Plugin Name | WP JobHunt |
---|---|
Type of Vulnerability | Authenticated Authorization Bypass |
CVE Number | CVE-2025-7374 |
Urgency | Medium |
CVE Publish Date | 2025-10-09 |
Source URL | CVE-2025-7374 |
WP JobHunt ≤ 7.6 — Authenticated Authorization Bypass (CVE-2025-7374): What WordPress Site Owners Must Do Now
Author: Hong Kong Security Expert | Date: 2025-10-09
TL;DR
A medium-severity authorization bypass (Broken Authentication / A7) affects WP JobHunt versions up to and including 7.6 (CVE-2025-7374). An authenticated user with the “candidate” role can trigger actions that should be limited to higher-privileged accounts because of insufficient server-side authorization checks. A fixed release (7.7) is available — upgrade immediately. If you cannot upgrade right away, consider temporary mitigations: disable the plugin, harden candidate capabilities, apply WAF/virtual-patch rules, and audit for suspicious activity.
This advisory is prepared by a Hong Kong security expert. It explains the vulnerability in plain technical detail, shows safe detection and mitigation strategies (including sample WAF rules and WordPress hardening snippets), and describes incident response steps if you suspect compromise.
Why you should read this
- WP JobHunt is a common recruitment plugin; authorization errors allow lower-privileged users to perform privileged actions.
- The flaw requires authentication (a candidate account) but is trivial to weaponise at scale where public registration is allowed.
- You will receive concise, actionable guidance: detection, immediate mitigations (virtual-patching / WAF), and recovery steps.
What happened (high level)
An authorization bypass was found in WP JobHunt ≤ 7.6. The root cause is missing or incorrect capability checks in AJAX and/or REST endpoints or custom plugin actions. Authenticated accounts with the “candidate” role (or similar low-privilege roles) can access functionality intended for employers or admins. The vendor fixed the issue in 7.7 by enforcing proper authorization checks.
Because exploitation requires authentication, the risk depends on whether your site permits public registrations or if attackers can obtain candidate credentials. Many job sites allow self-registration for applicants; if yours does, treat this as urgent.
Impact
- Privilege escalation and unauthorized actions by low-privileged users.
- Potential to create/modify listings, alter application data, change usermeta, or perform actions that could lead to admin account takeover — depending on which endpoints your site exposes.
- If exploited, attackers may plant backdoors, create admin accounts, or manipulate job listings to defraud or phish users.
- CVSS: 5.4 (medium). Real-world impact increases significantly for sites with open candidate registration or poor monitoring.
Who is at risk
- Sites running WP JobHunt ≤ 7.6.
- Sites that allow public candidate registration.
- Sites where candidate accounts are reused or password hygiene is weak.
- Multisite setups with custom role mappings or plugin customisations.
If you manage multiple sites, prioritise those with public registration and high traffic.
Immediate actions (ordered)
- Upgrade to WP JobHunt 7.7 (or later) immediately. Backup files and database prior to upgrade.
- If you cannot upgrade right away, disable the plugin temporarily.
- Enforce stronger authentication for candidate accounts: require strong passwords and consider 2FA for privileged users.
- Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) or server-level filters to virtual-patch the affected endpoints while you plan the upgrade.
- Audit user accounts and database changes for signs of unauthorised activity.
- Follow the incident response checklist below if you suspect compromise.
Safe reproduction (technical summary without exploit code)
Responsible disclosure encourages defenders to understand high-level reproduction details. The flaw appears when plugin code processes requests (via admin-ajax.php, custom AJAX routes, or REST API endpoints) and executes privileged actions without verifying the current user’s capabilities or role.
Common problematic patterns:
- An AJAX action handler checks only is_user_logged_in() or the user ID, but not current_user_can() or a custom capability.
- REST endpoints registered with a permission_callback that returns true for any authenticated user or no permission_callback at all.
- Assumptions in code that “candidate” cannot alter certain resources without server-side enforcement.
Because these are generic patterns, a WAF can be used to block odd request routes and parameters while you upgrade.
Detection: What to look for in logs and the database
Fast triage reduces risk and helps detect exploitation.
A. Web server / Access logs
- Sudden or recurrent POST requests to admin-ajax.php or plugin-specific endpoints authenticated as candidate accounts.
- Requests containing suspicious parameter combinations (e.g., actions named job_create, job_update, user_update originating from front-end candidate pages).
- Multiple IPs creating candidate accounts quickly followed by calls to those endpoints.
B. WordPress activity & database indicators
- New admin users created after the disclosure date — check wp_users.user_registered.
- Changes to usermeta where role or capabilities were updated (wp_usermeta meta_key = ‘wp_capabilities’).
- New or modified job listings with unusual content or redirect URLs.
- New or modified files — scan file modification times on the filesystem.
Sample SQL queries for triage:
-- New admin users created recently
SELECT ID, user_login, user_email, user_registered
FROM wp_users
WHERE user_registered >= '2025-10-01'
AND ID IN (
SELECT user_id FROM wp_usermeta WHERE meta_key = 'wp_capabilities' AND meta_value LIKE '%administrator%'
);
-- Check for candidate role escalations
SELECT user_id, meta_key, meta_value, umeta_id
FROM wp_usermeta
WHERE meta_key = 'wp_capabilities' AND meta_value LIKE '%candidate%'
AND user_id IN (
SELECT user_id FROM wp_usermeta WHERE meta_key = 'wp_capabilities' AND meta_value LIKE '%administrator%'
);
C. WordPress debug and plugin logs
- Enable WP logging temporarily: add define(‘WP_DEBUG’, true); define(‘WP_DEBUG_LOG’, true); to wp-config.php. Logs will write to wp-content/debug.log.
- Search for failed or unexpected permission checks and suspicious plugin activity.
WAF & virtual patch: immediate protections you can apply
If you run a Web Application Firewall or server-level filtering, virtual-patching the affected endpoints is the fastest way to reduce risk. Test all rules in detection mode first to avoid breaking legitimate functionality.
Important: do not implement rules that break necessary candidate workflows. Log-only mode for 24–48 hours is recommended before blocking.
A. Block POST requests that escalate privileges
Block POSTs to admin-ajax.php or REST endpoints where action parameters match job management actions originating from front-end referrers or low-privilege contexts.
Example ModSecurity-style rule (pseudo; adapt to your WAF syntax):
# Block suspicious admin-ajax actions originating from front-end (virtual patch)
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" \
"phase:2,chain,deny,log,msg:'Block suspicious WP JobHunt AJAX admin action from non-admin',id:1009001,severity:2"
SecRule ARGS:action "@rx (job_create|job_update|job_delete|application_update|user_elevate)" \
"t:none,chain"
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "@eq 0" "t:none"
B. Block REST endpoint access patterns
If the plugin exposes REST routes under /wp-json/wp-jobhunt/ or similar, add rules to restrict write operations (POST/PUT/DELETE) until patched or require additional verification.
Example Nginx + Lua concept (pseudo):
-- If request is to /wp-json/wp-jobhunt/ and method is POST/PUT/DELETE, require a valid admin cookie
if ngx.var.request_uri:match("^/wp%-json/wp%-jobhunt/") and ngx.req.get_method() ~= "GET" then
-- Check for WordPress logged-in cookie and valid capabilities via internal auth
-- Otherwise deny
ngx.exit(ngx.HTTP_FORBIDDEN)
end
C. Rate-limit account creation and suspicious endpoints
- Limit registrations per IP per hour (e.g., 3 per hour).
- Throttle calls to plugin endpoints that modify data.
D. Block suspicious parameter patterns
Monitor or block requests containing admin-only fields such as role=administrator, capability strings, or usermeta keys being submitted from front-end contexts.
E. IP allowlists for admin-only APIs
If admin features are only used from private IPs, restrict access to those endpoints with an IP allowlist.
F. Safe deployment guidance
Run new rules in detection mode for at least 24 hours, review logs, then move to blocking when confident. Maintain a rollback plan.
WordPress-level compensating controls (apply if upgrade is not immediately possible)
-
Temporarily disable public registration
Dashboard: Settings → General → uncheck “Anyone can register”. Or add a filter to block registrations until patched.
-
Harden the candidate role capabilities
Add an mu-plugin on staging first to remove dangerous capabilities:
<?php // mu-plugins/wpjobhunt-hardening.php add_action('init', function() { $role = get_role('candidate'); if ($role) { // Remove dangerous capabilities that should never exist for candidate $dangerous = ['edit_posts', 'publish_posts', 'edit_others_posts', 'manage_options', 'promote_users']; foreach ($dangerous as $cap) { if ($role->has_cap($cap)) { $role->remove_cap($cap); } } } });
-
Disable plugin front-end actions temporarily
If the plugin registers non-essential admin-ajax handlers for public use, remove or filter those actions in an mu-plugin until you can apply the vendor patch.
-
Require stronger checks for sensitive AJAX actions
Where practical, require a custom header, nonce, or capability check for sensitive admin-ajax actions. Test carefully to avoid breaking legitimate front-end behaviour.
-
Protect plugin PHP files
As a last-resort temporary measure, deny direct access to plugin include files via webserver rules. This can break functionality — test on staging.
# Example .htaccess for /wp-content/plugins/wp-jobhunt/includes/ <FilesMatch "\.(php)$"> Require all denied </FilesMatch>
Monitoring & hunting tips (post-patch)
- Monitor user creation and role changes daily for at least two weeks after patching.
- Run file integrity scans: compare code against vendor-provided copies.
- Search for webshell indicators: unusual base64, eval(), preg_replace with /e, file writes to uploads, etc.
- Check scheduled tasks (wp-cron) for newly added jobs.
- Export recently modified posts/pages and inspect for injected content or redirects.
Useful SQL:
-- Look for recently modified attachments
SELECT ID, post_title, post_date, post_modified
FROM wp_posts
WHERE post_type='attachment' AND post_modified > NOW() - INTERVAL 14 DAY;
Server-side search example:
grep -R --include="*.php" -n --color -E "(base64_decode|eval\(|system\(|passthru\(|exec\(|shell_exec\()" /var/www/html
Incident response if you detect compromise
- Isolate the site (maintenance mode or take offline if severe).
- Preserve logs and database snapshots for forensics.
- Rotate all admin and high-privilege passwords and invalidate sessions. Example (WP-CLI):
wp user session destroy <user-id>
. - Check for and remove any new admin users you did not create.
- Restore from a known-good backup when available.
- Remove malware/backdoors, then update core, themes, and plugins to latest.
- Rotate API keys, tokens, and any credentials stored in files or the database.
- Perform a post-mortem: root cause, scope of impact, and preventive measures.
If uncertain about cleanup, engage an incident response specialist with WordPress experience. Acting quickly limits damage.
Example WAF rule patterns — translated for common platforms
Readable patterns your security team can adapt to their WAF:
-
Block suspicious admin-ajax actions from ordinary referrers
Pattern:
admin-ajax.php?action=(job_create|job_update|user_elevate)
Conditions: Method POST; lack of valid admin referrer or nonce header; UA/IP anomaly scoring.
-
Throttle registration endpoint
Pattern:
wp-login.php?action=register
or/wp-json/wp/v2/users
if used. Action: Rate-limit to ~3 registrations per IP per hour. -
Block REST write endpoints until patched
Pattern:
^/wp-json/(wp-jobhunt|wp-jobhunt/v1)/.*$
Methods: POST, PUT, DELETE. Action: Block or require additional verification.
Checklist: Step-by-step for site owners / admins
- Confirm plugin version. If ≤ 7.6, treat as vulnerable.
- Backup site (files + database).
- Upgrade plugin to 7.7 immediately if possible.
- If you cannot upgrade, disable the plugin or apply WAF virtual patches.
- Harden candidate role capabilities and disable registration if not needed.
- Set up monitoring and scanning (file integrity, malware checks).
- Audit users and recent site changes.
- Rotate admin credentials and invalidate sessions.
- Monitor server and application logs closely for at least 30 days.
- If suspicious activity is found, isolate and follow the incident response steps above.
Frequently asked questions
- Q: Do attackers need an account to exploit this?
- A: Yes. The vulnerability requires authentication (candidate role). However, public registration or compromised low-privilege accounts still make the site at risk.
- Q: Is there an available patch?
- A: Yes. The vendor released WP JobHunt 7.7 which fixes the authorization checks. Upgrade immediately.
- Q: Can a firewall block this completely?
- A: A WAF can reduce risk by virtual-patching vulnerable endpoints and blocking known exploit traffic patterns, but it is a mitigation — not a replacement for the official patch.
- Q: Will disabling the plugin break my site?
- A: It depends. Test on staging. If the plugin provides core functionality, apply compensating controls instead of disabling if necessary.
Closing notes from a Hong Kong security expert
Authorization flaws are dangerous because they undermine business logic and privilege boundaries. Even when an issue requires authentication, attackers can often obtain low-privilege accounts at scale or exploit credential reuse. Prioritise sites with public candidate registration and high-value listing data.
Practical guidance: patch when you can, virtual-patch if needed, monitor continuously, and follow a disciplined incident response process if you see signs of abuse. If you need hands-on help, hire an experienced WordPress security consultant or incident responder — time is critical.
References and additional reading
- CVE-2025-7374 (public record)
- Plugin vendor release notes — upgrade to 7.7
- OWASP Top 10: Identification and Authentication Failures