TL;DR (What every site owner needs to know)

• A stored XSS in Ditty News Ticker (versions 3.1.39–3.1.45) allows an Author‑level user to store malicious JavaScript that can be executed in other users’ browsers.
• The vulnerability is fixed in Ditty 3.1.46. Update to 3.1.46 or later immediately.
• If you cannot update immediately, consider deactivating the plugin, restrict author access, apply virtual patching via your WAF, and scan content for suspicious script tags.
• Because this is an author stored XSS, exploitation can be achieved through social engineering that entices an admin/editor to view the malicious content — treat it seriously.

What is stored XSS — and why “Author stored” matters

Stored (persistent) XSS occurs when an attacker injects a malicious script into a web application which stores that payload (for example, in the database). Later, when other users view the stored content, the malicious script executes in their browsers.

An “Author stored XSS” means the attacker only needs Author‑level privileges to place the payload. On many WordPress sites Authors can create and edit posts and various types of content. That capability is enough for an attacker to persist an XSS payload in a plugin’s data store (in this case, Ditty’s ticker items or related meta). The payload may then run when an administrator or editor views the ticker in the admin area or on the front‑end where the plugin renders tickers.

Why this is important:

• Authors are common on multi-author blogs and content sites. A compromise of an Author account — via credential reuse, phishing, or a malicious collaborator — is feasible.
• The stored payload is persistent and can affect privileged users (e.g., administrators), increasing the risk of account takeover and site compromise.
• Even though exploitation often requires some user interaction (e.g., viewing a page), administrative actions triggered by a malicious script (changing options, creating users, or importing malicious content) can escalate the impact.

Vulnerability specifics (high level)

• Affected plugin: Ditty News Ticker
• Vulnerable versions: 3.1.39 — 3.1.45
• Fixed in: 3.1.46
• Type: Stored Cross‑Site Scripting (XSS)
• Required privilege to exploit: Author (or any role able to create or edit ticker content)
• CVSS example context: moderate (this class of issue is often assigned mid‑range scores because exploitation requires some privilege and sometimes user interaction)

We will not publish proof‑of‑concept exploit code here. Assume the vulnerability can be used to execute arbitrary JavaScript where Ditty content is displayed or where Ditty admin pages render stored ticker content.

Attack scenarios — what an attacker could do

Stored XSS gives an attacker a browser context on victims who view the infected content. Possible malicious outcomes include:

• Steal admin session cookies or authentication tokens (if cookies are not properly protected via HttpOnly and SameSite) or exfiltrate CSRF tokens.
• Perform admin actions via the logged‑in user’s browser (create or modify posts, change plugin settings, install backdoors) by making authenticated requests from the victim’s session.
• Inject UI overlays that trick admins into disclosing credentials or approving dangerous actions.
• Redirect users to phishing pages or serve fake login screens.
• Inject persistent scripts to mine cryptocurrency or load additional payloads.
• Use the compromised admin context to upload web shells, backdoors, or pivot elsewhere on the infrastructure.

Because Authors can place the payload and Administrators or Editors may be the victims, the attack surface and impact are non‑trivial.

Immediate steps if you are responsible for any site using Ditty

1. Update the plugin to 3.1.46 or later now. This is the single most important action.
2. If you cannot update immediately:
   • Temporarily deactivate Ditty until you can update.
   • Restrict who can create or edit tickers (remove or limit Author role permissions).
   • Apply a virtual patch via your WAF if possible (see example rule concepts below).
3. Rotate credentials for high‑privilege accounts if you suspect compromise.
4. Run a content scan for injected script tags or suspicious HTML in plugin data.
5. Review recent changes and new users created in the last 30 days.
6. Ensure backups are recent and stored offline/immutably before remediation.

Detection: how to look for indicators of compromise (IoCs)

Scan for suspicious content in the key WordPress tables, especially where plugin content is likely stored (wp_posts, wp_postmeta, wp_options, plugin custom tables). Focus on script tags, event handlers (onload, onclick), and suspicious base64 data.

Run these read‑only queries (adjust table prefixes if yours differ):

SELECT ID, post_title, post_type, post_status
FROM wp_posts
WHERE post_content LIKE '%<script%';

SELECT meta_id, post_id, meta_key, meta_value
FROM wp_postmeta
WHERE meta_value LIKE '%<script%';

SELECT option_id, option_name
FROM wp_options
WHERE option_value LIKE '%<script%';

Search Ditty plugin tables (if present) for script tags or suspicious payloads. Replace wp_ditty_* with actual table names used by the plugin:

SELECT * FROM wp_ditty_items WHERE content LIKE '%<script%';

You can also use WP‑CLI to search posts:

wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%<script%';"

Manual checks:

• Inspect the admin screens where Ditty lists tickers — view HTML source and look for unexpected <script> blocks.
• Check recently modified posts/tickers and the accounts that modified them.
• Review access logs for suspicious POSTs to plugin endpoints, or large POST bodies that may carry payloads.

Note: attackers sometimes encode payloads (e.g., using HTML entities or base64) to evade simple searches. Expand searches to include suspicious patterns like “javascript:” or encoded strings.

If you find malicious content — an incident response checklist

1. Isolate
   • Temporarily take the site offline or block access to the admin area while you investigate.
   • Consider adding HTTP auth to /wp-admin/ to reduce exposure.
2. Preserve
   • Make a full backup (files + database) before any remediation so you can analyze the compromise.
3. Eradicate
   • Remove malicious ticker items, posts, postmeta, or options containing the payload.
   • Deactivate and update the Ditty plugin to 3.1.46 or later.
   • Check the uploads and plugin folders for unexpected files (web shells).
   • Reinstall the plugin from an official package if needed.
4. Recover
   • Rotate passwords for all admin/editor/author accounts.
   • Revoke and reissue API keys, OAuth tokens, and any credentials that may have been exposed.
   • Rebuild compromised accounts if necessary.
5. Post‑incident hardening
   • Enable additional logging and monitoring.
   • Enforce strong passwords and two‑factor authentication for privileged users.
   • Limit the number of users with Author or higher privileges.
   • Review and tighten role capabilities.
6. Notification
   • If the compromise affects user data, follow applicable notification laws/regulations.

How a WAF or virtual patch helps (practical virtual‑patch examples)

If you operate a Web Application Firewall (WAF) or have server‑side request filtering, use virtual patching to block exploit attempts until you can update. A virtual patch is a server‑side rule that neutralizes malicious input patterns. A properly configured WAF can block requests that attempt to inject scripts into the plugin’s endpoints.

Here are example rule concepts you can adapt for your environment (illustrative patterns — test carefully in staging before production):

Example ModSecurity rule (block <script> in request bodies for plugin endpoints):

# Block requests containing <script or on* handlers in bodies for admin AJAX and Ditty endpoints
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx (admin-ajax\.php|ditty|ditty-items)" \
  "phase:2,chain,deny,log,id:1001001,msg:'Potential Ditty stored XSS (script tag in request body)'"
  SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx (?i)<\s*script\b" "t:none"

Block suspicious attributes in request body (onload, onclick, javascript:):

SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx (admin-ajax\.php|ditty|ditty-items)" \
  "phase:2,chain,deny,log,id:1001002,msg:'Potential Ditty stored XSS (JS event handler in request body)'"
  SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx (?i)on(click|load|error|mouseover)\s*=" "t:none"

Important notes:

• Be specific about the endpoints you protect to reduce false positives. Target the plugin’s admin endpoints and AJAX routes, not every request to your site.
• Use logging mode first to fine‑tune rules before enabling block/deny actions.
• Regular expression detection is useful but not perfect. Combine with additional checks such as content length thresholds, user agent anomalies, or rate limits.

Concrete suggestions for WAF rule tuning (practical)

• Limit rule scope: apply rules only to URIs used by the plugin (e.g., admin-ajax.php actions related to Ditty).
• Inspect request body only for POST/PUT methods on those URIs.
• Use a whitelist approach where possible for expected payload types (e.g., allow only alphanumeric and safe punctuation in ticker titles).
• Monitor and log event handler attributes and script tags:
  • Patterns to log: “<script”, “javascript:”, “on\w+\s*=”, “eval(“, “setTimeout(“, “setInterval(“.
• Avoid blocking legitimate HTML snippets used by editors; tune using logging mode prior to blocking.

Development remediation guidance (for plugin developers and integrators)

If you develop or maintain plugins or themes, follow these controls to prevent stored XSS:

• Sanitize input on save:
  • Use WordPress sanitization for incoming data (e.g., sanitize_text_field for simple text).
  • For rich HTML input, use a strict allowed list with wp_kses() and a controlled set of allowed tags and attributes.
• Escape on output:
  • Always escape data immediately before output: esc_html() for plain text, esc_attr() for attributes, esc_js() for JavaScript contexts.
  • For content that should allow limited HTML, use wp_kses_post() or a custom wp_kses() policy.
• Validate roles and capabilities server‑side: Don’t trust client‑side checks. Ensure server endpoints verify current_user_can() for intended capabilities.
• Avoid storing raw HTML from untrusted roles: If Authors must submit HTML, sanitize heavily or store as sanitized/escaped output only.

Example (pseudo code) — sanitize and store:

// When saving ticker content
if ( current_user_can( 'edit_posts' ) ) {
    $content = $_POST['ditty_content'];
    // Permit only a safe subset of tags
    $allowed = array(
        'a' => array('href' => array(), 'title' => array()),
        'strong' => array(), 'em' => array(), 'br' => array()
    );
    $safe = wp_kses( $content, $allowed );
    update_post_meta( $post_id, '_ditty_content', $safe );
}

Hardening recommendations for site owners and admins

1. Keep everything updated — Plugins, themes, and core should be updated promptly. Prioritize security updates.
2. Least privilege policy — Limit the number of users with Author, Editor, and Administrator capabilities. Review and remove unused accounts.
3. Strong authentication — Use unique strong passwords and enable two‑factor authentication for all privileged accounts.
4. Logging and monitoring — Keep access and audit logs for your site and webserver. Review periodically. Alert on suspicious admin area POSTs or unusual account activity.
5. Backups and recovery — Maintain frequent, tested backups. Keep at least one offsite immutable copy.
6. Use a robust WAF and malware scanner — A WAF can stop exploit attempts at the HTTP layer; malware scanners catch known malicious payloads. Ensure virtual patching is available for rapid response to newly disclosed vulnerabilities.
7. Content review — Periodically audit content produced by Authors and Contributors for unexpected HTML or scripts.
8. Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) — A well‑crafted CSP reduces XSS impact by limiting allowed script sources. Test carefully to avoid breaking site functionality.

Long-term monitoring: what to watch for after remediation

• Repeated POST attempts to Ditty endpoints from the same IPs or patterns.
• Admins reporting unexpected UI elements or redirects.
• New admin or editor accounts created without authorization.
• Outbound connections or requests initiated by the web server that you did not authorize (possible beaconing).
• Changes to wp_options or cron schedules that originate from web interfaces.

Example search and cleanup commands (practical)

Search the database for potential script injections in postmeta or options (adjust table prefix):

# posts
wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%<script%' LIMIT 100;"

# postmeta
wp db query "SELECT meta_id, post_id, meta_key FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_value LIKE '%<script%' LIMIT 100;"

# options
wp db query "SELECT option_id, option_name FROM wp_options WHERE option_value LIKE '%<script%' LIMIT 100;""

If you find confirmed malicious entries and are comfortable editing the database, you can update or remove the offending rows. Always take a backup before modifying.

Communication and transparency

If your site is customer‑facing or handles user data, prepare a straightforward, factual message for stakeholders. Describe:

• What happened (without overly technical details that would help attackers).
• The actions you’ve taken to remediate (updated plugin, applied firewall rule, rotated credentials).
• Any recommended user actions (e.g., change password only if there’s evidence of credential exposure).
• How you will prevent recurrence.

Why consider proactive virtual patching and managed protections

A proactive approach that includes virtual patching and continuous monitoring can significantly reduce your exposure window between vulnerability disclosure and full remediation. Virtual patches can blunt automated exploit attempts and give you time to test and deploy official updates without immediate, catastrophic exposure.

Final checklist — what to do right now

• Update Ditty to version 3.1.46 or later.
• If you cannot update immediately:
  • Deactivate the plugin OR
  • Restrict author capabilities and apply a virtual patch/WAF rule.
• Scan for injected script tags in posts, postmeta, options, and plugin tables.
• Rotate credentials for high privilege users and review user roles.
• Ensure backups are recent and safe.
• Monitor logs and set alerts for suspicious admin area activity.
• Consider professional security assistance or a managed WAF to shorten the exposure window for future vulnerabilities.