Civil Society Alert midi Synth File Upload(CVE20261306)

Arbitrary File Upload in WordPress midi-Synth Plugin
Plugin Name midi-Synth
Type of Vulnerability Arbitrary File Upload
CVE Number CVE-2026-1306
Urgency Critical
CVE Publish Date 2026-02-15
Source URL CVE-2026-1306

Urgent Security Advisory: Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload in midi-Synth (≤ 1.1.0) — What WordPress Site Owners Must Do Now

Date: 2026-02-15  |  Author: Hong Kong WordPress Security Expert  |  Category: WordPress Security


TL;DR — What happened and why you should care

A critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-1306) has been disclosed in the WordPress plugin “midi-Synth” affecting versions ≤ 1.1.0. The flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files to the site via an exposed AJAX action named export. Because the upload is unauthenticated and unrestricted, attackers can place web shells or other malicious files and then execute them, leading to full site compromise. This is a high-severity issue with an effective CVSS score of 10 (network exploitable, no privileges required, and full impact to confidentiality, integrity, and availability).

If you run midi-Synth on any WordPress site, assume immediate risk. Below is a clear, prioritized action plan — quick mitigations, detection steps for compromise, and longer-term hardening — presented in a direct, practical tone.


Vulnerability summary (technical, but readable)

  • Affected software: WordPress plugin “midi-Synth”
  • Vulnerable versions: ≤ 1.1.0
  • Vulnerability class: Unauthenticated arbitrary file upload (via AJAX)
  • Vulnerability vector: AJAX action export
  • CVE: CVE-2026-1306
  • Impact: Remote code execution (RCE) via uploaded backdoors; site defacement; data theft; pivoting to other infrastructure
  • Privileges required: None — unauthenticated
  • Fix status at disclosure: No official patch available at time of disclosure

In short: the plugin exposes an AJAX endpoint that accepts and writes files without proper authentication, authorization, or safe-file checks. An attacker can craft a request that uploads a file into a web-accessible directory. Because the request requires no authentication, mass exploitation across the web is practical and simple for automated scanners and botnets.


Why this is particularly dangerous for WordPress sites

  1. Unauthenticated: No login or special token required — any internet user can trigger it.
  2. File upload sink: The site accepts arbitrary file types and writes them into locations that attackers can access via the web.
  3. Execution vector: If PHP files (or other executable artifacts) are allowed and placed in a web root or directory parsed by the server, RCE is immediate.
  4. Automation-friendly: Attackers and bots routinely scan WordPress sites for known plugin endpoints and can weaponize exploitation at scale.
  5. Post-exploitation steps are simple: Once a backdoor is in place, an attacker can pivot to database access, create admin accounts, exfiltrate content, and use the site to distribute malware or spam.

What an attacker could do after successful exploitation

  • Upload a PHP web shell and execute arbitrary commands
  • Create a persistent admin-level WordPress user
  • Inject backdoors into theme or plugin PHP files
  • Dump or export the site’s database for credential theft
  • Deploy ransomware or encrypt site content
  • Use the site as part of a botnet, hosting area for malicious payloads, or spam/scam infrastructure
  • Escalate from the web server to other internal systems if network segmentation is weak

Do not panic — prioritize and act

If you host any site using midi-Synth (≤1.1.0), follow this prioritized mitigation checklist immediately. Actions are grouped into “Immediate (minutes)”, “Short-term (hours)”, and “Long-term (days/weeks)”.

Immediate (minutes)

  1. Disable the vulnerable plugin:
    • Login to WordPress admin if safe and deactivate the plugin.
    • If you cannot access admin, remove or rename the plugin folder via SFTP/SSH: wp-content/plugins/midi-synthmidi-synth.disabled.
  2. Block the AJAX entry point at your webserver or perimeter:
    • Deny requests that call the export AJAX action from unauthenticated users. For example, block requests containing admin-ajax.php?action=export or similar patterns.
  3. Temporarily restrict uploads and file writes:
    • Tighten directory permissions for web-writeable directories.
    • If possible, set the upload directory to non-executable (disable PHP execution in wp-content/uploads).
  4. Take an immediate backup:
    • Snapshot files and database for forensic work before making major changes.

Short-term (within hours)

  1. Scan the filesystem for web shells and suspicious files:
    • Search for files added/modified around the time of vulnerability disclosure or suspicious timestamps.
    • Common web shell signatures include usage of eval, base64_decode, shell_exec, preg_replace with /e modifier, system, passthru, or assert.
  2. Review webserver logs and WordPress logs:
    • Look for POST requests to admin-ajax.php?action=export and unexpected $_FILES uploads.
    • Note IP addresses and time windows for likely exploitation attempts.
  3. Rotate credentials:
    • Change WordPress administrator passwords and any database credentials if you suspect compromise.
    • If FTP/SFTP accounts or hosting control panel credentials are suspected, rotate those as well.
  4. Restore from a clean backup if you find a confirmed compromise:
    • Only restore from backups taken well before the vulnerability window and ensure the vulnerability is mitigated before going live.

Long-term (days / weeks)

  1. Apply a vendor patch when released:
    • Monitor the plugin’s official source for a fixed release and apply it promptly after testing.
  2. Harden your WordPress site:
    • Enforce least privilege, limit plugin/theme installations to vetted sources, and remove unused plugins.
    • Disable plugin and theme editor in WordPress config: define('DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT', true);
  3. Maintain layered protection:
    • Consider a Web Application Firewall (WAF) that supports virtual patching and anomaly detection.
    • Schedule regular malware scans and file integrity monitoring.
  4. Incident response & monitoring:
    • Maintain SIEM logs or centralized logging for activity monitoring.
    • Periodic audits and penetration testing to surface gaps.

How to detect whether you were compromised

Indicators of compromise (IoCs) to search for:

  • New or modified PHP files in wp-content/uploads, wp-content/plugins, wp-content/themes or top-level directories that you did not add.
  • Webserver logs showing requests to admin-ajax.php?action=export followed by a 200/201 response where a file upload occurred.
  • Unusual admin user accounts, suspicious scheduled tasks (wp_cron entries), or unauthorized database exports.
  • Outbound network connections from your web server you did not authorize (check netstat or host-level logs).
  • Elevated CPU or memory usage, unexpected cron jobs, or sudden appearance of files with very recent modification timestamps.

Hunting approach examples:

  1. Search for files containing typical backdoor signatures:
    grep -R --include="*.php" -E "eval|base64_decode|system\(|shell_exec|passthru|assert\(|preg_replace\(.*/e" /path/to/webroot
  2. Check upload directories for PHP files:
    find wp-content/uploads -type f -name "*.php"
  3. Compare file hashes against a clean baseline if you have file integrity monitoring enabled.

If you find suspicious files, isolate the site (make it offline), preserve evidence, and perform remediation with a forensic mindset.


Safe mitigation patterns (do this even if the plugin is removed)

  • Deny web execution from upload directories:

    For Apache, an .htaccess in wp-content/uploads:

    <FilesMatch "\.(php|phtml|php5|php7|phps)$">
      Deny from all
    </FilesMatch>

    For Nginx:

    location ~* /wp-content/uploads/.*\.(php|phtml|php5|php7|phps)$ {
      deny all;
    }
  • Use strict file-type checks on upload processing code:

    Never trust MIME types sent by clients. Validate using server-side detection and whitelist allowed types.

  • Avoid storing user-uploaded files in web-accessible directories when possible:

    Serve via controlled handlers or use storage outside the web root.

  • Harden admin-ajax endpoints:
    • Use nonces or token-based checks for sensitive actions.
    • Require authentication for export/download operations.
  • Enable file integrity monitoring:

    Alerts when core, plugin, or theme files change outside expected maintenance windows.


Why WAF and virtual patching matter right now

A mature WAF provides several important protections in this scenario:

  • Blocks attempts to call the vulnerable AJAX action pattern from the internet.
  • Prevents file upload payloads that match common malicious indicators.
  • Applies virtual patching: while the vendor develops and tests an official corrective release, the WAF can shield your site by blocking known attack signatures and exploit sequences.
  • Granular blocking allows you to maintain functionality for legitimate users while protecting against unauthenticated abuse.

Expert mitigation recommendation

  1. Block unauthenticated access to the vulnerable endpoint immediately:
    • At the webserver or reverse proxy, deny requests containing the pattern admin-ajax.php?action=export unless they originate from trusted admin IPs.
  2. Remove or disable the plugin in production:
    • Disable if you do not need the plugin; if you must keep it for business reasons, restrict access to the endpoint strictly.
  3. Scan and clean:
    • Run content and file scans focused on web shells and suspicious PHP files placed outside normal plugin/theme locations.
  4. Harden and monitor:
    • Disable PHP execution in the uploads directory, enforce least privilege, rotate credentials, and enable file integrity monitoring.

Practical incident response playbook (concise checklist)

  1. Immediately isolate: Disable plugin and block the AJAX endpoint.
  2. Preserve forensics: Make a snapshot of files and DB for offline analysis.
  3. Triage: Scan for web shells, review logs, list changed files and created users.
  4. Contain: Remove malicious files, kill suspicious cron jobs, reset credentials.
  5. Remediate: Restore from a known-clean backup if necessary; apply hardening measures.
  6. Recover: Bring site back online after confirming no lingering backdoors or scheduled tasks.
  7. Post-incident: Document the incident, notify affected stakeholders, and update security processes.

If you’re unsure whether your cleanup is complete, involve a reputable specialist or a forensic team to perform a deeper audit and post-compromise validation.


  • Webserver log query: Search logs for admin-ajax.php and action=export occurrences.
  • File system searches:
    find /var/www/html -type f -mtime -7 -ls
    
    find /var/www/html/wp-content/uploads -type f -name "*.php"
  • Database checks:
    SELECT ID, user_login, user_email, user_registered FROM wp_users u
    JOIN wp_usermeta m ON u.ID = m.user_id AND m.meta_key = 'wp_capabilities'
    WHERE m.meta_value LIKE '%administrator%';

    Adjust SQL prefixes if your installation uses a different table prefix.


Best practices to prevent future exploitation of plugin vulnerabilities

  • Minimal plugin footprint: only install plugins you actively use and trust.
  • Timely updates: apply plugin updates in a tested staging environment before production rollout.
  • Principle of least privilege: limit admin accounts and only grant capabilities required for tasks.
  • Hardening configurations:
    • Disable direct file editing: define('DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT', true);
    • Ensure wp-content/uploads is non-executable for PHP.
  • Network segmentation: separate your web server from sensitive admin interfaces and internal networks.
  • Monitoring & alerting: implement file integrity monitoring (FIM), vulnerability scanning, and WAF logging.
  • Backup strategy: maintain regular, offline backups and test restores.

If your site is already compromised — escalation and recovery tips

  • Assume credentials are exfiltrated: rotate all credentials and API keys in use by the site.
  • If you suspect data exfiltration, inform stakeholders and follow legal/regulatory obligations.
  • Consider a professional forensic investigation if the breach is severe or if financial/PII data may have been exposed.
  • Rebuild in a clean environment if you lack confidence in your cleanup. Export content, provision fresh WordPress and plugins from trusted sources, and import content after sanitization.

How to communicate to your clients or stakeholders (sample messaging)

Use concise, clear language:

  • Explain the risk: “A critical plugin vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to upload files and potentially take over websites.”
  • State the action taken: “We have disabled the vulnerable plugin or applied a temporary server-level rule to block exploitation attempts.”
  • Provide next steps: “We will scan for any indication of compromise, restore affected sites from backups if necessary, and apply vendor patches as soon as they are available.”
  • Offer remediation support: “If you notice unusual behavior on your site (login issues, content changes, pop-ups), contact our support team immediately.”

Protect multiple sites easily: Plan for Small Businesses and Agencies

  • Apply perimeter controls and virtual patching across all managed sites so new disclosures are mitigated quickly.
  • Use centralized logging to correlate suspicious activity across clients and detect broad exploitation campaigns.
  • Implement a staged update policy: test patches in staging first, then roll them out in production with backup and rollback plans.

Final notes from Hong Kong security experts

This vulnerability is a textbook example of why unauthenticated functionality in plugins must be treated with suspicion — especially when file handling is involved. Plugins often require privileges and careful validation; when those expectations break, the damage can be severe and fast.

If you run midi-Synth (≤1.1.0), act immediately: disable or block the vulnerable endpoint, scan for compromise, and use layered defenses to prevent exploitation while awaiting a vendor patch. If you manage many sites or lack the in-house resources, engage experienced incident responders or a trusted security consultant — defence in depth is the key to surviving fast-moving, high-severity plugin vulnerabilities.

If you would like assistance evaluating whether your WordPress installation is affected or need help implementing the protections outlined above, seek a reputable local security provider or consultant. Stay safe — keep backups, monitor logs, and treat plugin updates and server configurations as critical security controls.


— Hong Kong WordPress Security Expert

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