My Auctions Allegro (<= 3.6.31) Authenticated Admin SQL Injection (CVE-2025-10048) — What WordPress Site Owners Must Do

Summary

• A SQL injection vulnerability affects My Auctions Allegro plugin versions up to and including 3.6.31 (CVE-2025-10048).
• Exploitation requires an authenticated Administrator account. If an attacker obtains or already controls such credentials, the impact can be severe.
• A fix is available in version 3.6.32. Updating is the definitive remediation.
• If immediate updating is not possible, access restrictions, credential hygiene and virtual patching significantly reduce risk.

Note: Credit for discovery: researcher “tmrswrr”. Published: 10 October 2025. CVE: CVE-2025-10048.

Quick risk at a glance

• Affected software: My Auctions Allegro plugin for WordPress
• Versions: <= 3.6.31
• Fixed in: 3.6.32
• Vulnerability type: SQL Injection
• Privilege required: Administrator (authenticated)
• CVSS: 7.6 (high/important, although exploit requires admin access)
• Primary impact: Database read/write access, data disclosure, possible site takeover via DB-driven user creation or privilege escalation

What exactly is this vulnerability?

The plugin accepts administrator-supplied input in admin-side actions and concatenates that input into SQL queries without adequate sanitization or prepared statements. Because those queries run with the WordPress database user’s privileges, crafted input can execute arbitrary SQL.

Exploitation is constrained to authenticated admin traffic. That reduces the window for direct unauthenticated attacks, but many compromises begin with credential theft (phishing, reused passwords), session hijacking, or a malicious admin. Once an attacker can make a crafted admin request, they can exfiltrate wp_users, wp_options and other sensitive tables, or insert rows that establish persistent backdoors (for example, creating a new admin user in wp_users).

I will not publish exploit payloads or step-by-step instructions. The responsible disclosure cycle concluded with release 3.6.32 — update the plugin as soon as practical.

Why this still matters even though exploitation needs an admin user

• Admin credentials are commonly compromised: phishing, password reuse and stolen session cookies are frequent.
• Pivot potential: An attacker who gains any admin foothold can use SQLi to escalate and solidify access.
• Data sensitivity: WordPress sites often store PII, commerce data and API keys that can be exfiltrated via SQLi.
• Persistence: SQL-level changes (new users, altered options, injected templates) are hard to detect and survive updates if not cleaned properly.

Realistic attack scenarios

1. Phished admin credentials → attacker logs in → sends crafted request to the plugin admin endpoint → use SQLi to dump wp_users and create a backdoor admin.
2. Compromised admin workstation (keylogger or session hijack) → attacker uses active admin session to trigger the vulnerable action → escalates to database access.
3. Malicious third‑party admin (contractor or insider) intentionally abuses admin pages to exfiltrate commercial or customer data.

Typically the attack proceeds in two steps: initial admin compromise, then SQLi to expand control or persist access.

How to detect if your site has been targeted

Immediate Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) to check:

• Unexpected new admin accounts in Users (odd email addresses / display names).
• Unexplained changes to wp_options or recent edits to active theme/plugin files.
• Database errors in logs referencing plugin files, or unusual SQL query patterns if you log queries.
• Suspicious outgoing traffic shortly after admin activity.
• High frequency of admin-side POST/GET requests to plugin admin endpoints from unusual IPs or at odd hours.
• Login anomalies: successful admin logins from new IPs or geolocations after failed attempts.

Practical checks:

• Export wp_users and sort by user_registered to spot new accounts.
• Audit wp_options and wp_usermeta for new keys or odd serialized values.
• Inspect webserver and PHP logs for database errors tied to plugin paths.
• Check file modification timestamps for themes/plugins.
• If you have server logs or SIEM, search for admin-form POSTs containing SQL metacharacters (quotes, UNION, comments) to the plugin admin endpoints.

Immediate mitigations (apply now)

If you operate My Auctions Allegro (≤ 3.6.31), apply these steps immediately:

1. Update the plugin to 3.6.32. This is the definitive fix.
2. If you cannot update immediately:
   • Disable the plugin until you can update.
   • Restrict admin access: limit wp-admin to known IP ranges via host ACLs or web server rules (e.g., nginx allow/deny, Apache Require ip, or .htaccess where supported).
   • Enforce Two-Factor Authentication for all admin accounts.
   • Force password resets for all administrator accounts.
   • Reduce the number of administrators: demote or remove accounts that do not need admin rights and verify identities of remaining admins.
3. Virtual patching: If you operate a WAF or can configure request filtering, block admin requests that contain SQL-control characters or suspicious payloads to the plugin’s admin endpoints. Scope rules narrowly to avoid false positives.
4. Logging and backups: Increase logging for admin-side requests, take a full database backup and store it offsite before any remediation so you preserve evidence and enable rollbacks.

Virtual patching and managed protections (neutral guidance)

Virtual patching (edge or application-layer filters) reduces exposure while you deploy the official fix. Key points for administrators and hosts:

• Scope filters to the plugin admin paths (for example, requests to /wp-admin/admin.php or the specific plugin pages).
• Prefer rules that only apply to authenticated admin sessions to limit disruption to public traffic.
• Look for SQL metacharacters combined with admin-only actions in POST/GET variables: quotes, UNION/SELECT, comment tokens (/*, –), or injected numeric operators.
• Test rules in staging before production to avoid blocking legitimate admin workflows.

Example WAF rule considerations (for technical teams)

Guidelines you can provide to your hosting or security team. Validate in staging before deployment:

• Scope: Restrict to plugin admin paths only (avoid global rules).
• Condition: Trigger for authenticated admin sessions or when an admin nonce is present to reduce false positives.
• Match patterns: Typical SQL metacharacter sequences in POST/GET variables:
  • Single quote followed by SQL keywords (e.g., ‘ OR 1=1, UNION SELECT).
  • Comment tokens (/*, –).
  • Serialized payloads containing SQL fragments.
• Action: Return HTTP 403 or redirect to a safe admin page and log the full request for forensics.

Conceptual pseudo-rule (product syntax will vary):

IF request.path CONTAINS "/wp-admin" AND user.is_authenticated AND user.role == "administrator" AND (request.body MATCHES /(\bUNION\b|\bSELECT\b|--|/\*|\bor\b.*=|['"][^']*['"]\s*\bSELECT\b)/i) THEN block & log

Note: overly broad rules cause false positives — tune carefully.

Post-incident response checklist (if you suspect exploitation)

1. Isolate: Put the site into maintenance mode and block public access where possible to limit further damage.
2. Preserve evidence: Create a full copy of files and a DB dump for analysis without modifying them.
3. Rotate credentials: Force password reset for all admin/editor accounts and rotate API/integration keys stored in the DB or wp-config.
4. Scan and remediate: Search for modified files, webshells and suspicious admin pages. Restore modified plugin/theme files from clean sources where appropriate.
5. Audit the DB: Look for new users in wp_users, unexpected capabilities in wp_usermeta, and injected entries in wp_options.
6. Harden endpoints: Enforce 2FA and restrict admin access by IP where possible.
7. Apply the fix: Update My Auctions Allegro to 3.6.32 immediately.
8. Monitor: Maintain elevated logging for several weeks and review for repeated attempts or lateral movement.

If you lack in-house expertise, engage an experienced incident response provider to perform timeline reconstruction, remove backdoors and validate complete cleanup. Quick restoration without root-cause analysis risks persistent threats.

Long-term hardening recommendations

• Least privilege: Grant admin rights only to trusted individuals; use editor/author roles for routine tasks.
• Strong authentication: Enforce strong passwords and 2FA for every admin-level account.
• Plugin and theme hygiene: Keep plugins/themes updated; remove inactive plugins and unused themes from the filesystem; prefer well-maintained projects with recent updates.
• Site segmentation: Restrict wp-admin by IP where feasible; use separate admin accounts for different personnel.
• Backups and recovery planning: Maintain regular automated backups (files + DB) with offsite retention and periodic restore tests.
• Logging and monitoring: Centralize server and application logs and alert on suspicious admin activity and unusual DB queries.
• Virtual patching where needed: Keep request filters updated and tuned for your environment — they buy time but do not replace code fixes.

Frequently asked questions

Q: If I’m not running My Auctions Allegro, should I be concerned?

A: Only with respect to other vulnerable plugins you run. The broader lesson: any plugin that exposes admin functionality can contain vulnerabilities. Maintain a patching process and layered security posture.

Q: My site has many admins. What should I do now?

A: Immediately rotate admin passwords, enable 2FA, remove inactive admins, demote accounts where possible and monitor logs closely during credential rotation.

Q: Can a WAF fully replace updating the plugin?

A: No. A WAF or request-filtering can reduce exposure and buy time, but the correct long-term fix is to update the plugin to a secure version. Treat virtual patches as temporary measures.

Practical upgrade and verification steps

1. Put your site in maintenance mode (optional but recommended if you suspect compromise).
2. Backup files and database (via phpMyAdmin, WP-CLI: wp db export, or your host’s tools).
3. Verify plugin version: Dashboard → Plugins → My Auctions Allegro (or check plugin header files).
4. Update plugin:
   • From WP Admin: Plugins → Update now.
   • Or download 3.6.32 from the official source and install via FTP/SFTP if necessary.
5. Verify there are no suspicious admin accounts: Users → All Users. Remove unknown accounts or reset their passwords.
6. Run a full security scan (files + DB) and review results.
7. Remove any temporary request filters only after confirming the plugin is patched and stable. Keep permanent hardening (login protections, IP restrictions) active.
8. Re-enable normal site access once verified.

What to expect from plugin developers and disclosure timelines

Responsible disclosure practices vary, but you should expect:

• A prompt security patch from the plugin developer (this issue is fixed in 3.6.32).
• Potentially a changelog entry or advisory describing the fix.
• Interim mitigations such as documentation for administrators if they cannot update immediately.

Closing thoughts — pragmatic prioritisation

SQL injection is a powerful attack class. The silver lining here is that exploitation requires admin access, which is a chokepoint you can and should protect vigorously. In priority order:

1. Update My Auctions Allegro to 3.6.32 immediately.
2. If you cannot update right away — disable the plugin and apply tightly scoped request filtering and admin access restrictions.
3. Harden admin access: 2FA, IP restrictions, credential rotation and fewer admin accounts.
4. Monitor logs and take backups before and after changes.

If you need external help for incident response, restoration or forensic analysis, engage a qualified security provider with WordPress experience — ensure they follow a strict evidence preservation and root-cause methodology.

Stay vigilant: preventing attackers from obtaining admin access is the most effective way to stop vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-10048 from becoming a major incident.

Prepared by a Hong Kong-based security expert — practical, concise, and focused on rapid risk reduction for WordPress site owners.