TL;DR

An SSRF vulnerability affecting TableMaster for Elementor versions ≤ 1.3.6 (CVE-2025-14610) was publicly disclosed on 28 January 2026. An authenticated user with Author privileges can supply a csv_url parameter that causes the site to fetch arbitrary URLs. Although exploitation requires an Author account, the risk is real: internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or other server-accessible resources can be probed or exfiltrated.

Immediate actions:

• Update TableMaster for Elementor to version 1.3.7 or later (patch available).
• If you cannot update immediately, apply mitigations described below (restrict CSV import, tighten author permissions, block egress to metadata and private IPs, and deploy WAF rules to block suspicious csv_url targets).
• Hunt for signs of exploitation in logs and egress monitoring (indicators listed below).

Practical note from a Hong Kong security perspective: in shared and cloud-hosted environments common in Hong Kong and the region, metadata access and internal services are routinely reachable from the web server; treat SSRF as a high-priority configuration risk even when the CVSS appears moderate.

Background — what went wrong

The plugin’s CSV import accepts a csv_url parameter. When processing imports, the plugin forwards the supplied URL to WordPress HTTP functions (for example, wp_remote_get()) or cURL without adequate validation. This lets an authenticated Author cause the server to perform HTTP(S) requests to arbitrary destinations.

Why this matters:

• Servers typically can reach internal-only networks and addresses (127.0.0.1, private CIDRs, and link-local addresses such as 169.254.169.254). An SSRF can map or probe these resources.
• Cloud metadata endpoints (for example, the AWS metadata service at 169.254.169.254) may return temporary credentials or secrets if queried successfully.
• An SSRF originating from an Author account can be chained with other weaknesses to achieve information disclosure or privilege escalation.

The issue was fixed in TableMaster for Elementor 1.3.7. The CVSSv3 score published for this issue is 5.5 (Medium). The required privilege is Author, but the practical impact depends on the hosting environment and what internal services are reachable.

Who is at risk?

• Sites running TableMaster for Elementor version 1.3.6 or earlier.
• Sites that permit user accounts with the Author capability.
• Sites hosted on cloud platforms (AWS, GCP, Azure) where metadata endpoints are reachable from the VM instance.
• Sites with internal services accessible from the web server (localhost or private network).

Sites not using the plugin are not affected. Sites that have disabled CSV import or restricted it to Administrators have a much lower risk surface.

Attack scenarios and examples (high level)

Below are defender-focused, high-level scenarios — step-by-step exploit instructions are intentionally omitted.

1. Reconnaissance and internal scanning:
   A malicious Author supplies a csv_url pointing to internal addresses (for example, http://127.0.0.1:8080/). The server’s fetches reveal internal services and open ports.
2. Cloud metadata access (high impact):
   On cloud VMs the server may reach the metadata API (commonly at 169.254.169.254); an SSRF there can reveal temporary credentials, enabling cloud compromise.
3. Exploiting misconfigured internal services:
   Admin UIs, management APIs or HTTP-enabled databases on localhost or the private network can be queried, returning sensitive data or allowing configuration changes.
4. Server-side chaining:
   SSRF responses might contain tokens or credentials that are then used to access external systems, enabling data exfiltration or lateral movement.

Because the vulnerable parameter is csv_url, an attacker can use otherwise benign-looking import requests to command server-side discovery calls.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and detection signals

Look for these signals in logs and monitoring systems:

• Requests to plugin import endpoints that include a csv_url parameter referencing private IP ranges, 169.254.169.254, localhost, or non-HTTP schemes (for example file://).
• Unexpected outbound HTTP(S) connections from your web server to internal IP ranges or the cloud metadata address.
• Spikes in outbound connections originating from PHP processes (mod_php, php-fpm) correlated with import requests.
• Web server logs showing Author accounts performing import actions they normally would not.
• Application logs with failures or stack traces from wp_remote_get() or cURL when fetching user-supplied URLs.
• Suspicious content in temporary CSV files or unexpected records created after imports.

Search examples:

• Search web server access logs for occurrences of csv_url= and inspect the destination hosts.
• Filter egress logs or firewall logs for outbound connections from the web server to private ranges or 169.254.169.254.
• Audit database changes and recent imports for anomalous entries following import requests.

Immediate mitigation (what to do right now)

1. Update the plugin (preferred):
   Update TableMaster for Elementor to version 1.3.7 or later. This is the only remedy that fully removes the vulnerability in the plugin codepath.
2. If you cannot update immediately — compensating controls:
   • Disable CSV import or restrict it to Administrator accounts only.
   • Temporarily deactivate the plugin if updates are impossible in the short term.
   • Harden Author permissions: reduce the number of users with Author capability; consider demoting to Contributor until patched.
   • Block outbound access from your web server to cloud metadata endpoints and private CIDRs using host-level egress controls (iptables, ufw), or via cloud security groups and network ACLs. Blocking egress to 169.254.169.254 removes the most damaging SSRF vector in cloud environments.
   • Deploy WAF rules to detect and block requests containing the csv_url parameter that point to internal/private ranges or use forbidden schemes.
3. Monitor and hunt:
   Inspect logs for the indicators above. Rotate any cloud credentials or server-side tokens you suspect may have been exposed and perform a scoped incident response if evidence of exploitation exists.

Recommended hardening and longer-term controls

• Least privilege for users and plugins: Only grant Author or higher when strictly required; use Contributor for content submission without publish/import capabilities.
• Outbound egress restrictions: Restrict HTTP(S) egress from web servers to only the domains required. At minimum, block private IP ranges and link-local addresses from web server processes.
• Secure development practices for plugins: Validate and sanitize inbound URLs, allowlist domains, enforce scheme checks (prefer HTTPS), and perform DNS resolution checks against deny/allow lists.
• Capability checks and nonces: Ensure network fetch actions verify current_user_can() and use WordPress nonces.
• Timeouts and size limits: Apply strict timeouts and response size limits on wp_remote_get() to avoid resource exhaustion.
• Logging: Log original requests and target hosts to support forensic reconstruction.

Concrete WAF rules and recommendations

Below are defensive recipe examples you can adapt to your WAF (ModSecurity example and generic pseudo-rules). Test in staging or monitor mode first to avoid false positives.

1) Block requests where csv_url points to cloud metadata or local addresses (ModSecurity example)

# Example ModSecurity rule: block csv_url pointing to internal ranges or metadata
SecRule REQUEST_URI|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS|REQUEST_BODY "@rx csv_url" "id:100001,phase:2,pass,log,ctl:ruleEngine=DetectionOnly,msg:'csv_url parameter present - inspect target',chain"
    SecRule &ARGS:csv_url "@gt 0" "chain"
        SecRule ARGS:csv_url "@rx (127\.0\.0\.1|localhost|10\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|192\.168\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|169\.254\.169\.254|file:|gopher:)" "id:100002,phase:2,deny,log,status:403,msg:'Blocked potential SSRF via csv_url to internal or metadata address'"

Explanation:

• First rule detects presence of csv_url.
• Second chained rule inspects the value for internal IPs, metadata address, or forbidden schemes.
• Use pass and log initially, then switch to deny after validating false-positive rates.

2) Generic WAF pseudo-rule (GUI WAF or managed WAF)

If (param_name == "csv_url") AND (param_value matches PRIVATE_IP_REGEX OR contains "169.254.169.254" OR scheme IN ["file","gopher"]) THEN block request (403) and log details.

Conditions to match:

• Parameter name equals csv_url (GET or POST).
• Parameter value matches private IP ranges (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16), 127.0.0.1, localhost, or 169.254.169.254, or uses forbidden schemes (file:, gopher:).

3) Allowlist approach

If ("csv_url" provided) AND (target domain NOT in ["trusted.example.com","cdn.trusted.example"]) THEN block.

Prefer allowlists where practical: only permit CSV imports from trusted hosting providers or storage endpoints.

4) Deny network fetches from non-admin users

At the application level, ensure import endpoints check current_user_can('manage_options') or another strict capability before performing network operations. Where possible, implement server-side checks before invoking the HTTP client.

5) Monitor outbound egress to metadata address

If outbound IP == 169.254.169.254 and source == web_server_process THEN alert and block.

Sample incident response playbook (if you suspect exploitation)

1. Contain
   • Disable or change credentials for the offending Author account immediately.
   • Apply WAF rules to block csv_url requests to internal addresses.
   • Restrict egress to metadata endpoints (block 169.254.169.254) at host or cloud network layer.
2. Preserve evidence
   • Collect web server access logs, PHP/FPM logs, plugin logs and any temporary CSV files.
   • Create snapshots or forensic images if a deep investigation is planned.
3. Investigate
   • Search logs for all occurrences of csv_url and review requested targets and responses.
   • Check for outbound connections to private networks or metadata addresses and review their responses.
   • Audit cloud IAM logs and rotate credentials if metadata access is suspected.
4. Remediate
   • Update the plugin to 1.3.7 or later.
   • Rotate exposed credentials and remove any persistence mechanisms found.
5. Recover and learn
   • Reassess user roles and plugin exposure.
   • Apply WAF controls and egress restrictions to prevent recurrence.
   • Document the incident and update response procedures.

Hardening checklist (quick summary)

• [ ] Update TableMaster for Elementor to 1.3.7 (or remove plugin if unused).
• [ ] Review all accounts with Author or higher privileges; reduce where possible.
• [ ] Restrict CSV import to Administrators only (or disable until patched).
• [ ] Add WAF rules to block csv_url to private ranges and metadata IPs.
• [ ] Block outbound access to 169.254.169.254 and other internal ranges from web servers.
• [ ] Audit logs for csv_url access patterns; search for recent suspicious imports.
• [ ] Rotate cloud credentials if metadata access might have occurred.
• [ ] Add monitoring/alerts for outbound requests to internal ranges.

Why this is actionable for managed hosts and site owners

Features that fetch remote resources on behalf of users must validate inputs and be environment-aware. Site owners often assume the web server cannot pivot into internal systems — SSRF disproves that assumption. Managed hosts and operators can reduce risk by restricting plugin functionality by role, applying egress filtering, and using WAF rules to block known exploit patterns while updates are deployed.

If you work with a hosting or security team, coordinate the update and mitigation steps: host-level blocks and egress rules are typically the fastest way to stop active exploitation while you apply the plugin fix.

Frequently asked questions

Q: The vulnerability requires Author privileges — is that difficult for an attacker to obtain?

A: Not necessarily. If your site allows registrations, self-assigned roles, or has weak onboarding controls, attackers may gain Author access. Compromise of legitimate Author accounts is also a real path. Monitor user role assignments and restrict Author capability where possible.

Q: If I update to 1.3.7, am I completely safe?

A: Updating the plugin removes this vulnerability, but residual risks remain if your environment permits metadata access or has weak roles or other vulnerable components. Apply the hardening checklist in addition to updating.

Q: Should I block all outbound HTTP from my web server?

A: Blocking all outbound egress is the most secure posture but may break legitimate functionality (updates, plugin APIs, remote uploads). A practical approach is to whitelist only required domains and block everything else, or at minimum block private and link-local ranges plus metadata addresses.

Technical notes for developers

• Validate remote URL inputs using a robust URL parser; enforce scheme restrictions (allow HTTPS only) and perform DNS resolution to inspect the resolved IP address (both IPv4 and IPv6).
• Disallow requests to private IP ranges, loopback, link-local, and cloud metadata addresses.
• Use strict capability checks and nonces for actions that initiate network fetches.
• Set tight timeouts and maximum response sizes on wp_remote_get() to avoid resource exhaustion.
• Log target hosts of remote fetches to enable forensic investigation if required.
• Return benign error messages on validation failures so internal validation details are not leaked to attackers.

Closing notes — practical priorities

1. Update TableMaster for Elementor to 1.3.7 as the top priority.
2. If you cannot update immediately, apply mitigations: restrict CSV import, block egress to metadata and private IPs, and apply WAF rules.
3. Hunt for suspicious csv_url activity in logs and check for outbound connections to metadata or internal addresses.
4. Reduce Author role proliferation: only trusted users should hold roles that can trigger server-side fetches.

We will continue to monitor disclosures and publish guidance and rule examples. If you need assistance with detection, rule configuration, or incident response, engage your security or hosting team promptly.

References and further reading

• CVE: CVE-2025-14610 (TableMaster for Elementor ≤ 1.3.6 — SSRF via csv_url).
• Plugin action: Update TableMaster for Elementor to 1.3.7 or later.
• Guidance: SSRF defenses, metadata endpoint protection, egress filtering.