Local File Inclusion in “Category and Product Woocommerce Tabs” (<= 1.0) — What Every Site Owner Needs to Know

On 17 November 2025 a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability (CVE‑2025‑13088) was disclosed in the WordPress plugin “Category and Product Woocommerce Tabs” affecting versions <= 1.0. The vulnerability permits an authenticated user with Contributor privileges or higher to trigger inclusion of arbitrary local files. Below I explain the risk, likely attack paths, detection signals, and practical hardening steps you can apply immediately. This analysis is written from the perspective of a Hong Kong–based security expert experienced in WordPress incident response.

Summary (TL;DR)

• Vulnerability: Local File Inclusion (LFI) in plugin versions <= 1.0 — CVE‑2025‑13088.
• Required privilege: Contributor role or higher (authenticated).
• Immediate risk: Low-to-medium for many sites, but can escalate to exposure of sensitive files (wp-config.php, .env, logs) and — in some hosting setups — remote code execution.
• Immediate actions: Identify affected sites, deactivate or remove the plugin if possible, restrict Contributor accounts, enforce least privilege, apply virtual patching via a WAF where available, and rotate secrets if compromise is suspected.
• Longer term: Harden inclusion patterns, apply secure coding practices, and implement continuous monitoring and incident response processes.

Why this issue matters

LFI vulnerabilities occur when application input controls which file path is included, required, or read without proper validation. An attacker who can control the path may retrieve sensitive files (database credentials, private keys) or, under certain server configurations and writeable directories, chain the issue to remote code execution. What makes this situation notable is the required privilege: a Contributor can reach admin endpoints on many sites. On sites that accept guest authors or external content, Contributor accounts are common and can be abused.

Vulnerability details (high level)

• Affected software: WordPress plugin “Category and Product Woocommerce Tabs”.
• Vulnerable versions: <= 1.0.
• Vulnerability type: Local File Inclusion (LFI).
• CVE: CVE‑2025‑13088.
• Required privileges: Contributor (authenticated).
• Reported by: security researcher (credited).
• Fix status (at disclosure): No official plugin fix available at time of disclosure.

How LFI typically works (technical explanation, no exploit code)

Often a plugin endpoint accepts a parameter (for example tab, template, file, or path) and performs a direct include or require using that parameter:

include plugin_dir_path( __FILE__ ) . $_GET['tab'] . '.php';

If the plugin fails to validate or whitelist allowed values, an attacker can pass directory traversal sequences or absolute paths to read files outside the intended directory:

?tab=../../../../wp-config

Because the attacker is authenticated (Contributor or higher), they can reach admin endpoints and may bypass protections that prevent unauthenticated access. If the web server returns file contents, attackers can extract secrets such as DB credentials or API keys. On servers with insecure PHP settings (for example allow_url_include enabled) or writable web folders, the chain may escalate to code execution.

Possible impact and attack scenarios

• Disclosure of wp-config.php or other files containing DB credentials. With DB credentials an attacker can extract user data, escalate privileges, or inject content.
• Disclosure of private keys, SMTP credentials, API keys, or backups.
• Abuse of LFI to include log files that contain attacker‑controlled payloads, possibly allowing code execution when combined with other weaknesses.
• Post‑exploitation activities such as creating admin users, installing backdoors, or lateral movement to other sites on the same server.
• Supply‑chain risk: widespread use of the plugin across many sites increases the blast radius for attackers who can use accounts with Contributor access.

Why Contributor privilege matters

Contributors can typically:

• Create and edit posts (which might include uploads depending on settings or plugin functionality).
• Access certain admin pages where the plugin hooks in.
• Trigger server interactions that unauthenticated users cannot.

Many sites have multiple contributors, including contractors and guest authors. Treat Contributor accounts as potentially risky and apply least-privilege principles.

Risk rating notes

The published CVSS score for this entry is 7.5 (High). Although authentication is required, the technical impact (confidentiality, integrity) is significant: disclosure of wp-config.php can lead rapidly to full site compromise depending on hosting and permissions. Prioritise mitigation even when immediate RCE is not evident.

Immediate, step‑by‑step mitigation (what to do right now)

1. Identify affected sites
   • Search single‑site and network installations for the plugin slug category-and-product-woocommerce-tabs or the plugin folder name.
   • Use inventories and management tools to locate the plugin in staging and production.
2. Take the plugin offline
   • Deactivate the plugin across impacted sites if you can. Deactivation prevents vulnerable code from executing.
   • If deactivation is not immediately possible, consider renaming the plugin folder via SFTP or restricting access to the plugin admin pages with webserver rules.
3. Restrict and review Contributor accounts
   • Temporarily lock down Contributor roles: reset passwords, require 2FA where available, and remove unknown or suspicious accounts.
   • Reduce the number of Contributors to the minimum necessary.
4. Apply virtual patching via a WAF or webserver rules
   • Deploy rules that block directory traversal and attempts to include local files, and restrict access to the plugin’s admin endpoints for low‑privilege roles.
   • If you use a WAF, enable managed rules that detect include‑style parameters and directory traversal patterns.
5. Harden server PHP and filesystem settings
   • Disable allow_url_include in PHP and use open_basedir to limit accessible directories when possible.
   • Restrict read access to wp-config.php and other sensitive files (for example 640 permissions and appropriate ownership).
   • Configure the webserver to deny direct access to files like .env or config backups.
6. Rotate secrets if exposure is suspected
   • If you see suspicious requests that indicate reads of wp-config.php or logs, rotate DB passwords and any exposed API keys or credentials.
7. Perform a full scan and forensic snapshot
   • Run a malware and integrity scan. Take filesystem and database snapshots for forensic analysis before making further changes.
   • If backdoors or unknown users are detected, consider restoring from a known‑good backup or rebuilding the site.
8. Monitor logs for Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
   • Look for requests to plugin endpoints carrying parameters like file, tab, template or path with traversal sequences (%2e%2e%2f or ../).
   • Alert on frequent or anomalous access to plugin pages from low‑privilege accounts.

Recommended virtual patch/WAF rules (examples)

Below are generic example patterns you can convert to your WAF syntax or hand to your hosting provider. Test rules in staging before production to avoid false positives.

• Block directory traversal patterns:
  • Pattern: (%2e%2e|../|%c0%ae%c0%ae|..%5c)
  • Action: Block or challenge
• Block attempts to access sensitive files:
  • Pattern: (wp-config\.php|/etc/passwd|\.env|\.git)
  • Action: Block and log
• Disallow .php in query parameters for admin/plugin endpoints:
  • Pattern: ([\?&][^=]+=.*\.php)
  • If request path matches the plugin admin path and a parameter contains .php → block
• Require valid nonces and capability checks for admin operations:
  • Enforce the presence of expected CSRF nonces for POST/GET administrative actions. Treat admin pages as requiring a valid logged‑in session and nonce.
• Rate limit authenticated users accessing plugin pages:
  • Throttle or block if a Contributor or other low‑privilege account triggers repeated include attempts.

Generic ModSecurity example (adapt and test before use):

SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS "@rx \.\./|\%2e\%2e|wp-config\.php|/etc/passwd|\.env" "id:100001,phase:2,deny,log,msg:'LFI Attempt - blocked'"

Detection: what to look for in logs and site behavior

• Requests to plugin admin pages with parameters named file, template, tab, or path containing traversal sequences (%2e%2e%2f, ../).
• Unexpected content displayed in the browser (for example system file contents).
• New admin accounts, changed user roles, or posts containing injected code.
• Unexpected outbound network connections from the site (possible data exfiltration or command-and-control traffic).
• Modified core files or unexpected PHP files under uploads or other writable directories.
• New cron jobs or scheduled tasks added by non‑admin users.

If you find evidence of compromise

1. Isolate the site: take it offline or block public access.
2. Preserve evidence: save logs, file snapshots, and DB exports.
3. Rotate all secrets: database credentials, API keys, third‑party credentials, and any stored SMTP credentials.
4. Rebuild or restore from a verified clean backup after thorough cleanup.
5. Re‑scan for persistence or backdoors and verify removal.
6. Notify stakeholders and customers as required by policy or regulation.

Developer guidance: how this should have been coded

From a secure‑coding perspective, avoid dynamic file includes based on user input. For file/path includes, apply these mitigations:

1. Whitelist allowed values

   Maintain a server‑side whitelist of allowed slugs and only include files when input matches that whitelist:

   $allowed_tabs = array( 'description', 'additional_info', 'reviews' );
   $tab = sanitize_text_field( $_GET['tab'] );
   if ( in_array( $tab, $allowed_tabs, true ) ) {
       include plugin_dir_path( __FILE__ ) . 'tabs/' . $tab . '.php';
   } else {
       // safe fallback
   }

2. Sanitize and normalize input

   Use WordPress sanitization functions (for example sanitize_text_field, sanitize_key) and validate that the resulting string contains only expected characters. Never allow slashes or dots.

3. Avoid including files by path where possible

   Use callbacks, handlers, or template-loading functions that map whitelisted names to known files rather than directly including a path provided by the user.

Hardening WordPress hosting environment

• Disable PHP execution in the uploads directory (use an .htaccess or webserver rule to deny .php execution in wp-content/uploads).
• Restrict filesystem permissions to least privilege (files 640/644, directories 750/755 as appropriate for your host).
• Use open_basedir to constrain PHP access to the WordPress directory where possible.
• Keep PHP and the webserver patched and up to date.
• Enforce 2FA for users with elevated privileges where possible.
• Limit plugin installation and editing to administrators. Consider disabling file editing in the admin (define DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT).

Why managed rules and virtual patching matter (neutral guidance)

When a plugin vulnerability is disclosed and an official fix is not yet available, managed WAF rules or server-level mitigations can provide virtual patching — blocking exploit attempts before they reach the vulnerable code. Benefits include immediate protection across sites and time to organise safe remediation without rushing code changes. If you use a WAF or host-provided rule set, ensure it covers LFI and directory traversal patterns and the specific plugin endpoints.

Detection & logging best practices

• Centralise logs: send webserver, PHP, and WAF logs to a hosted aggregator or SIEM for retention and alerting.
• Alert on suspicious admin requests: trigger alerts for non‑admin users accessing plugin admin pages with include-style parameters.
• Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes to core files, plugins, and uploads.
• Schedule automated malware and vulnerability scans to surface issues early.

Recovery checklist (if you suspect a breach)

• Isolate the site and preserve evidence.
• Restore from a clean backup if persistence or backdoors are found.
• Conduct thorough scans for backdoors, malicious scheduled tasks, and unauthorised users.
• Reissue credentials and keys, and review service accounts.
• Apply hardening measures: WAF rules, open_basedir, file permission adjustments.
• Perform a post‑incident review and implement process improvements (fewer Contributors, stronger vetting, better monitoring).

Long‑term defence‑in‑depth recommendations

1. Plugin governance
   • Install plugins from reputable sources and maintain an inventory of plugins and versions.
   • Remove unused or abandoned plugins.
2. Principle of least privilege
   • Grant Contributor/Editor/Admin roles only when necessary and revoke rights for inactive users.
3. Automated patching and monitoring
   • Apply security updates promptly in test/staging, then production. Use CI/CD pipelines and automated tests where possible.
4. Layered protections
   • Host-level hardening (permissions, PHP config), application WAF rules, file integrity monitoring, malware scanning, and regular backups.
5. Developer training & secure coding
   • Train plugin developers on whitelisting inputs, avoiding dynamic includes, using nonce and capability checks, and sanitising input.

Signs you may have been exploited via LFI

• Unexpected disclosure of file contents in the browser.
• Strange new files under the uploads directory (for example .php webshells).
• New admin users or unexpected database changes.
• Outbound connections to unknown hosts or C2 infrastructure.
• Unusual traffic spikes to plugin endpoints.

A practical sample detection query (logs)

Search access logs for plugin path requests containing traversal patterns or expected parameter names:

GET /wp-admin/admin.php?page=category-and-product-tabs&tab=../../wp-config.php HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: ...

Encoded traversal examples:
%2e%2e%2f, %252e%252e%252f, %2e%2e%5c

If you observe these patterns, escalate to incident response immediately.

Frequently asked questions (short)

Q: If my site uses this plugin, do I need to panic?

A: No panic, but act quickly. Deactivate the plugin if possible, or deploy suitable WAF/webserver rules. Review Contributor accounts and rotate credentials if you suspect a read of sensitive files.

Q: Can a Contributor actually take over my site?

A: LFI alone does not always yield immediate takeover, but disclosure of wp-config.php could allow database access and subsequent takeover. In hosts with writable web directories or insecure PHP settings, the risk is higher.

Q: Is there an official plugin update?

A: At the time of disclosure an official fix may not be available. Apply vendor patches when they are published and tested. Until then rely on the mitigations described above.

Closing thoughts

LFI remains one of the most impactful classes of vulnerabilities in PHP applications. The combination of authenticated access (Contributor) and insecure include logic creates an attractive vector for attackers. Defenders can reduce risk quickly by removing the vulnerable plugin, applying WAF or server-side virtual patches, restricting Contributor privileges, locking down server configs (for example open_basedir), and monitoring for suspicious activity.

If you need assistance applying virtual patches across multiple sites, configuring WAF rules, or performing incident response after suspected abuse, engage a trusted security consultant or your internal security team. Treat plugin vulnerabilities seriously — a single compromised Contributor account can lead to disproportionate damage.

Stay vigilant.