Executive summary

On 30 January 2026 a high‑severity vulnerability (CVE‑2025‑14975) was published for the WordPress plugin “Custom Login Page Customizer” (plugin slug: login-customizer). Versions prior to 2.5.4 are affected. The flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to trigger an arbitrary password reset for site users, including administrative accounts, resulting in immediate privilege escalation and potential full site takeover.

• Severity: High — CVSS 9.8 (critical impact, network‑accessible, no authentication required).
• Attack vector: unauthenticated remote (HTTP).
• Core impact: arbitrary password reset leads to account takeover; potential full site compromise if admin accounts are reset.
• Fixed version: 2.5.4.
• Researcher credited: Drew Webber (mcdruid).

Why this matters (plain language)

The vulnerable plugin exposes a mechanism that allows anyone on the Internet to reset the password of any account on a site where the plugin is active. Unlike the standard WordPress password reset flow that requires an email verification link and single‑use tokens, this flaw bypasses or misimplements required protections. An attacker can change an admin account password without access to the admin email address, then log in as admin and take full control of the site (install backdoors, alter content, exfiltrate data, or pivot to other systems).

Because password reset is the primary recovery path for account access, a bug that permits unauthenticated password resets is among the most dangerous vulnerabilities for multi‑user platforms such as WordPress.

Who is at risk

• Any WordPress site with the “Custom Login Page Customizer” plugin installed and active where the plugin version is earlier than 2.5.4.
• Sites that rely on plugin‑provided custom login/reset endpoints (some plugins register additional endpoints or AJAX actions).
• Sites without multi‑factor authentication (MFA) for administrative accounts.
• Sites where monitoring and logging are limited or not actively reviewed.

High‑level technical overview (non‑exploitative)

No exploit code is published here. The high‑level technical picture:

• The plugin exposes a password reset flow or endpoint that, due to missing verification checks, accepts parameters which allow setting a new password for an arbitrary user account.
• The endpoint does not validate a reset token properly, or it fails to confirm the requester is the legitimate email owner.
• Because an attacker can set a new password for an administrative account, they can immediately authenticate and perform privileged actions.

This is a classic identification/authorization failure combined with insufficient server‑side validation.

Attacker impact and likely objectives

An attacker who successfully exploits this issue can:

• Log in as any user (including administrators) without needing email or token access.
• Create new administrative users for persistent access.
• Install malware/backdoors, inject JavaScript for skimming or defacement, or pivot to other sites on the same host.
• Exfiltrate data stored on the site.
• Use the site for spam, phishing, or SEO abuse.

Because the vulnerability is unauthenticated and remote, expect automated scanning and exploitation attempts soon after disclosure.

Immediate (first 60 minutes) actions — triage and emergency mitigation

If you manage one or more affected sites, act immediately:

1. Contain: Put affected sites into emergency containment mode.
   • If you have a web application firewall (WAF) or managed firewall, apply a block rule for requests that target the plugin’s endpoints (examples below).
   • If you don’t have a WAF, restrict access to the plugin files with server rules (examples below) or take the site offline temporarily if necessary.
2. Check plugin version: WordPress admin → Plugins → locate “Custom Login Page Customizer”. If version < 2.5.4, consider deactivating the plugin immediately if you can accept losing the custom login behavior temporarily.
3. If you cannot immediately update or deactivate:
   • Enforce two‑factor authentication (2FA) for all administrator accounts.
   • Reset passwords for all administrative accounts and rotate any secrets that may have been exposed (API keys, service tokens).
   • Force logout for all sessions (see Recovery section).
4. Monitor: Watch for intrusion indicators listed in the Detection section during and after containment.

Recommended short‑term mitigations

The single best action: update the plugin to 2.5.4 (or later) as soon as possible on every affected site. If you cannot patch immediately, apply the mitigations below.

A. Deactivate or remove the plugin

Pros: Immediately eliminates the vulnerable code path. Cons: You lose the plugin’s functionality (custom login appearance/behavior) until you replace it safely.

B. Block the plugin’s HTTP endpoints via server rules (temporary)

Use nginx, Apache (.htaccess), or ModSecurity to deny POST requests targeting the plugin paths.

# Example nginx snippet (place in server block or include file — adapt to your environment)
# Temporary block for login-customizer endpoints
location ~* /wp-content/plugins/login-customizer/ {
    if ($request_method = POST) {
        return 403;
    }
}
# Also block typical AJAX endpoints if you know them, for example:
location = /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php {
    if ($arg_action ~* "(?:lc_reset|login_customizer_reset|login_customizer_reset_password)") {
        return 403;
    }
}
  

# Example Apache .htaccess rule (place in site docroot .htaccess)

  RewriteEngine On
  # Block POSTs to plugin directory
  RewriteCond %{REQUEST_METHOD} POST
  RewriteRule ^wp-content/plugins/login-customizer/ - [F,L]

  

C. WAF rule examples (generic / pseudo‑code)

Block POST requests where URI contains “login-customizer” or where an AJAX param equals suspected plugin action names. Example ModSecurity concept:

SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "POST" "chain,deny,status:403,msg:'Block login-customizer POSTs'"
    SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains /wp-content/plugins/login-customizer/" 
  

Do not blindly block admin‑ajax.php if your site relies on other AJAX features — instead block specific action parameters.

D. Rate limit and CAPTCHA

If the plugin exposes password reset forms, add rate limiting and CAPTCHA on the public reset page. This is a mitigant, not a cure.

Detection: how to know if you were targeted or compromised

Search server logs, WordPress logs, and plugin activity for the following indicators:

1. Unusual POST requests to plugin endpoints: Look for POST requests with URIs containing “login-customizer” or to admin-ajax.php with suspicious action parameters.
2. Unexpected password changes:
   • Compare current wp_users.user_pass values with backups or snapshots to detect recent changes.
   • Look for logins to admin accounts from new IP addresses.
3. New administrator users: Run a query to list administrators and check for unexpected accounts:

   SELECT u.ID, u.user_login, u.user_email, u.user_registered
   FROM wp_users u
   JOIN wp_usermeta m ON m.user_id = u.ID
   WHERE m.meta_key LIKE '%capabilities' AND m.meta_value LIKE '%administrator%';
         

4. Authentication events in logs: Look for logins to /wp-admin or /wp-login.php from unusual IPs following suspicious reset requests.
5. File system changes and new files: Scan for modified plugin/theme files, new PHP files in wp-content, or recent file timestamp changes.
6. Outbound connections or unusual scheduled tasks (wp_cron): Watch for scheduled tasks or external calls created by an attacker.
7. Integrity and malware scanner alerts: Run available scanners and compare file hashes to a known good baseline.

Full incident response playbook (step‑by‑step)

1. Contain
   • Block traffic to the vulnerable endpoints (WAF, server rules), or take the site offline temporarily if necessary.
   • Rotate keys and credentials (database, FTP, SFTP, hosting control panel).
   • Force logouts and invalidate sessions by changing AUTH_KEY salts in wp-config.php or using a trusted security tool.
2. Preserve evidence
   • Make full backups of the current site (files + DB) to an isolated location for forensic analysis.
   • Preserve raw webserver logs for the suspected time window plus at least a week.
   • Copy the environment before performing destructive cleanups.
3. Eradicate
   • Update the plugin to 2.5.4 (or uninstall if you plan to replace it).
   • Remove any malicious admin accounts discovered.
   • Clean or restore modified files from a known clean backup, or replace changed core/plugin/theme files with official copies.
4. Recover
   • Rotate passwords for all admin accounts and require strong passwords.
   • Enable 2FA on all administrator accounts.
   • Re‑enable normal functionality only after verifying the site is clean.
5. Notify & learn
   • Inform stakeholders and clients if you manage sites for others.
   • Document timeline, detection, and remediation steps.
   • Adjust monitoring and rules to detect future variants.

Practical recovery commands & checks

A. Force logout all users

Change the four authentication salts in wp-config.php (AUTH_KEY, SECURE_AUTH_KEY, LOGGED_IN_KEY, NONCE_KEY). Changing these will invalidate existing cookies and force reauthentication.

B. Reset administrator passwords (wp‑cli example)

# list admins
wp user list --role=administrator --fields=ID,user_login,user_email
# reset password for user ID 1
wp user update 1 --user_pass='A_Strong_Passw0rd!'
  

C. Find admin users via MySQL

SELECT u.ID, u.user_login, u.user_email, u.user_registered
FROM wp_users u
JOIN wp_usermeta m ON u.ID = m.user_id
WHERE m.meta_key = 'wp_capabilities' AND m.meta_value LIKE '%administrator%';
  

D. Scan filesystem for suspicious PHP files in writable directories

# look under uploads for .php files
find wp-content/uploads -type f -name '*.php' -ls
  

WAF rules we recommend (concrete examples, adapt to your stack)

Test rules in alert-only mode before enforcing. Broad blocking may break legitimate functionality; prefer targeted rules.

# nginx: Block POSTs to plugin folder
location ~* ^/wp-content/plugins/login-customizer/.*$ {
    if ($request_method = POST) {
        return 403;
    }
}
  

# nginx: Block known risky admin-ajax actions (only if verified)
if ($request_method = POST) {
    set $block_action 0;
    if ($arg_action ~* "(?:lc_reset_password|login_customizer_reset|reset_password_customizer)") {
        set $block_action 1;
    }
    if ($block_action = 1) {
        return 403;
    }
}
  

# nginx: Rate limiting example
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=reset_zone:10m rate=2r/m;

location = /wp-login.php {
    limit_req zone=reset_zone burst=5 nodelay;
    # ... existing login handling
}
  

# ModSecurity conceptual rule
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "POST" "chain,deny,status:403,msg:'Block unauthenticated password reset via vulnerable plugin'"
    SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains /wp-content/plugins/login-customizer/" "t:none"
  

Hardening to reduce risk from similar vulnerabilities

• Keep all plugins, themes, and WordPress core updated.
• Limit installed plugins to those you actively use and audit before installing.
• Enforce least privilege: grant administrator role only to necessary users.
• Enable two‑factor authentication (2FA) for all administrator accounts.
• Use strong, unique passwords and a password manager.
• Implement file‑integrity monitoring to alert on unexpected file changes or new PHP files in uploads.
• Use a WAF with tuned rules and rate limiting where possible.
• Review plugin code for unusual endpoints before deployment, or engage a security reviewer for critical plugins.

Post‑incident monitoring and continuous detection

After remediation, maintain focused monitoring for at least 90 days:

• Watch for repeated requests to previously blocked endpoints — treat as probing.
• Monitor for new admin users or capability changes.
• Watch for changes to wp_options that could persist malicious behaviors (new cron entries, automated option updates).
• Monitor outbound server connections to detect exfiltration attempts.

If you find signs of compromise — extra steps

• Assume data exfiltration is possible if the attacker had admin access: check logs and databases for sensitive data access.
• Rotate credentials for any integrated services (payment processors, CRM, mailing services).
• If payment data or personal information was exposed, follow applicable breach notification laws and inform affected customers as required.
• If you are not confident in fully eradicating the threat, rebuild the site from a clean backup and migrate sanitized content only after careful review.

Developer notes — what to expect in a proper patch

A robust patch should:

• Ensure password reset flows always involve unforgeable, single‑use tokens that are validated against the user and timestamp.
• Require verification of an email token or the current user session for password changes as appropriate.
• Add strict input validation and anti‑CSRF checks on AJAX endpoints.
• Include rate limiting for reset requests and sufficient logging for auditing.

Timeline & disclosure

• Vulnerability reported by a security researcher.
• Fix released in plugin version 2.5.4.
• Public disclosure and CVE assignment (CVE‑2025‑14975) on 30 January 2026.
• Because this flaw allows unauthenticated password resets and rapid privilege escalation, site owners should prioritise rapid patching and consider temporary WAF protections where many installations exist.

Frequently asked questions (FAQ)

Q: I updated to 2.5.4 — do I still need to do anything else?
A: Update is the primary action. After updating, confirm no new admin accounts were created and rotate admin passwords if you suspect attempted exploitation. Remove or relax temporary WAF rules only after verifying the patch removes the risk.

Q: What if the plugin is essential and cannot be updated immediately?
A: Deploy the short‑term server/WAF rules documented above to block vulnerable endpoints until you can update. Consider deactivating the plugin if blocking breaks critical functionality.

Q: Will this vulnerability let attackers get database access?
A: Indirectly — once an attacker has admin access via a reset, they can install plugins or PHP files that read or modify the database. The vulnerability itself is an authentication bypass, not a SQL injection.

Q: Should I change my hosting passwords?
A: If an attacker could have obtained admin access, you should rotate any credentials that may be reachable from the site, including hosting control panel and SFTP credentials.

Checklist — Immediate 10‑point action list

1. Identify all sites running the plugin (versions < 2.5.4).
2. Update to 2.5.4 or higher on each site immediately.
3. If you cannot update within an hour, deactivate the plugin or apply WAF/server rules to block requests to the plugin paths.
4. Reset passwords for all administrator accounts.
5. Force logout all sessions (change authentication salts or use trusted security tooling).
6. Enable 2FA for administrators.
7. Search logs for suspicious requests and new admin users.
8. Scan file system for new PHP files in uploads or other writable directories.
9. Rotate API keys and credentials that the site uses.
10. Monitor for re‑appearance of suspicious activity for 90 days.

If you need assistance

If you are managing many sites or lack in‑house incident response capability, engage a reputable incident response team, your hosting provider, or a qualified security consultant to assist with containment, forensic collection, and recovery. Prioritise rapid containment and preserve evidence for later analysis.

Final thoughts

This vulnerability highlights that authentication flows are high‑value targets. From a Hong Kong security practitioner’s perspective: keep a simple, repeatable incident playbook, ensure rapid patching cycles for plugin ecosystems, and maintain layered defenses (least privilege, MFA, WAF, monitoring). Act now: identify affected installations, apply the fix, and harden administrative access.