| Plugin Name | Electric Enquiries |
|---|---|
| Type of Vulnerability | Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) |
| CVE Number | CVE-2025-14142 |
| Urgency | Low |
| CVE Publish Date | 2026-02-26 |
| Source URL | CVE-2025-14142 |
Emergency Security Advisory: Authenticated Stored XSS in Electric Enquiries <= 1.1 — How to Protect Your WordPress Site Now
Summary: An authenticated stored Cross‑Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability affecting Electric Enquiries plugin versions ≤ 1.1 (CVE‑2025‑14142) allows a user with Contributor or higher privileges to inject script payloads through the plugin’s
buttonshortcode attribute. This advisory explains the risk, exploitation paths, detection and containment steps, short‑term mitigations you can apply immediately, and long‑term fixes to keep your site secure.
TL;DR — What you need to know
- Vulnerability: Authenticated (Contributor+) stored XSS via the plugin’s
buttonshortcode attribute in Electric Enquiries ≤ 1.1 (CVE‑2025‑14142). - Impact: Stored XSS can execute in administrators’ or visitors’ browsers, enabling session theft, privilege escalation via social engineering, unauthorized actions, and site compromise.
- Exploitable by: Any authenticated user with Contributor role or higher — ensure contributor accounts are trusted or restricted.
- Patch status: At time of writing there is no confirmed patched release from the vendor; follow official vendor channels for updates. Treat this as a real risk (Patch Priority: Low to Medium depending on exposure and user roles) with a representative CVSS example around 6.5.
- Immediate mitigation: Neutralize the vulnerable shortcode, harden user roles, apply virtual patching at the application layer where possible, and scan for injected content.
- Protection approach: Use layered defenses — careful role management, content scanning, short-term virtual patches in the application layer (WAF), and code fixes when available.
Why this vulnerability matters
Stored XSS is particularly dangerous because the malicious code is saved on the server and delivered to other users later — including administrators. Practical concerns for this discovery:
- Contributors are common on community and multi‑author sites. If a low‑privilege account stores XSS, an attacker can craft content that executes when an admin or editor views it.
- Plugins that register shortcodes may output HTML directly into pages. If shortcode attributes are not validated and escaped, they become injection vectors.
- Stored XSS can be chained to perform admin actions via forged requests in the browser, steal cookies or tokens, perform phishing inside an admin session, or drop secondary payloads (web shells, backdoors).
- Because the vector is a shortcode attribute, payloads may not be visible in the WYSIWYG editor easily: they reside inside markup and attributes, sometimes in shortcode parameters, so they can persist and be missed by standard editors.
Technical summary of the Electric Enquiries issue
- Vulnerable component: The plugin’s
buttonshortcode handler — it accepts attributes and outputs them without sufficient sanitization or escaping. - Vulnerable versions: ≤ 1.1
- Attack flow:
- An attacker with Contributor (or higher) creates or edits content and inserts a
[button]shortcode. - The attacker injects a JavaScript payload in a shortcode attribute (for example, in an attribute that is later echoed into an HTML attribute of a button).
- The payload is stored in the post content (or wherever the plugin stores the shortcode data).
- When another user or admin visits the page, the vulnerable handler outputs the attribute without escaping, and the browser executes the attacker’s script.
- An attacker with Contributor (or higher) creates or edits content and inserts a
- Realistic outcomes: cookie/session token theft, invisible redirects, silent admin operations (changing options, creating users), and delivery of additional malware.
Note: Exact attribute name(s) exploited will vary depending on how the plugin builds its button markup. The root cause is missing validation and missing escape before rendering.
Attack scenarios and examples (conceptual)
To avoid providing working exploit code, these are conceptual scenarios you should consider when assessing impact.
- Scenario A — Admin session theft: The attacker inserts a payload that reads
document.cookieand sends it to a remote server. When an admin views the page, cookies are exfiltrated and may be used to impersonate the admin. - Scenario B — Silent privilege escalation through UX: The script triggers hidden POST requests in the admin UI to change options or create a new administrator account using the admin’s session.
- Scenario C — Reputation damage and SEO spam: The injected script modifies the DOM to inject spammy links or redirects visitors to malicious sites.
These scenarios show why stored XSS must be remediated quickly.
Detection: how to find signs of exploitation on your site
- Scan for shortcodes in content and attributes
Use WP‑CLI to identify posts containing the
buttonshortcode:wp post list --post_type=post --field=ID | xargs -n1 -I % sh -c "wp post get % --field=post_content | sed -n '1,200p' | grep -n '\[button' && echo 'POST: %'"Also search
post_contentandpostmetafields for occurrences of[button. - Look for suspicious attributes
Search the database for strings like
javascript:,<script,onmouseover=,onerror=,onload=,svg/onload, ordata:URIs in content:wp db query "SELECT ID, post_title FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%javascript:%' OR post_content LIKE '%onmouseover=%' OR post_content LIKE '% - Log and audit review
Check access logs for unusual POSTs from contributor accounts. Review admin visits to pages that contain the shortcode — look for admin views followed by suspicious actions.
- Malware and scanner checks
Run a full filesystem scan for known web shells and unexpected files in uploads or theme/plugin directories. Use a reputable scanner to look for injected scripts stored in posts and files.
- Browser observation
Visit suspect pages in an isolated browser or sandbox: inspect Console for errors, Network for requests to unknown domains, and DOM for unexpected modifications.
Immediate containment steps (what to do right now)
If you cannot update the plugin immediately, apply these containment measures to reduce risk while preparing a full remediation.
- Restrict contributor accounts
Temporarily change untrusted contributor accounts to Subscriber, or require an approval workflow for all content. This reduces the risk of new stored payloads being created.
- Disable or neutralize the vulnerable shortcode
The fastest WordPress‑level mitigation is to neutralize the shortcode so it no longer outputs vulnerable HTML. Add this to your theme's child
functions.phpor a site‑specific plugin and deploy immediately:// Neutralize the vulnerable 'button' shortcode and prevent XSS output add_action('init', function() { if (shortcode_exists('button')) { // Remove existing handler remove_shortcode('button'); // Register safe handler that only outputs sanitized content (or empty string) add_shortcode('button', function($atts, $content = '') { // Only allow a very small whitelist of attributes if you must. // Example: return only the content escaped or an empty string. return esc_html($content); }); } }, 20);This avoids the plugin's vulnerable rendering while preserving the post content.
- Use WAF / virtual patching where available
Configure your application firewall to block requests that attempt to inject script-like content into shortcodes or include typical XSS patterns in POST bodies and post content. Test rules in detection mode before blocking to reduce false positives.
- Search and remove existing malicious shortcodes
Identify posts with malicious attributes and either clean them manually or use scripted replacements (WP‑CLI, database tools). Export suspected post content to staging and perform changes there before modifying production.
- Rotate credentials and invalidate sessions (if compromise is suspected)
If there is evidence admin credentials were exposed or suspicious admin activity occurred, force password resets for administrators and revoke persistent sessions.
- Back up your site
Before making bulk content changes, take a fresh full backup (files + database). Preserve a safe rollback point in case cleaning interferes with site functionality.
Sample WAF rule (conceptual)
Below is an example ModSecurity-style signature that firewall engineers can adapt. This is conceptual — test in detection (log) mode first.
# Block XSS attempts delivered via 'button' shortcode attributes in POST body or content fields
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx \[button[^\]]*(?:on\w+\s*=|javascript:||data:[^ ]*text/html)" \
"id:1001001,phase:2,deny,log,msg:'Block potential stored XSS via button shortcode attribute',severity:2,tag:'application-multi',tag:'language-php'"
# Key detections to include:
# - Shortcode name near suspicious tokens: \[button + (on[a-z]+=|javascript:| Cleaning existing infections
- Isolate and export
Work on a staging copy (restore backup into staging). Export all posts that contain the shortcode.
- Programmatic cleanup
Replace or remove dangerous attributes via safe scripts:
- Replace any occurrence of
on\w+=in shortcode attributes. - Strip
<script>tags orjavascript:protocol occurrences.
- Replace any occurrence of
- Manual verification
After automated cleanup, manually review updated pages in staging to ensure legitimate functionality is not broken.
- Re‑scan
Rescan the site (files + DB) to ensure no additional artifacts remain.
- Reintroduce functionality safely
If you need the
buttonshortcode for layout, rebuild it in a secure manner (see "Example safe implementation" below).
Long‑term fixes and best practices
- Keep plugins updated and monitor vendor advisories
Apply vendor updates as soon as they are available.
- Principle of least privilege
Give users only the capabilities they need. Use review workflows for contributors and editors.
- Sanitize and escape plugin output
Plugin developers should validate and sanitize shortcode attributes on input (e.g.
sanitize_text_field,intval) and escape output using appropriate functions (esc_attr(),esc_html(),wp_kses()).Example safe output for a button attribute:
$label = isset($atts['label']) ? sanitize_text_field($atts['label']) : ''; $href = isset($atts['href']) ? esc_url_raw($atts['href']) : '#'; $html = '<a href="'.esc_attr($href).'" class="plugin-button">'.esc_html($label).'</a>'; echo $html; - Use nonces and capability checks for user-submitted actions
If the plugin uses AJAX or processes form input, always check
current_user_can()and verify WP nonces. - Audit shortcode implementations
Periodically review custom and third‑party shortcodes for proper sanitization and escaping.
- Harden editor capabilities
Consider trusted editor workflows, disable untrusted HTML editing, and moderate raw HTML/shortcodes from untrusted roles.
- Application‑level security layers
Use an application firewall (WAF) with virtual patching capability to protect until vendor patches are available. Monitor logs and configure alerts for suspicious post content changes, file changes, or sudden admin activity.
Incident Response Checklist
If you suspect exploitation, follow this checklist to respond in an orderly way:
- Take a full backup (database + files).
- Put the site in maintenance mode or restore to staging to prevent further exposure while investigating.
- Neutralize the shortcode (see neutralize snippet above).
- Change passwords for all administrator accounts and force logout of all sessions.
- Scan for web shells and suspicious files in
wp-content/uploads, themes, and plugin directories. - Search the database for suspicious scripts,
javascript:,<scripttags, andon*attributes. - Apply application-layer rules (WAF) to block known exploit patterns; start in log-only mode to tune rules, then block.
- Clean compromised content on staging and verify functionality.
- Apply vendor/author patch when available and re-enable shortcode only after review.
- Publish an incident summary internally and evaluate whether external disclosure is needed.
- Review user account policies, rotate credentials, and implement 2FA for administrators.
Layered protection approach (practical)
Do not rely on a single control. Recommended layers:
- Prevention — Harden roles, use approval workflows, and restrict who can publish raw shortcodes or untrusted HTML.
- Application filtering / virtual patching — Apply rules at the application edge (WAF) to block obvious exploit patterns until code is fixed.
- Detection — Scan posts and files for injected scripts, monitor admin activity and content changes, and alert on anomalies.
- Response — Maintain clean backups, staging environments for remediation, and an incident response playbook.
Example safe implementation for a replacement button shortcode
If your site relies on button shortcodes, replace the vulnerable handler with a safe, whitelist approach:
// A safe button shortcode implementation
add_action('init', function() {
// Replace existing handler
remove_shortcode('button');
add_shortcode('button', function($atts, $content = '') {
// Allow only a small set of attributes (href and target)
$atts = shortcode_atts([
'href' => '#',
'target' => '_self',
'class' => '',
], $atts, 'button');
// Sanitize inputs
$href = esc_url($atts['href']);
$target = in_array($atts['target'], ['_self', '_blank', '_top', '_parent']) ? $atts['target'] : '_self';
$class = sanitize_html_class($atts['class']);
$content = wp_kses_post($content); // allow safe HTML in content
$class_attr = $class ? ' class="'.esc_attr($class).'"' : '';
return '<a href="' . esc_attr($href) . '" target="' . esc_attr($target) . '"' . $class_attr . '>' . $content . '</a>';
});
}, 20);Hardening user permissions (practical tips)
- Limit who can create or edit content. Use approval workflows for posts from Contributors.
- Temporarily restrict Contributor and Author roles until the plugin is patched.
- Ensure admin accounts use strong passwords and two‑factor authentication (2FA).
- Confirm that
unfiltered_htmlis not granted to untrusted roles. - On multisite, verify network role permissions as behavior can differ.
Monitoring and post‑remediation validation
- Keep application-layer rules active for 30+ days to catch delayed or repeated attempts.
- Schedule scans (daily for a week, then weekly).
- Monitor traffic and admin activities for anomalies.
- Re‑audit plugin and theme code for similar insecure output patterns.
Frequently asked questions
Q: If contributors cannot upload files, how could they exploit this?
A: Shortcode attributes are stored as text within post content — no file upload is required. A contributor can insert a shortcode with a crafted attribute value containing JavaScript or malicious HTML that the vulnerable handler later renders into the page.
Q: Why disable the shortcode instead of deleting the plugin?
A: Deleting the plugin may break site functionality if the shortcode is used widely. Neutralizing the shortcode is quicker and less disruptive; you can later replace or rebuild the feature safely.
Q: Will the vulnerability trigger only when admins visit a page?
A: No — a stored payload executes in anyone’s browser who views the page. The risk is highest when an admin or editor visits the page because those accounts can do more damage if compromised.
Choosing help
If you need assistance applying short‑term mitigations, deploying application-layer rules, or cleaning a suspected infection, engage a trusted security professional or an incident response team. Select providers based on reputation, technical capability, and independent reviews — avoid making choices based only on marketing claims.
Final recommendations — prioritized
- If you have Electric Enquiries ≤ 1.1 installed: neutralize the
buttonshortcode immediately (see snippet above) or disable the plugin if that functionality is not critical. - Harden contributor workflows and restrict untrusted accounts.
- Deploy application-layer rules (WAF/virtual patches) to block exploit patterns until the vendor releases an official fix.
- Scan and clean any stored payloads; rotate credentials if you see evidence of compromised sessions.
- Monitor activity and re‑enable functionality only after careful code review or after the vendor provides an official patch.
Closing thoughts
Shortcode and attribute injection is a subtle but serious problem. Modern WordPress sites are often collaborative, and low‑privileged users exist by design. Plugin authors must be diligent with sanitization and escaping; site owners must adopt layered defenses and conservative content workflows.
Treat stored XSS incidents with urgency — they are easy to create and can be catastrophic in impact. If you require external help, retain a reputable security professional to triage and remediate.
— Hong Kong Security Expert
