, defacement).
  • Install or activate malicious plugins or themes (persistent backdoors).
  • Create additional administrative accounts to regain access even if the original compromise is found and fixed.
  • Access or exfiltrate sensitive data (user emails, order information, private content).
  • Modify site configuration, PHP files or theme templates to run arbitrary code.
  • Steal credentials, place spam links, or use your site as a launchpad for attacks on visitors.

Because this vulnerability is exploitable without authentication, an attacker needs only to reach your site to attempt exploitation. That makes automated scanning and mass exploitation likely.

Common patterns attackers use when a registration endpoint is flawed:

  • Inject a role parameter in the registration POST body (role=administrator).
  • Submit multipart/form-data or JSON payloads with unexpected keys that influence capability mapping.
  • Submit crafted requests that exploit logic errors (e.g., a function that maps numeric role IDs to capability arrays without validation).
  • Create many accounts to test post-registration behavior, then escalate one to a privileged role and attempt to log in.

Attackers often automate these steps and then attempt to immediately create persistence (malicious admin, backdoor plugin, wp-config modifications, scheduled tasks).

Indicators of compromise (IoCs) — what to look for now

If you suspect your site may be targeted or already exploited, look for these signs:

User account anomalies

  • New administrator accounts you did not create.
  • Accounts with names like “admin”, “administrator”, “system”, or random strings created after the advisory date.
  • An unexpected spike in newly created user accounts.

Audit/log anomalies

  • Unusual POST requests to registration endpoints (/wp-login.php?action=register, custom registration endpoints).
  • Requests with payloads containing parameters like role=admin, role=administrator, or role_id.
  • Repeated registration requests from the same IP ranges.

File system and plugin changes

  • New or modified plugin/theme files — especially in /wp-content/plugins and /wp-content/themes/.
  • Recently updated plugins/themes with unfamiliar timestamps.
  • Presence of files with suspicious names (e.g., upload.php in a plugin folder, or files with base64-encoded content).

Scheduled tasks and cron jobs

  • Unknown wp_cron entries or scheduled events that call unfamiliar functions.
  • New users with admin privileges who have scheduled tasks to run arbitrary code.

Network/traffic

  • High volume of registration attempts from specific IP addresses.
  • Requests with unusual user agents or empty user agents.

Database indicators

Check usermeta entries for unexpected capabilities. For example, inspect wp_usermeta.meta_key = ‘{prefix}_capabilities’ — an administrator will have a serialized array that includes “administrator” => 1.

Immediate actions (first 24 hours)

If your site runs the affected theme/plugin, prioritise the following immediate actions. These are triage measures to prevent further exploitation and buy time for a thorough response.

  1. Put the site into maintenance mode (if possible). This prevents further automated abuse while you act.
  2. Disable open user registration. WordPress option: Settings → General → uncheck “Anyone can register”. If registration must remain open for business reasons, add CAPTCHA and rate-limiting immediately (see WAF mitigations below).
  3. Lock down the registration endpoint. Remove or disable any custom registration endpoints or forms supplied by the theme/plugin until fixed. If you must keep registration open, require email confirmation and manual approval for new users.
  4. Enforce account role defaults. Ensure all new registrations are forced to the “subscriber” role. See the safe code snippet below you can add as an MU-plugin.
  5. Force a password reset for administrators. Reset passwords for all administrator accounts and rotate any API keys or tokens stored on the site.
  6. Audit admin users now. Immediately check for recently created admin users; remove any you did not authorize.
  7. Enable or update WAF rules. If you run a Web Application Firewall (WAF), apply rules to block registration payloads with role parameters or block POSTs to registration endpoints that contain suspicious values.
  8. Back up the site and export logs. Capture a full backup (files + database) for forensic analysis and restore points. Collect webserver and WAF logs (requests, IPs, payloads) for later investigation.

Short-term remediation (24–72 hours)

  1. Deep audit & clean-up. Inspect theme/plugin files for unauthorized changes, new files, or eval/base64 code. Perform code review and malware scans.
  2. Remove unauthorized admin users. Use WP-CLI or the Admin UI to remove any accounts you did not explicitly create or approve.
  3. Rotate credentials and keys. Change WordPress salts (wp-config.php), admin emails, and any API keys or tokens stored in the database or configuration.
  4. Harden file permissions and disable file editing. Add define('DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT', true); to wp-config.php. Lock down file permissions so plugin/theme files are not writable by the web server where possible.
  5. Monitor for persistence. Look for scheduled tasks, modified .htaccess, or additional backdoors.
  6. Coordinate with theme/plugin vendor. Monitor vendor communications for a patch and verify any official fixes. When an official update is released, test and apply it promptly.

Hardening and recovery (post-incident)

Once the immediate threat is contained:

  • Restore from a clean backup if you find persistent backdoors or if site integrity cannot be guaranteed.
  • Run a full malware scan (file and DB scanning).
  • Consider migrating credentials and secrets that may have been exfiltrated.
  • Conduct a “lessons learned” review to update your patching policy: ensure themes and plugins are updated proactively, keep staging for testing fixes, and apply defence-in-depth controls (WAF + strong access controls + monitoring).

Make a plan for least privilege and account hygiene:

  • Limit number of administrators.
  • Use role-based access and give users only the capabilities they require.
  • Require strong passwords + two-factor authentication for admin users.

WAF mitigations and rule guidance

Virtual patching at the edge (WAF) is the fastest way to reduce risk while waiting for an upstream patch. Below are neutral, vendor-agnostic mitigations and conceptual rule examples that security teams and hosts can implement.

  1. Block suspicious registration payloads. Deny requests which include role=administrator or similar strings (case-insensitive) in the request body, query string or form-data. Deny requests with common exploit signatures such as role[]=administrator, URL-encoded role strings, or suspicious JSON keys.
  2. Block/Challenge POSTs to registration endpoints. Block or challenge (CAPTCHA) POST requests to endpoints used for registration (/wp-login.php?action=register, any theme-provided registration path). For sites that need registration open, convert to a challenge-response: force CAPTCHA and send registrations for manual approval.
  3. Rate-limit registration activity. Apply per-IP rate limits to registration attempts (e.g., no more than 5 registrations per hour from a single IP).
  4. Enforce role defaults. Use virtual patching to rewrite or ignore the role parameter server-side: drop the role parameter before it reaches WordPress or the plugin.
  5. Monitor and alert. Alert on bursts of registration traffic, creation of administrator role in usermeta, or suspicious file writes.

Example virtual-patch rules (conceptual)

Adjust syntax to your WAF product or host interface.

Rule: Block if request contains role=administrator
Condition: REQUEST_BODY matches regex (?i)role\s*=\s*administrator
Action: Block + Log

Rule: Challenge registrations from unknown IPs
Condition: POST to /wp-login.php?action=register
Action: CAPTCHA or 403

Rule: Rate-limit
Condition: More than 5 registration POSTs from a single IP in 1 hour
Action: Block for 24 hours

Note: Do not rely solely on client-side measures (JS validation). The checks must be enforced at the server/WAF level.

Quick detection commands and code snippets

The following are safe diagnostic commands and small code bits to help you triage. Run them only if you have access and you understand your environment, or ask your host/managed service to run them.

WP-CLI: list recent users and admins

# List admin users
wp user list --role=administrator --fields=ID,user_login,user_email,registered --format=table

# List users created in the last 7 days (adjust filters as needed)
wp user list --field=ID --role=subscriber --format=csv --since='7 days ago'

SQL: find users with admin capability (replace wp_ with your DB prefix)

SELECT u.ID,u.user_login,u.user_email,um.meta_value
FROM wp_users u
JOIN wp_usermeta um ON u.ID = um.user_id
WHERE um.meta_key = 'wp_capabilities' AND um.meta_value LIKE '%administrator%';

MU-plugin snippet: force new users to subscriber role

Create a file in wp-content/mu-plugins/force-subscriber.php with the following content (test on staging first):

<?php
/*
Plugin Name: Force Subscriber Role for New Registrations
Description: Ensures any newly registered user is set to 'subscriber'.
*/

add_action('user_register', function($user_id) {
    if ( ! $user_id ) {
        return;
    }

    $user = new WP_User($user_id);
    // Overwrite any role and set to subscriber
    $user->set_role('subscriber');
}, 10, 1);

Registration shield: remove ‘role’ parameter early

Place in an MU-plugin to prevent processing of a role value in registration:

<?php
add_action('init', function() {
    if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST') {
        // Remove role from posted registration data to prevent role override
        if ( isset($_POST['role']) ) {
            unset($_POST['role']);
        }
        if ( isset($_REQUEST['role']) ) {
            unset($_REQUEST['role']);
        }
    }
});

Important: These snippets are emergency mitigations. They do not replace proper vendor fixes. Test on staging before production.

What to do if you discover a suspicious admin account (incident response quick steps)

  1. Do not delete immediately. Export account details for investigation.
  2. Change passwords for all administrator accounts.
  3. Revoke active sessions and force re-login for admin users.
  4. Remove unauthorised admin accounts after preserving logs and user data.
  5. Search files and database for persistence/backdoors.
  6. Restore from a known-clean backup if you find evidence of file or database tampering.
  7. Notify stakeholders and, if required by law/regulation, follow your incident disclosure obligations.

Longer-term prevention — policies and best practices

  • Least privilege governance — Keep administrator counts to a minimum and review them quarterly.
  • Patch management — Apply updates to WordPress core, themes and plugins in a staged manner; test in staging before production.
  • Continuous monitoring — Centralise logs (webserver, WAF, WordPress activity) and monitor for registration spikes, new admin creation, or code changes.
  • Defence-in-depth — Combine WAF + file integrity monitoring + strong access controls (2FA, SSH key-based SFTP, IP restrictions where applicable).
  • Pre-production testing — When installing third-party themes/plugins, scan and review their code. For custom themes/plugins, include security code review in QA.
  • Incident playbook — Maintain an incident response playbook with contacts, backup locations, and a process for containment, eradication, and recovery.

Why virtual patching (WAF rules) is critical during vendor remediation

When a vendor has not yet released a fix, virtual patching via your WAF offers the fastest way to keep attackers out while preserving normal site functionality. Virtual patches can:

  • Stop exploitation attempts at the edge (blocking malicious payloads).
  • Buy you time to plan safe updates and audit code.
  • Reduce operational risk, especially for high-traffic or business-critical sites.

Remember: virtual patching is a mitigation, not a permanent fix. Apply vendor patches as soon as they are available and validated.

Final checklist — immediate, short, and follow-up

Immediate (now)

  • Put site in maintenance mode if feasible
  • Disable open registration
  • Force admin password resets
  • Check user list for new admin accounts
  • Enable WAF rule to block role override payloads
  • Back up files & DB and export logs

Short-term (24–72 hours)

  • Run full malware scan
  • Remove unauthorized accounts
  • Audit plugins and theme files
  • Harden registration handling (force subscriber, use CAPTCHA)
  • Rotate keys and tokens

Follow-up (weeks)

  • Monitor logs for signs of reactivation
  • Apply vendor patch when released and test on staging
  • Perform a post-mortem and update security policy

Resources and references

  • CVE record: CVE-2025-13851 — check the canonical entry for updates.
  • WordPress official hardening documentation — use WordPress.org guidance on securing installations.
  • Contact your hosting provider or a qualified security professional for hands-on assistance and emergency containment.

Closing thoughts

When an unauthenticated vulnerability leads to privilege escalation, there is no time for complacency. Treat registration endpoints as high-risk surfaces: they are exposed to the internet, frequently abused by automated tools, and when mishandled, they lead to full site compromise. The most important steps are simple and effective: stop untrusted registration immediately, force least-privilege for new users, and deploy edge controls while you prepare a safe update.

If you run the Buyent theme + Buyent Classified plugin, act now. If you are unsure whether you’re affected, run the quick WP-CLI checks above, and if you find suspicious accounts or signs of compromise, follow the incident steps in this post or engage a professional.

— Hong Kong Security Expert


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