Summary — A recent public disclosure identified a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in the Fana WordPress theme affecting versions up to and including 1.1.35. The issue allows unauthenticated attackers to include local files and potentially expose sensitive data (including wp-config.php) and in some configurations enable command execution. A patch is available in version 1.1.36. If you run the Fana theme or a site built on it, treat this as an immediate priority.

Quick facts

• Affected product: Fana WordPress theme (theme code)
• Vulnerable versions: ≤ 1.1.35
• Fixed in: 1.1.36
• Vulnerability class: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
• CVE identifier: CVE‑2025‑68539
• Reported by: security researcher João Pedro S Alcântara (Kinorth)
• Severity: High (CVSS ~8.1)
• Authentication: Not required — unauthenticated attackers can trigger the issue
• Exploitation risk: High — can expose credentials and sensitive files, may lead to full site compromise in some environments

What is Local File Inclusion (LFI) and why it’s dangerous

Local File Inclusion (LFI) occurs when an application includes or reads a local file based on user-controlled input without adequate validation. In PHP this commonly involves include(), require(), include_once() or require_once() called with variables derived from GET/POST/COOKIE or other untrusted sources.

Why this matters for WordPress:

• wp-config.php contains database credentials and salts — an LFI that can read files within the WordPress directory may leak these secrets.
• Writable directories or logs can be abused: attackers may upload PHP payloads or poison logs and then include them, achieving remote code execution (RCE).
• LFI can expose backups, .env files, or other sensitive artifacts if stored under the webroot.
• Themes run with webserver privileges; a theme LFI often transitions quickly from information disclosure to site takeover.

Vulnerability specifics (what was reported)

A public disclosure identified an LFI in the Fana theme up to version 1.1.35. Key points:

• Endpoint/parameter: the issue stems from a dynamic file inclusion mechanism where user input controls the included file path.
• Authentication: not required — the flaw is exploitable by unauthenticated attackers.
• Impact: local files can be returned to the requester; depending on server configuration and writable locations this may escalate to RCE via log poisoning or uploaded PHP files.
• CVE: CVE‑2025‑68539.
• Fix: theme author released 1.1.36 which sanitises or whitelists include targets or removes dynamic includes.

Action required: upgrade to 1.1.36 immediately. If you cannot update right away, apply the temporary mitigations below.

How attackers exploit LFI in WordPress themes

Typical attacker workflow:

1. Reconnaissance — identify the vulnerable parameter (for example ?template= or ?file=) and test directory traversal patterns like ../../../../wp-config.php or /etc/passwd.
2. Data exfiltration — use LFI to read wp-config.php, backups, .env files, and other sensitive data.
3. Escalation to RCE — upload a PHP payload to a writable directory or poison logs (User-Agent, request body) then include the file via LFI to execute code. Attackers may also leverage php:// wrappers (e.g., php://filter) for creative data extraction.
4. Persistence — install backdoors, create admin accounts, and modify theme/plugin files; attackers may also clean logs to hide activity.

Because this Fana LFI is unauthenticated, exploitation can be automated and scaled rapidly.

Immediate actions for site owners (prioritised checklist)

1. Update: upgrade the Fana theme to version 1.1.36 or later. This is the highest-priority action. Test on staging where possible, then deploy to production.
2. If you cannot update immediately — apply temporary mitigations:
   • Put the site into maintenance mode if feasible.
   • Apply webserver-level access restrictions for suspected vulnerable endpoints or block known exploit patterns (examples below).
3. Scan for compromise: review access and error logs for suspicious requests, search filesystem for unexpected changes, and run one or more reputable malware scanners or file-integrity tools.
4. Rotate credentials: change database passwords, API credentials, and any application keys that could have been exposed. Regenerate WordPress salts.
5. Review users and roles: remove unknown admin accounts and inspect scheduled tasks/cron entries.
6. Restore if needed: if compromise is confirmed, restore from a known-clean backup and reapply security updates.
7. Notify stakeholders: follow incident notification policies if user or customer data may be involved.

Technical mitigation options if you cannot immediately update

Apply these low-risk server-side mitigations while preparing to update the theme:

1) Block exploit traffic at the web server

Prevent requests containing traversal or known wrapper patterns.

<IfModule mod_rewrite.c>
  RewriteEngine On
  # Block attempts with directory traversal or common PHP wrappers
  RewriteCond %{QUERY_STRING} (\.\./|\.\.\\|php://|data:|base64_encode|expect:|/etc/passwd) [NC]
  RewriteRule .* - [F,L]
</IfModule>

if ($query_string ~* "(?:\.\./|\.\.\\|php://|data:|base64_encode|expect:|/etc/passwd)") {
  return 403;
}

2) Virtual patching / WAF rules

If you operate a WAF, add rules to block directory traversal, php:// wrappers or suspicious include parameters. Test rules in staging before production.

3) Restrict or disable access to the vulnerable theme file

If you can identify the specific PHP file under wp-content/themes/fana/ that performs the include, consider temporarily denying direct HTTP access, renaming the file (with caution), or replacing it with a safe stub. Note: this can break theme functionality—test first.

4) File permissions and ownership

Ensure theme files are not writable by the webserver where possible. Typical permissions: files 644, directories 755. Adjust owner/group to follow your hosting model (e.g., siteowner:www-data).

5) Disable allow_url_include

Confirm in php.ini that allow_url_include = Off. Most secure hosts already enforce this.

6) Quick blacklist of common strings

Block query strings or POST bodies containing ../, php://, data:, base64_encode, and other known exploit patterns.

Detection: how to tell whether an exploit attempt or compromise occurred

Search for both attempts and signs of successful intrusion.

Log searches

# Look for embedded PHP or suspicious values in headers
grep -i "php" /var/log/apache2/access.log

# Requests referencing /etc/passwd
grep -i "etc/passwd" /var/log/nginx/access.log

# Encoded traversal checks
grep -R --line-number "%2e%2e%2f\|..\|%2e%2e\\ " /var/log/nginx/*.log

High-volume sources

awk '{print $1}' access.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr | head

Filesystem checks

# Recently modified files
find /var/www/html -type f -mtime -7 -print

# Find dynamic includes in theme code
grep -R --line-number -E "include|require" wp-content/themes/fana | grep -E "\$_(GET|REQUEST|POST|COOKIE|SERVER|ENV)"

Database and WP checks

• Search for unexpected admin users or suspicious content insertions.
• Check wp_options for unfamiliar cron entries or scheduled tasks.

Indicators of RCE or persistence

• New .php files in uploads/ or other writable directories.
• Unknown scheduled tasks, unfamiliar admin accounts.
• Outbound network connections from the server to unusual destinations.

If evidence of compromise is found, isolate the site (remove from public access) and proceed to remediation steps below.

Remediation and recovery if your site was compromised

1. Take the site offline to stop ongoing data loss or attacker activity.
2. Preserve logs and artifacts — copy logs, suspicious files, and DB dumps for analysis.
3. Identify scope — which files were changed, what data accessed, were admin accounts created?
4. Wipe and restore — restore from a clean backup taken before intrusion. If no clean backup exists, reinstall WordPress core, theme, and plugins from official sources and carefully restore content after sanitisation.
5. Rotate secrets — database passwords, API keys, WordPress salts, and any credentials stored on the site must be changed.
6. Remove backdoors — search for PHP files in uploads, suspicious files, and unknown scheduled tasks; remove all malicious code.
7. Harden and patch — update theme to 1.1.36, deploy server-level mitigations, and enable ongoing monitoring.
8. Monitor — keep heightened surveillance for several weeks to detect return activity.
9. Report — follow regulatory and contractual obligations if personal data was exposed.

Hardening guidance for WordPress themes and site admins

Recommended practices to reduce LFI and related risks.

For theme developers

• Avoid dynamic inclusion of user-supplied paths. Never pass raw request data directly to include/require.
• Use allowlists: map friendly template names to explicit file paths rather than including arbitrary files.
• Prefer WordPress APIs (get_template_part, locate_template) over manual includes.
• Sanitise and validate all inputs using WP functions (sanitize_key, sanitize_text_field, esc_url_raw).
• Limit file-reading operations to known safe directories and escape any output returned to users.
• Conduct code reviews with a focus on file-inclusion patterns and risky constructs.

For site administrators

• Use themes from trusted sources and keep them updated.
• Test theme updates in staging before production. Switch to a default theme for emergency triage where necessary.
• Apply least-privilege file permissions and remove unnecessary write access from theme folders.
• Disable file editing via the dashboard:

  define('DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT', true);

• Enable log monitoring and schedule regular malware scans with reputable scanning tools.

Example WAF rules and server-level mitigations

Test these snippets in staging before deploying to production.

ModSecurity example

SecRule REQUEST_URI|ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/* "(?:\.\./|\.\.\\|php://|data:|base64_encode\(|/etc/passwd|/proc/self/environ|expect:|phar:)" \
    "id:100001,\
    phase:2,\
    block,\
    t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
    msg:'LFI attempt blocked',\
    severity:2,\
    log"

Nginx snippet

server {
  # ...
  if ($query_string ~* "(?:\.\./|\.\.\\|php://|data:|base64_encode|/etc/passwd|/proc/self/environ)") {
    return 403;
  }
}

Deny direct access to include files

# Deny direct access to includes folder
<FilesMatch "^(.*\.php)$">
  Order deny,allow
  Deny from all
</FilesMatch>

Use selective allow rules where needed. Misconfiguration can break legitimate functionality — test carefully.

Search commands to find risky code

# Find include/require with variables
grep -R --line-number -E "include(_once)?\s*\(|require(_once)?\s*\(" wp-content/themes/fana | grep -E "\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE|SERVER|ENV)"

Additional recommendations and final checklist

1. Update the theme to 1.1.36 immediately.
2. If you cannot update, apply server-level blocks for suspicious query strings and deploy tested WAF rules.
3. Scan the site for evidence of compromise and review logs for the indicators described above.
4. Rotate all secrets and regenerate WordPress salts in wp-config.php.
5. Perform post-recovery hardening: enforce least privilege, disable file editing, schedule regular scans, and maintain monitoring.
6. Consider engaging an incident response specialist if you detect data exfiltration or persistent backdoors.

Final words

Theme vulnerabilities that permit file inclusion are urgent and high consequence. This Fana LFI is exploitable without authentication and can directly expose database credentials and other sensitive data. Treat it as a top priority: apply the theme vendor’s patch (1.1.36) immediately. If you cannot update right away, deploy the temporary mitigations and detection checks described here, and perform a careful forensic review if you see suspicious indicators.

If you require specialist assistance, engage a qualified incident response team or experienced malware analyst. In Hong Kong and the wider region, rapid action — containment, investigation, and patching — reduces reputational and regulatory risk. Act now: LFI exploits are fast-moving and frequently automated.