TL;DR — A stored Cross‑Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability (CVE‑2025‑3458) affecting Ocean Extra versions ≤ 2.4.6 allows an authenticated contributor to store a malicious payload via the ocean_gallery_id parameter. The vendor released a fix in 2.4.7. If you run Ocean Extra, update immediately. If you cannot update right away, implement virtual patching via a WAF and follow the mitigation steps in this article.

Summary

On 30 January 2026 a stored XSS vulnerability in the Ocean Extra plugin (affecting versions ≤ 2.4.6) was publicly disclosed. The flaw permits an authenticated user with Contributor privileges to store JavaScript in a field referenced by the parameter named ocean_gallery_id. When that stored value is later rendered without proper escaping or sanitization, it can execute in the browser of any visitor or privileged user viewing the affected content.

This vulnerability is assigned CVE‑2025‑3458 and has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5. The plugin author published a patch in version 2.4.7. Site owners should apply that update immediately and follow the additional steps below to reduce exposure, detect abuse, and clean up any stored malicious payloads.

In this advisory we:

• Explain the vulnerability and attack vector in practical terms.
• Describe real-world impact and exploitation scenarios.
• Provide step‑by‑step mitigation advice for WordPress site owners and administrators.
• Share sample rules and remediation suggestions for developers and hosts.

The vulnerability in plain language

• What is it? A stored Cross‑Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability. An attacker with Contributor privileges can inject JavaScript into a database field tied to ocean_gallery_id. When that field is rendered on the front end or in admin views without proper escaping, the script executes in the visitor’s browser.
• Where is the input point? The ocean_gallery_id parameter, commonly referenced by shortcodes, forms, or request parameters. The issue arises because input wasn’t validated/sanitized before storage and output.
• Who can exploit it? An authenticated user with Contributor-level privileges (or any role with similar capabilities).
• What is required? The attacker must store the payload (create or edit content containing ocean_gallery_id) and the victim must later view the affected page or admin view for the payload to execute.

Why stored XSS matters even from a Contributor

Contributor roles are common in editorial workflows. Stored XSS undermines the trust model:

• It executes in the site’s origin, exposing cookies, localStorage and any client-side state accessible to JavaScript.
• Attack goals include session theft, forged actions in the browser, content defacement, social engineering, or tricking privileged users into performing sensitive actions.
• If editors or admins preview or edit infected content, the payload can run in high‑privilege browser contexts and be used to escalate impact.

CVE and severity

• CVE: CVE‑2025‑3458
• Affected versions: Ocean Extra ≤ 2.4.6
• Fixed in: Ocean Extra 2.4.7
• CVSS v3.1 base score: 6.5
• Required privilege: Contributor
• Classification: Cross Site Scripting (A3: Injection)

How an attacker might exploit this (realistic scenario)

1. Attacker obtains Contributor access (registration or existing account).
2. Attacker injects a malicious payload into a gallery field or any interface that stores ocean_gallery_id.
3. The payload is saved to the database without proper sanitization.
4. An editor or administrator views the gallery on the front end or in the admin UI; the stored payload executes in their browser.
5. The script steals tokens, makes authenticated requests, exfiltrates data, or creates persistence via REST/ajax endpoints exposed in the admin context.

Immediate actions for site owners (step‑by‑step)

1. Inventory and update
   • Update Ocean Extra to 2.4.7 or later on production, staging and backups.
   • Confirm updates completed successfully.
2. If you cannot update immediately: virtual patch / WAF
   • Deploy a WAF rule that blocks requests attempting to set ocean_gallery_id to values containing script tags, event handlers, or suspicious characters (examples below).
   • Block or sanitize requests from contributor-level endpoints where feasible.
3. Audit Contributor content
   • Search the database for suspicious ocean_gallery_id values or fields referencing galleries.
   • Example SQL (backup DB first):

   SELECT ID, post_title, post_content
   FROM wp_posts
   WHERE post_content LIKE '%ocean_gallery_id%' OR post_content LIKE '%<script%';

4. Remove stored payloads
   • For infected posts/galleries remove malicious content or restore from a good backup.
   • Temporarily unpublish suspicious posts if you are uncomfortable editing the DB directly.
5. Harden accounts and workflows
   • Limit Contributor accounts with edit/create privileges.
   • Require stronger verification for new accounts where feasible.
   • Encourage reviewers to preview content in staging or sanitized viewers.
6. Monitor logs and traffic
   • Inspect access logs and WAF logs for attempts that include ocean_gallery_id payloads.
   • Watch for unusual admin sessions or logins around suspected exploitation times.
7. Post‑incident recovery
   • If you detect exploitation, perform a full site scan for backdoors and persistent changes.
   • Rotate sensitive keys and reset admin credentials as necessary.
   • Engage professional incident responders if evidence suggests broader compromise.

How a Web Application Firewall (WAF) can help

A WAF provides rapid, configurable protections you can enable while you update the plugin:

• Block or sanitize requests targeting ocean_gallery_id when values contain obvious script markers.
• Apply virtual patches that deny requests containing <script, inline event handlers (on*) or javascript: URIs in that parameter.
• Rate-limit or apply behavioral rules to detect abnormal contributor submissions.
• Use scanning to detect stored XSS payloads in the database or files.

Virtual patching buys time but is not a substitute for applying the vendor fix.

Example WAF signatures and rule templates

Below are illustrative examples. Test in staging before production.

1) ModSecurity-style rule (blocks common script tags in ocean_gallery_id)

SecRule REQUEST_URI|ARGS_NAMES "@rx ocean_gallery_id" "phase:2,deny,log,status:403, \
msg:'Block ocean_gallery_id script injection', \
chain"
  SecRule ARGS:ocean_gallery_id "@rx (<\s*script\b|javascript:|on\w+\s*=)" "t:none"

Notes: phase:2 inspects request body/parameters; the chained rule denies requests where ocean_gallery_id contains obvious script markers.

2) Lightweight WordPress hook-based pre-filter (theme/plugin authors or hosts)

add_filter('pre_post_content', function($content) {
    if (isset($_REQUEST['ocean_gallery_id'])) {
        $value = wp_unslash($_REQUEST['ocean_gallery_id']);
        // Remove script tags and on* attributes
        $clean = wp_kses($value, array()); // strip all HTML - be conservative
        $_REQUEST['ocean_gallery_id'] = $clean;
    }
    return $content;
}, 10, 1);

Note: This is a defensive filter that strips HTML from the parameter at request time. Use with care and test for side effects.

3) Regex-based request blocking

Block requests where ocean_gallery_id contains patterns such as:

• <\s*script
• on\w+\s*= (inline event handlers)
• javascript\s*:

Combine pattern matching with rate-limiting and anomaly detection — attackers may obfuscate payloads.

Fix recommendations for plugin developers (how to patch properly)

1. Validate and sanitize on input

   Never trust user input. For numeric IDs use absint() or intval(). For strings, use sanitize_text_field() or appropriate validators.

   $gallery_id = isset($_POST['ocean_gallery_id']) ? absint($_POST['ocean_gallery_id']) : 0;

2. Escape on output

   When rendering values in HTML, use esc_attr() or esc_html() as appropriate.

   echo '<div data-gallery-id="'.esc_attr($gallery_id).'>...</div>';

3. Restrict capabilities

   Ensure only users with the minimal required capability can set that field. Use current_user_can() checks.

4. Use nonces for form submissions

   Verify nonces server-side before accepting changes.

5. Avoid storing raw HTML

   If you must store HTML, sanitize with a strict whitelist via wp_kses() and validate types/keys for structured data (JSON).

6. Audit all read/write paths

   Every path that reads or writes ocean_gallery_id should perform appropriate validation and escaping for the output context (attribute, body, JS string).

Detection: find stored payloads in your site

Stored XSS payloads may be embedded in posts, meta, or custom tables. Practical hunting steps:

• Database search

  SELECT * FROM wp_posts WHERE post_content LIKE '%<script%';
  SELECT * FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_key LIKE '%ocean_gallery_id%' AND meta_value LIKE '%<script%';

  Important: backup the database before running destructive updates.

• Web/malware scanner

  Run a trusted site scanner to detect inline scripts or unexpected payloads.

• Admin preview hygiene

  Require previewing in a sanitized viewer or staging site where feasible.

• Browser console

  When viewing suspect pages, check the console for errors or network requests to unknown domains.

If you find malicious scripts: remove the offending content, restore from a verified backup if available, and rotate any integration keys that could have been exposed.

If your site was compromised: incident response checklist

1. Isolate: Take the site offline or enable maintenance mode if active compromise or data exfiltration is suspected.
2. Preserve evidence: Export server logs, WAF logs, and database dumps for forensic review.
3. Clean: Remove malicious code, backdoors and unauthorized admin users. Replace compromised files with fresh copies from official sources.
4. Restore and validate: Restore from a pre‑compromise backup where possible. Reinstall WP core and plugins from official packages and apply updates.
5. Rotate secrets: Update passwords, API keys, OAuth tokens and other sensitive credentials.
6. Post‑mortem: Determine root cause, which accounts were involved, and apply controls to prevent recurrence.

If you need assistance, engage a reputable security professional for forensic analysis and remediation.

Configuration and recommended rules for WAF users

Suggested generic measures to reduce exposure. Adapt to your environment and test thoroughly.

• Enable managed rules for common XSS/injection patterns (OWASP Top 10 coverage).
• Apply a temporary virtual patch that blocks or sanitizes ocean_gallery_id containing:
  • <script or </script>
  • javascript: URIs
  • Inline event attributes: onload=, onclick=, onerror=, etc.
• Apply stricter submission rules for contributor accounts (extra sanitization and validation).
• Enable periodic malware scanning and schedule regular site scans.
• Configure alerts for rule triggers involving ocean_gallery_id so incidents are visible early.

Clean-up examples and safe editing tips

• Avoid blind global replacements. Identify exact posts and meta entries before editing.
• Use the WordPress editor to remove offending markup or export posts to XML for offline sanitization and re-import after validation.
• To inspect suspect meta values safely:

-- Inspect first
SELECT * FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_key = 'ocean_gallery_id' AND meta_value LIKE '%<script%';
-- Remove only verified malicious entries
DELETE FROM wp_postmeta WHERE meta_id = 12345;

Always have a verified backup before deletes.

Preventive best practices for site owners and teams

• Update promptly: apply vendor fixes as soon as available.
• Least privilege: review and limit Contributor accounts.
• Staging and preview hygiene: encourage previews on staging or sanitized viewers.
• Content moderation: implement editor review workflows for contributor content.
• Input validation + output escaping: validate on input and escape for the correct output context.
• Content-Security-Policy (CSP): implement a restrictive CSP to reduce impact from injected scripts (not a silver bullet).
• Monitor and alert: enable WAF logging, admin login alerts and file integrity monitoring.

Developer patch example (how to fix in code)

Treat ocean_gallery_id as an integer identifier and avoid storing raw HTML:

// When receiving input
if ( isset( $_POST['ocean_gallery_id'] ) ) {
    $gallery_id = absint( wp_unslash( $_POST['ocean_gallery_id'] ) );
    // store $gallery_id as integer
    update_post_meta( $post_id, 'ocean_gallery_id', $gallery_id );
}

// When outputting in HTML attribute
$gallery_id = get_post_meta( $post_id, 'ocean_gallery_id', true );
echo '<div data-ocean-gallery-id="' . esc_attr( $gallery_id ) . '">...</div>';

If the field supports JSON or structured data, validate keys and types and sanitize with wp_kses() using a strict whitelist.

Why you should not delay updates — practical reasoning

• The fix exists and is straightforward to apply.
• Delay increases the window of exposure; opportunistic scanners will search for vulnerable sites after disclosure.
• Even small sites can be abused to target editors or admins via injected payloads.
• Virtual patching is useful short-term but is not a substitute for applying vendor patches.

Start protecting today

If you do not have immediate capacity to update, implement the following mitigations now:

• Apply a virtual patch in your WAF to block requests with obvious script markers in ocean_gallery_id.
• Scan the database for stored <script> tags and suspicious meta values.
• Tighten contributor workflows and restrict privileges temporarily.
• Schedule a maintenance window to apply the official plugin update as soon as possible.

Final checklist — what to do right now

• Update Ocean Extra to 2.4.7 or later (highest priority).
• If you cannot update immediately:
  • Enable a WAF and apply virtual patching rules for ocean_gallery_id.
  • Scan for stored scripts in posts and postmeta.
  • Temporarily restrict contributor privileges and tighten content moderation.
• Audit logs for suspicious activity and rotate sensitive keys if exploitation is suspected.
• Harden development and deployment practices to prevent recurrence.

Closing notes from Hong Kong security experts

Stored XSS vulnerabilities can remain dormant until the right victim visits an infected page. In editorial environments where multiple contributors interact with the CMS, an attacker needs only one successful injection to impact privileged users. Treat this incident as operational: patch quickly, reduce the number of users who can inject content, monitor for abuse, and validate content hygiene in staging.

If you require hands-on assistance for scanning, virtual patching or forensic analysis, engage a trusted security consultant or incident response firm. Rapid, methodical action will limit damage and restore a safe operating posture.