Urgent: IDOR in “Wishlist and Save for later for WooCommerce” (≤ 1.1.22) — What WordPress Site Owners Need to Know

Published: 12 November 2025  |  CVE: CVE-2025-12087  |  Severity: Low (CVSS 4.3)  |  Affected versions: ≤ 1.1.22  |  Fixed in: 1.1.23

Summary: an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) in the wishlist deletion functionality allows an authenticated user with Subscriber-level privileges to delete wishlist items owned by other users. This note is written from the perspective of a Hong Kong security practitioner: concise, practical and focused on actions site owners and developers can take immediately.

Quick summary

• What happened: The wishlist deletion endpoint did not verify ownership of the target item. An authenticated user can manipulate the identifier and delete another user’s wishlist entry.
• Impact: Data integrity and privacy — other users’ wishlist items can be removed. This can be used for nuisance attacks, targeted sabotage, or as part of multi-step abuse.
• Exploitable by: Any authenticated account with Subscriber privileges or higher.
• CVE: CVE-2025-12087
• Fix: Update the plugin to version 1.1.23 or later, which adds proper server-side authorization checks.
• Immediate priority: Update the plugin as the primary corrective action; if immediate update is not possible, apply temporary mitigations (see below).

What is an IDOR — simply explained

An IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) is a broken access-control issue. The application uses a client-supplied identifier (for example item_id=123) to locate and act on a resource without confirming the requester is authorised to do so. If IDs are guessable or enumerable, low-privilege accounts can access or modify objects they do not own.

In this case the wishlist deletion handler accepted an item identifier and removed the record without a server-side ownership check, allowing Subscriber accounts to delete other users’ wishlist items.

Why this vulnerability matters

Although the CVSS score is low because exploitation requires authentication and the action is limited to deletion of wishlist entries, the practical consequences can be significant:

• Customer trust and conversion may suffer if wishlists disappear unexpectedly.
• Targeted sabotage or repeated nuisance actions degrade user experience.
• IDORs can be chained with other flaws to escalate impact in larger attack sequences.
• Presence of one access-control omission often indicates inconsistent security checks elsewhere.

How an attacker could (realistically) exploit this

• Requires a valid account on the site (Subscriber is sufficient).
• Attacker sends deletion requests to the wishlist endpoint with manipulated item identifiers.
• If identifiers are predictable (incrementing IDs), they can be enumerated and abused at scale with simple scripts.
• Automated tools can amplify the impact across many accounts and items.

Note: public disclosure here omits exploit code or step-by-step PoC. The purpose is mitigation and detection guidance rather than facilitating misuse.

Immediate mitigation steps for site owners (what to do now)

1. Update the plugin. The vendor released version 1.1.23 which contains the corrective authorization checks. Applying the update is the definitive fix. Test in staging where possible, but prioritise timely deployment for security fixes.
2. If you cannot update immediately — apply temporary mitigations:
   • Apply virtual patching via your WAF or edge/hosting provider if available: block or rate-limit suspicious deletion requests to the affected endpoint.
   • Block or challenge requests from newly registered accounts, suspicious IPs, or requests exhibiting parameter-tampering patterns.
   • Restrict the wishlist deletion endpoint to authenticated requests validated with a server-side nonce or to roles higher than Subscriber until the plugin is updated (if business requirements permit).
3. Harden registration and account creation: enforce email verification, add CAPTCHA/human verification on registration, and consider manual review for high-risk sites to raise the cost of creating large numbers of Subscriber accounts.
4. Improve logging and monitoring: log wishlist deletion events (endpoint, acting user ID, target item ID, IP, user agent) and monitor for spikes, repeated deletions, or many accounts deleting the same items.
5. Communicate with customers carefully: if abuse is detected, notify affected users, explain remediation steps taken and restoration options if available. Be factual; avoid alarmist language.
6. Restore data when feasible: recover wishlist data from backups or exports if available. Balance data integrity versus re-introducing unintended changes when restoring.
7. Rotate credentials when needed: if wider compromise is suspected, rotate API keys, reset administrative passwords and invalidate active sessions.

How virtual patching and layered measures reduce risk while you update

Where an immediate plugin update is impractical, layered defensive measures reduce exploitability:

• Virtual patching rules at the WAF/edge can block requests that lack a valid nonce, contain obvious enumeration patterns, or originate from suspicious sources.
• Rate-limiting and behavioural controls limit automated enumeration and mass-deletion attempts.
• Stronger account-creation protections prevent attackers from spinning up many low-privilege accounts used to abuse the endpoint.
• Comprehensive logging and alerting help detect suspicious activity quickly so you can respond before large-scale impact occurs.

Detection: signs you may have been targeted or exploited

• Sudden disappearance of wishlist items for multiple users in a short timeframe.
• Deletion entries in logs where the acting user ID does not match the owner of the deleted item.
• High volumes of deletion requests from a single IP or small IP set.
• Many new Subscriber accounts immediately issuing deletion requests.
• Frequent error responses from wishlist endpoints (may indicate scanning/enumeration).

Where to look: webserver access logs, application/plugin logs, database audit logs (if available), and edge/WAF logs for blocked attempts and anomalies.

Incident response checklist

1. Apply the plugin update (1.1.23+) immediately.
2. Enable or implement virtual patching rules at the WAF/edge to stop further exploitation.
3. Collect and preserve logs (webserver, WP, WAF) for forensic review; copy to a secure location.
4. Identify affected accounts and determine the scope and timeframe of deletions.
5. Restore data from backups where feasible.
6. Notify affected users with clear remediation steps if their data was impacted.
7. Rotate credentials and invalidate sessions if a broader compromise is suspected.
8. Run a full site scan for malware/backdoors.
9. Review and tighten account creation flows and anti-bot measures.
10. Document the incident, timeline, and lessons learned. Feed this into your change and release process.

Practical developer guidance — avoid repeating this mistake

Developers maintaining plugins or custom endpoints should adopt the following secure coding practices:

• Enforce server-side ownership checks on every object-modifying operation. Example: fetch object by ID and verify object.owner_id == current_user_id (or the appropriate capability) before modification or deletion.
• Do not rely on client-supplied user identifiers; always derive ownership from server-side state.
• Use non-predictable identifiers where appropriate (opaque tokens or UUIDs), but do not treat them as a substitute for authorization checks.
• Leverage WordPress capability checks (current_user_can()) and enforce wp_verify_nonce() for state-changing actions to reduce risk of CSRF-assisted abuse.
• Apply the principle of least privilege — limit operations to the minimum capabilities required for each role.
• Centralise authorization logic to reduce the chance of missed checks across endpoints.
• Log sensitive operations (acting user, target object, timestamp, request origin) to support detection and forensics.
• Include role-based permission testing in QA (test as Subscriber, Contributor, Editor, Admin) and include IDOR scenarios in threat models.

Conceptual WAF/virtual-patching guidance (safe, non-exploitative)

Use these high-level patterns when configuring WAF rules or edge filters — avoid publishing any exploit payloads.

• Block or challenge requests to the wishlist deletion endpoint that lack a valid nonce or sensible referer header.
• Flag requests that contain sequential numeric IDs and enforce rate limits or CAPTCHA challenges for such patterns.
• Rate-limit deletion operations per account and per IP (for example, max 5 deletions per 10 minutes).
• Challenge or block actions from newly created accounts (e.g., age < X hours) that attempt deletion operations.
• Alert on and investigate patterns where many different accounts delete the same target item IDs.

Why the plugin fix in 1.1.23 is correct

A proper fix for this class of bug includes:

• Server-side verification that the wishlist item belongs to the requesting user before deletion.
• Use of WordPress capabilities (current_user_can()) or explicit owner checks for object operations.
• CSRF protection with server-verified nonces for state-changing requests.
• Audit logging for delete actions to support detection and investigation.

The vendor’s update (1.1.23) implements these checks; applying the update is the recommended corrective action.

Recommendations for hosting providers and agencies

• Push critical security updates promptly and notify clients about the issue and remediation steps.
• Offer temporary virtual patching or edge-layer rules for clients that cannot update immediately.
• Provide remediation support: log collection, site scanning, and help with restoration where needed.
• Enforce rate limits at the server or edge layer to reduce automated enumeration and mass deletions.

Long-term hardening roadmap (for stores with many plugins/custom code)

• Maintain a risk register of plugins and track update status for high-risk components.
• Automate staging updates and a short, auditable promotion path to production.
• Minimise the number of administrative accounts and use role-based access control.
• Keep regular backups and a tested restore process.
• Regularly audit custom endpoints and third-party integrations for access-control issues.

Frequently asked questions

Is this vulnerability remote-code execution or site takeover?

No. This is an access-control (IDOR) issue that allows deletion of wishlist items. It does not directly enable remote code execution or full site takeover, though it can be abused for nuisance or as part of a chained attack.

Do attackers need to be logged in?

Yes. An authenticated account with Subscriber-level privileges or higher is required.

Will updating automatically restore deleted wishlist items?

No. Updating prevents further exploitation but does not restore already-deleted data. Use backups or exports for restoration.

Can I detect past misuse?

Check logs for unusual deletion patterns and mismatched acting-user vs. owner pairs. Database and application logs are the best source for retrospective investigation.

I manage many client sites — how should I prioritise this?

Prioritise public-facing e-commerce and high-traffic stores. The vulnerability requires an authenticated account but can impact customer experience and conversions; apply WAF mitigations while scheduling updates.

Closing thoughts — Hong Kong security practitioner perspective

Access-control errors like IDORs are common and usually avoidable. They often result from incorrect assumptions in design (for example, “only the owner will call this endpoint”). In the real world, attackers automate requests, create accounts at scale, and look for predictable identifiers.

For operators of WooCommerce stores: apply the plugin update (1.1.23+) promptly; if immediate update is not feasible, apply layered protections (edge/WAF rules, rate-limiting, stronger registration controls) and improve logging so you can detect and respond quickly. Use this event as an opportunity to review authorization logic across custom code and other plugins.

If you need help assessing risk, implementing mitigations or performing incident response, engage a qualified security professional or your hosting provider’s security team. Prioritise safety and clear communication with affected users.