CVE-2026-1249: SSRF in “MP3 Audio Player for Music, Radio & Podcast” (Sonaar) — What WordPress Site Owners Must Do Now

By Hong Kong Security Expert — Published: 2026-02-13

Summary: A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability (CVE-2026-1249) affects the WordPress plugin “MP3 Audio Player for Music, Radio & Podcast by Sonaar” (versions 5.3–5.10). An authenticated user with Author privileges or higher can abuse a URL-fetching endpoint to make the site request attacker-controlled or internal hosts. The vendor fixed the issue in version 5.11. This article explains the technical details, realistic attack scenarios, detection methods, immediate mitigations (including virtual patching and WAF rules), and longer-term hardening guidance.

What happened — quick facts

• Type de vulnérabilité : Falsification de requêtes côté serveur (SSRF)
• Affected product: MP3 Audio Player for Music, Radio & Podcast (Sonaar)
• Affected versions: 5.3 — 5.10
• Fixed in: 5.11
• CVE: CVE-2026-1249
• Privilège requis : Auteur (authentifié)
• Patch priority: Low (CVSS score 5.0)
• Disclosure date: 2026-02-13

Although the CVSS score is moderate, SSRF issues can be a stepping-stone to serious compromises because they may expose internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or other infrastructure that should not be publicly reachable.

Qu'est-ce que SSRF et pourquoi cela compte pour WordPress

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) happens when an application fetches resources from user-supplied URLs without validating or restricting the destination. An attacker coerces the server into making HTTP (or other protocol) requests on their behalf. Since web servers typically have access to internal networks and cloud provider metadata services, SSRF can be used for:

• Internal network discovery (scanning private IP ranges)
• Accessing cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to obtain credentials or tokens
• Interacting with internal admin interfaces not exposed publicly
• Pivoting to other infrastructure or exfiltrating sensitive data

On WordPress, plugins commonly fetch remote resources using WordPress HTTP APIs (wp_remote_get, wp_remote_post, cURL). If a plugin accepts external URLs from authenticated users and fetches them without host validation or allowlisting, it can be abused for SSRF.

Technical summary of this vulnerability

High-level, non-exploitative summary:

• The plugin exposes functionality that fetches remote resources (likely for metadata retrieval or remote file validation) based on input supplied by authenticated users with the Author role or higher.
• The plugin fails to restrict or properly validate the destination host of outgoing HTTP requests (no robust allowlist or host validation), allowing an Author account to supply arbitrary URLs and have the server perform HTTP(S) requests to them.
• Because the server can access private IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints, an attacker with an Author account can cause requests to internal resources, enabling information disclosure and further attack vectors.

Note: requiring an Author account reduces the attack surface compared with unauthenticated flaws, but compromised or malicious Author accounts are common in real-world operations.

Scénarios d'attaque réalistes et impact

Practical abuse scenarios, ordered from most to least likely:

1. Internal service discovery and fingerprinting

   Attacker submits URLs targeting internal IP ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 127.0.0.1) and analyses responses to map reachable services.

2. Cloud metadata access and credential theft

   On cloud hosts, attacker targets metadata endpoints (e.g. AWS 169.254.169.254) to retrieve IAM credentials, tokens, or instance metadata—often leading to privilege escalation.

3. Accessing internal admin interfaces

   SSRF can be used to reach internal services such as Elasticsearch, Redis, or private admin panels bound to localhost.

4. Server-side request chaining

   The server is used as a proxy to access other external resources, hiding attacker origin or pivoting to additional targets.

5. Data exfiltration and covert channels

   Combining SSRF with content injection or caching can allow exfiltration of data in small fragments.

Qui est à risque

• Sites running the vulnerable plugin (versions 5.3 — 5.10).
• Sites that permit Author role accounts for external contributors or multiple editors.
• Sites hosted in cloud environments (where metadata endpoints exist).
• Sites without outbound egress controls (servers able to access internal IP ranges and metadata services).
• Sites that have not applied the vendor update (5.11) or implemented virtual patches.

Assume risk until you confirm the plugin is updated to 5.11+ and you have checked the site for abuse.

Étapes immédiates que chaque propriétaire de site devrait prendre (dans l'ordre)

1. Update the plugin to 5.11 or later

   This is the primary remediation. Apply the vendor patch in a controlled maintenance window.

2. Si vous ne pouvez pas mettre à jour immédiatement
   • Disable the plugin temporarily until you can apply the patch.
   • Apply virtual patching (WAF rules or application filters) to block SSRF attempts — see the WAF section below.
3. Review user roles
   • Audit all Author and Editor accounts; revoke or downgrade unknown or unused accounts.
   • Enforce strong passwords and enable multi-factor authentication for publishing-capable accounts.
4. Block outbound access to cloud metadata and internal subnets

   Add egress firewall rules to block 169.254.169.254 and consider blocking private ranges if not required.

5. Search logs for suspicious fetches

   Look for plugin endpoints invoked by Author accounts and unexpected outgoing requests from the server.

6. Scannez les indicateurs de compromission.

   Run malware scans and inspect for web shells or recent unauthorized file changes.

7. Follow the incident response checklist below if you find evidence

Virtual patching with a WAF — recommended rules and examples

If immediate patching is not possible, virtual patching at the edge or on the host can reduce risk. The principles below are vendor-agnostic; adapt them to your platform and test thoroughly.

Goals for WAF rules

• Block requests to plugin endpoints that include URL parameters pointing to private or link-local addresses.
• Deny requests containing dangerous protocols (file:, gopher:, dict:, ftp:).
• Block attempts to fetch cloud metadata (169.254.169.254).
• Log suspicious events before enforcing deny rules in production.

Detect private/internal IPs via regex (examples)

Common regex patterns to detect private ranges and link-local addresses (test and adapt for your engine):

• 10\.(?:[0-9]{1,3}\.){2}[0-9]{1,3}
• 192\.168\.(?:[0-9]{1,3}\.)[0-9]{1,3}
• 172\.(?:1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.(?:[0-9]{1,3}\.)[0-9]{1,3}
• 169\.254\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}
• 127\.0\.0\.1

Example combined regex (use with caution):

\b(?:(?:127\.0\.0\.1|169\.254\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|10\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|192\.168\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|172\.(?:1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}))\b

ModSecurity rule example (pseudocode)

This pseudocode rejects requests to the plugin path where a parameter contains an internal IP or metadata IP. Replace PLUGIN_PATH and URL_PARAM with your actual endpoint and parameter name.

SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains /wp-content/plugins/mp3-music-player" "phase:2,chain,deny,log,msg:'Potential SSRF attempt — blocked internal IP in parameter'"
  SecRule ARGS:remote_url "@rx \b(127\.0\.0\.1|169\.254\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|10\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|192\.168\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|172\.(?:1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})\b" "t:none"

Remarques :

• Use ARGS or a specific parameter name (e.g., ARGS:url) depending on where the plugin accepts input.
• Start with logging/alerting before switching to deny to avoid blocking legitimate traffic.
• Consider rate-limiting Author accounts invoking plugin endpoints to detect abuse.

Nginx/reverse proxy approach

If you control an Nginx reverse proxy, inspect request payloads for suspicious URLs and return HTTP 403 for matches to internal IPs or metadata addresses. Implement robust testing before deployment.

Blocking dangerous URL schemes

Block schemes such as file://, gopher://, dict:// and ftp://:

SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_HEADERS "@rx ^(?:file|gopher|dict|ftp):" "phase:2,deny,log,msg:'Blocked dangerous URL scheme in parameter'"

Virtual patching principle

• Virtual patching is a temporary stopgap until an official plugin update is applied.
• Combine virtual patches with host-level egress controls for defense-in-depth.
• Log all blocks to capture attacker TTPs for later analysis.

Server-side hardening and egress controls

Host and network-level controls are an effective secondary line of defense.

Block cloud metadata (example)

Block outbound HTTP to metadata endpoints. Example using iptables:

iptables -I OUTPUT -d 169.254.169.254 -j DROP

Or apply equivalent rules with nftables, cloud security groups, or host firewalls. Verify legitimate services before blocking broadly.

Restrict outbound traffic by allowlist

Allow egress only to domains your application requires (CDNs, APIs, payment processors). Enforce this with firewall rules, proxy allowlists, or host-based controls.

DNS controls

Use DNS to mitigate metadata/host access from the server’s resolver (e.g. return NXDOMAIN for metadata hostnames or point them to a sinkhole). Apply with caution.

Application-level restrictions

Plugins and code should implement host allowlists for external fetches and validate URL schemes. Use WordPress HTTP API filters to abort disallowed requests (example further below).

Detection: logs, indicators, and forensic triage

To determine if SSRF was attempted or successful, inspect:

Web server and application logs

• Requests to plugin URLs from authenticated users including URL parameters.
• Repeated requests from a single Author account to plugin endpoints with different internal target addresses.
• Unusual patterns targeting admin-ajax.php or plugin REST endpoints.

Outgoing connection logs

• Outbound requests to private IP ranges or to the cloud metadata IP.
• Spikes in outbound connections from the webserver on ports 80/443.
• DNS requests resolving internal hostnames or metadata hosts.

System and process indicators

• New processes or cron jobs contacting internal services.
• Unexpected file changes (web shells, new PHP files).
• Unauthorized tokens or credentials found in instance metadata/config files.

WordPress artifacts

• New admin users or role changes coinciding with suspicious activity.
• Unexpected scheduled events (wp_cron) created by certain accounts.

Étapes d'analyse

1. Preserve logs (web, reverse proxy, database, server syslog) covering the suspicious timeframe.
2. Capture memory and filesystem snapshots if active foothold is suspected.
3. Identify the Author user(s) that triggered requests and determine if accounts are compromised.
4. Check outgoing destinations to see if metadata or internal endpoints were accessed.

Liste de contrôle de réponse aux incidents si vous soupçonnez un compromis

1. Isolate the host (remove from load balancer, restrict network access) if feasible.
2. Rotate all secrets that could be compromised (API keys, cloud IAM keys, tokens).
3. Revoke and reissue cloud credentials if metadata was accessed.
4. Update the vulnerable plugin to 5.11 immediately.
5. Change passwords and enforce MFA for affected users (Authors, Editors, Admins).
6. Run full malware scans and manual code reviews for backdoors (web shells, scheduled tasks, altered files).
7. Rebuild the server from a known-good image if persistence cannot be removed.
8. Restore from a clean backup if integrity is compromised and remediation is not possible in-place.
9. Prepare a timeline of events and retain logs for post-incident analysis.
10. Engage a professional incident response team or security consultant for deep intrusions or if you lack internal capability.

Practical code snippet — short-term application layer mitigation

If updating immediately is impossible, use an application-level filter to block outgoing HTTP requests to disallowed destinations. Add this to an mu-plugin (preferred) or your theme’s functions.php. Test on staging first.

<?php
// mu-plugin/ssrf-mitigation.php
add_filter( 'pre_http_request', 'hksec_block_ssrf_targets', 10, 3 );

function hksec_block_ssrf_targets( $pre, $args, $url ) {
    // Only apply to plugin-related requests (adjust to the plugin's endpoints)
    if ( false === strpos( $url, 'mp3-music-player' ) && false === strpos( $url, '/wp-json/sonaar/' ) ) {
        return $pre; // not our target
    }

    // Parse host
    $host = parse_url( $url, PHP_URL_HOST );
    if ( ! $host ) {
        return new WP_Error( 'blocked_ssrf', 'Request blocked: invalid host' );
    }

    // Block link local / metadata IPs and private ranges
    $blocked_patterns = array(
        '/^127\./',
        '/^169\.254\./',
        '/^10\./',
        '/^192\.168\./',
        '/^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\./',
    );

    // Resolve host to IP(s)
    $ips = @dns_get_record( $host, DNS_A + DNS_AAAA );
    foreach ( $ips as $record ) {
        $ip = isset( $record['ip'] ) ? $record['ip'] : ( isset( $record['ipv6'] ) ? $record['ipv6'] : '' );
        if ( ! $ip ) {
            continue;
        }
        foreach ( $blocked_patterns as $pat ) {
            if ( preg_match( $pat, $ip ) ) {
                return new WP_Error( 'blocked_ssrf', 'Request blocked: disallowed IP address' );
            }
        }
    }

    // Block dangerous schemes
    $scheme = parse_url( $url, PHP_URL_SCHEME );
    if ( in_array( strtolower( $scheme ), array( 'file', 'gopher', 'dict', 'ftp' ) ) ) {
        return new WP_Error( 'blocked_scheme', 'Request blocked: disallowed URL scheme' );
    }

    // Allow request
    return $pre;
}
?>

This filter aborts HTTP requests matching plugin paths when resolved IPs fall into private/link-local ranges. It is a temporary mitigation and not a replacement for the official patch.

Long-term best practices for plugin and user security

• Keep plugins and themes up to date; monitor release notes and subscribe to trusted security feeds.
• Minimize roles with publishing capabilities. Limit Author role assignments and review them regularly.
• Use role-management to fine-tune who can upload or publish content.
• Appliquez l'authentification multifacteur pour tous les comptes privilégiés.
• Test updates in staging, then deploy quickly to production when security fixes are available.
• Apply network segmentation and egress controls at host or network level to block access to cloud metadata and untrusted internal services.
• Enable logging and alerting for unusual admin actions and plugin-specific endpoints.
• Perform periodic security audits and static code analysis for plugins that accept user input and perform remote fetches.

Update timeline and CVE reference

• Disclosure: 2026-02-13
• Fixed in plugin version: 5.11
• CVE assigned: CVE-2026-1249
• Required privilege: Author

Remarques finales

Action checklist: update the plugin to version 5.11, audit and lock down Author accounts, apply egress controls to block metadata and unnecessary internal ranges, and deploy WAF/application filters as temporary mitigations. Treat any detected SSRF attempts as a potentially high-priority incident because they frequently precede privilege escalation and lateral movement.

If you lack the in-house capability to implement these controls or perform a detailed forensic investigation, engage a reputable incident response or security consulting firm experienced with WordPress and cloud environments.

— Expert en sécurité de Hong Kong